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ABSTRACT 
 
 THE ELIMINATION OF ARMENIANS AND GREEKS AS PART OF TURKISH 
NATION BUILDING 
 
 
Sarah Miriam Moehr 
 
Turkish Studies, M.A. Thesis, 2011 
 
Asst. Prof. Dr. Banu Karaca 
 
 
Keywords : Armenians, minorities, national economy, nation building, Turkification 
 
 
Like many other instances of nation building, Turkish nation building was a violent 
process. However, accounts of it usually focus on its constructive side or deal only with 
aspects of its destructive side. 
 
This thesis analyzes secondary texts concerned with anti-minority policies and acts 
implemented and carried out with a view to nation building in Turkey in the period from 
the 1890s to the 1960s. It concentrates on how two minority populations, Armenians and 
Greeks, were affected by the two main goals of Turkish nation building: the 
homogenization of the population and the ‘nationalization’ of the economy. 
 
It shows that the expropriation, expulsion, killing and assimilation of Armenians and 
Greeks in Ottoman and Republican times were important factors in making the Turkish 
nation. It also shows how i) the removal of Armenians and Greeks from Turkish territory 
and ii) the disappearance of most of the former Armenian-Greek bourgeoisie, the 
appropriation of its property by the Turkish state and its Muslim citizens and the cooptation 
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of the know-how of the remaining minority businessmen contributed to the formation of the 
so-called national bourgeoisie. This process can also be related to the accumulation of 
Muslim-Turkish capital and to the homogenization of the population in Turkey in the early 
Republican era. Though the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) and Kemalist nation 
builders largely succeeded in homogenizing the population and in 'Turkifying' the 
economy, their actions seem to have had unintended consequences that negatively impacted 
the development of Turkish civil society, class formation, education and academia, living 
standards, industrialization, and the project of getting on a par with Europe. 
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ÖZET 
 
TÜRK ULUS DEVLET OLUŞUMU SÜRECĐNDE ERMENĐ VE RUM AZINLIKLARIN 
TASVĐYESĐ 
 
 
Sarah Miriam Moehr 
 
Türkiye Çalışmaları Yüksek Lisans Programı, 2011 
 
Yrd. Doç. Doc. Banu Karaca 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeleri: azınlıklar, Ermeniler, milli iktisat, Türkleştirme, ulus devlet oluşumu 
 
 
Türk ulus devletinin oluşumu başka bir çok ulus devlet inşası örneğinde de görülmüş 
olduğu gibi şiddet içeren bir süreçtir. Buna rağmen, bu sürecin tetkikinde bu prosenin 
olumlu taraflarına odaklanılmış ve menfi neticeleri incelememiştir.    
Bu tez 1890 ile 1960 yılları arasındaki dönemdeki azınlıklara karşı politikaları ve yasaları 
inceleyen kaynakları inceleyen çalışmadır. Özellikle Ermeni ve Rum azınlıkların Türk ulus 
devlet oluşumunun iki ana hedefinden olan nufüsün homojenleştirilmesi ve ekonominin 
‘ulusallaştılıması’ndan ne şekilde etkilendikleri odak alınacaktır.   
Bu tez Ermeniler ve Rumların istamlak, ihraç, katl ve assimilasyonunun Osmanlı ve 
Cumhuriyet dönemlerindeki Türkleştirme politikası çerçevesinde oynadığı önemli rolu  
gösterecektir. 
 
Ele alınacak iki ana mesele i) Ermeni ve Rumların Türk topraklarından ihracı, ve ii) 
Ermeni-Rum burjuvasinin büyük oranda yokedilişi, daha evvel bu gruba ait olan mal ve 
varlığın Türk Devleti ve Müslüman vatandaşları tarafından tahsisi ve Ermeni-Rum 
burjuvasından geri kalanların bilgi ve tecrübesinden yararlanılışının sözde ulusal 
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burjuvasının oluşumunundaki oynadığı roldur. Bu anlatım aynı zamanda erken Cumhuriyet 
dönemindeki Müslüman-Türk sermayasinin oluşum ve birikimi ve nüfusun 
homojenleştirilmesi bağlamında da uygulanabilir. Jön Türk ve Kemalist ulus devlet 
kurucuları nufüsün homojenleştirlimesi ve ekonominin Türkleştirilmesinde başarılı olmuş 
olsalar dahi, bu politikanın sonucu olarak Türk sivil toplumunun teşkili, sosyal sınıf 
oluşumu ve eğitim alanlarında olduğu gibi "muasır medeniyetlere ulaşma" projesinde de 
menfi gelişmeler meydana gelmiştir. 
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1. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
This thesis analyzes the expropriation, expulsion, killing and assimilation of 
Armenian and Greek Ottomans (and then Armenian and Greek citizens of Turkey) in the 
territory of Anatolia from the 1890s to the 1960s as part of Turkish nation building and as 
an important source of primitive capital accumulation in Turkey. It will show how i) the 
removal of Armenians and Greeks from Turkish territory and ii) the disappearance of most 
of the former Armenian-Greek bourgeoisie, the appropriation of its property by the Turkish 
state and its Muslim citizens and the cooptation of the know-how of the remaining minority 
businessmen contributed to the formation of the so-called national bourgeoisie, to the 
accumulation of capital and to the homogenization of the population in Turkey. 
The expropriation, killing and expulsion of several million Greek and Armenian 
Ottoman subjects and the repression and forced assimilation of those survivors that were 
permitted to stay within the state’s borders and to become Turkish citizens was thus an 
important component of Young Turk and Kemalist nation building. This knowledge is 
essential for understanding how Turkish nationalism and the Turkish nation took shape in 
the second half of the 20th century. 
Though the CUP and Kemalist nation builders largely succeeded in homogenizing the 
population and in 'Turkifying' the economy, their actions seem to have had unintended 
consequences that negatively impacted the development of Turkish civil society, class 
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formation, education and academia, living standards, industrialization, and the project of 
getting on a par with Europe. “The Turkish nation” that came into being was to a large 
degree the result of its leaders’ choices, planning and actions, though they acted under 
constraints. Had the Armenians and Greeks not been eliminated, the Turkish nation would 
look different today and would have different problems but also different assets.   
The Integrative Approach 
Many of the events and policies discussed here (for instance the Armenian genocide, 
the language reform of 1928 and the ‘6./7. Eylül 1955 olayları’), have been studied 
carefully and in great detail during the last decades. But what seems to be lacking in many 
of these studies is a sense that each of these events is only one piece in a big puzzle or one 
tragedy in a series of simultaneous, earlier and later tragedies that, among other reasons, 
took place because of a certain overarching ideology, Turkish nationalism.1 Studies of the 
Armenian genocide, for example, usually provide earlier massacres of Armenians as 
historical context (1895, 1909, and many smaller ones) but mention the simultaneous 
Assyrian genocide at best in passing and never the deportation and settlement of Muslim 
minorities.2 Yet both were aspects of the CUP’s interconnected, violent Turkification, 
motivated partly by nationalism and geared towards building a uniform nation.3 And the 
links extend beyond simultaneous policies and events, they reach far into Republican times: 
“In a sense the campaign of deportations and massacres exterminating hundreds of 
                                                 
1 An example of the integrative approach is the following: “The fate of the Armenians in 
the context of total war does not appear as an isolated monolith: it is shown as a part of a 
puzzle – marking the tip of the iceberg – of state violence and coercion aiming at the 
construction of a Turkish ethno-nation in Anatolia, in opposition to other political 
projects. Thus the experiences of expelled or ‘exchanged’ Orthodox Ottomans (Rum) and 
massacred Assyrians/Syriac (Süryani and Asuri) as well as of resettled Muslims and 
muhacir (refugees of the Balkan and Caucasus as they were assimilated into the Turkish 
nation in Anatolia) are taken as parts of the broad picture.”  Kieser and Plozza (2006: 48). 
2 One reason for the lack of historical context in many studies of the Armenian genocide, 
especially those written by Armenians, is the fear that any contextualization and historical 
comparison will diminish and relativize the Armenian genocide’s significance. 
3 Bjørnlund (2008: 41). 
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thousands of Ottoman Armenians in 1915, although predating the republic, constituted a 
precedent inspired by the same homogenizing logic.”4 This homogenizing logic would last 
at least into the 1960s (expulsion of most of the remaining Greeks), if not further.  
Üngör argues persuasively for studying all Turkification policies in context, since this 
gives us a better understanding of every one of them. He illustrates his point by giving the 
example of deportations: 
The relevance of studying CUP social engineering in its mutual interdependence 
lies in the notion that the deportations can function as control groups for each other. 
Ultimately, the separate policies were too interconnected to be understood in total 
isolation. Understanding the treatment of Armenians during the forced relocations 
requires contrasting it with the treatment of Kurds and Balkan Muslims during similar 
experiences. It then clearly appears that whereas Armenians were not given proper 
nutrition and rest during the endless marches, the Muslims were. Mass death was 
nothing to be fatalistic about, it was a consequence of deliberate choices and orders 
for rationing issued from Istanbul, and popular conduct only exacerbated the 
suffering. For a large part this can explain why hundreds of thousands of Armenians 
died of exhaustion and starvation in 1915, but hundreds of thousands of Muslims 
survived the same distances and heat in the same year, or later years, when, nota 
bene, the Empire had even less resources at its disposal. Also, colligating the 
Armenian genocide with the deportation of the Kurds and settlement of Turks 
strongly suggests that without the former, the latter could not have been financed and 
carried out to the extent it was.5 
 
About five, ten years ago researchers of the CUP and early Kemalist periods such as 
Dündar, Güven, Ülker, Üngör and Zürcher have begun to “emphasize the role of ‘ethnic 
reconfiguration’ or ‘demographic engineering’, the planned, interconnected, and proactive 
(as opposed to ‘accidental,’ isolated, or reactive) elements of these policies.”6 But a history 
of Turkey that gives the deserved emphasis to the destructive side of Turkish nation 
building remains yet to be written. Since the integrative approach is quite new, working on 
it is both exciting (lots of interesting questions, hypotheses to be confirmed or proven 
wrong) and challenging. There are relatively few studies that are available at the moment 
and a couple of very promising works are still in preparation as I am working on this piece, 
such as Üngör’s book The making of Modern Turkey: State and ation in Eastern Anatolia, 
                                                 
4 Özkırımlı and Sofos (2008:132).  
5 Üngör (2008: paragraph 34).  
6 Bjørnlund  (2008:42) 
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1913-50.7 The study of Turkish nation building through its treatment of minorities is also 
challenging because of its interdisciplinarity. It requires a good knowledge of Ottoman 
general history and economic history, of genocide and migration literature, of Jewish, 
Armenian, Greek and Kurdish history, of the histories of regions adjoining the Ottoman 
Empire, and could easily involve sociology, psychology, literary criticism and other 
disciplines (see Counting the Cost in chapter seven). Finally, a broad knowledge of 
languages (Ottoman, Turkish, and Armenian in addition to Greek, Ladino, European 
languages and possibly others) would also be required for archival work. This thesis brings 
together and analyzes secondary literature rather than sources. But this should not be seen 
as a shortcoming, since the format and scope are new. So far, almost all studies deal with 
single events, only few take the integrative approach and none explains what happened 
within the framework I have chosen.   
Organization of This Thesis 
This thesis takes one aspect of Turkish history, ‘the Turkish nation’, and shows how 
its construction depended upon the almost total elimination of the Christian minorities. 
Ideally, one would include all minorities to demonstrate how they were affected by Turkish 
nation building. But for reasons of space and time, I will concentrate in the second chapter 
on how minorities, most of them Muslim, were affected by demographic and economic 
changes.  The main part of this thesis (chapters four to seven) focuses on demographic and 
economic changes through the elimination of only two minorities, the Armenians and 
Greeks, over a period of roughly 70 years, from the late 19th to the mid-20th century.  
Rather than tell chronologically what happened to these two communities, I will 
distinguish between homogenization of the population and nationalization of the economy 
in the period up to 1923 and in the period starting in 1923, respectively, and analyze the 
events that took place or measures the government took (or aspects of them) under these 
headings. Many of the measures the state took to react to events and to realize its vision of 
                                                 
7 Üngör, Uğur Ümit 2011. The making of Modern Turkey: State and ation in Eastern 
Anatolia, 1913-50. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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the nation had a double effect: they contributed to the homogenization of the nation and to 
the Turkification of the economy. I will therefore deal with a few of these measures twice, 
once to illustrate their demographic effect and the second time to explain how they 
furthered the Turkification of the economy.  
I chose these two aspects of nation building because they had the biggest impact on 
the nation in the making, because they were the CUP’s declared goals and because they 
resurfaced again and again in the treatment of Armenians and Greeks in Republican times. 
Another reason why I distinguish between population policies and economic policies is that 
the latter is too often subsumed under the former, even though it is a crucial aspect of 
nation building and modernization (capital accumulation).  
However, this distinction should not obscure the fact that the policies described and 
analyzed under ‘homogenization of the population’ and ‘nationalization of the economy’ 
are intimately connected. For instance, someone was de facto expropriated after he was 
killed; and the withholding of Armenian property in the 1920s made Armenian returnees 
leave once again and forever which at the same time meant that the project of building a 
national economy had been advanced. These two dimensions of nation building also often 
stood in a causal relationship (some Armenians were deported to make room for the 
settlement of Muslim refugees in their homes). In order not to give the impression that the 
same outcome was the result of the same motivation or that the elimination of Armenians 
and Greeks happened in timeless space, the motivations and some historical or political 
context will be given with each instance of expulsion or appropriation. 
So the broad structure of this thesis is thematic, but on the micro level events are 
dealt with chronologically. The downside of this approach is that it requires the reader to 
know the order of events and that it breaks up the overall sequence of events and thereby 
obscures the interconnectedness of different measures and their dynamics. The advantage 
of my approach, though, is that it highlights the outcomes of acts and the continuity and 
changes within acts of the same kind.  
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Chapter Contents 
Chapter two outlines theories of nationalism and capital accumulation and relates 
them to the Ottoman-Turkish case. Chapter three is historical and divided into six periods 
of Ottoman-Turkish nation building from the late 19th to the mid-20th century. It includes 
many different minorities with the exception of the Armenians and Greeks who will be 
dealt with in detail in chapters four to seven.   
Chapters four and five cover two aspects of nation building, the homogenization of 
the population and the ‘nationalization’ of the economy. Chapter four deals with the former 
in the period between the 1890s and 1923, and specifically expulsion (Aegean Greeks 
1914, Greek-Armenian population exchange 1922/23), denaturalization, killing (Hamidiyan 
massacres 1894-6, Armenian genocide 1915-17) and institutional and non-institutional 
assimilation of Armenians and Greeks. As a result of these catastrophic events, around four 
million Armenians and Greeks disappeared from Turkey and largely lost their property. For 
Armenians, this constituted a severe attack on their very existence and it almost destroyed 
the non-Muslim bourgeoisie. For Turkey, it contributed to the homogenization of Anatolia 
(drop of the minority population from 20 per cent to two per cent) and to an increase in the 
percentage of Muslims working in the economy.  
Chapter five deals with the same period but a different aspect of nation building: the 
‘nationalization’ of the economy (ending minority privileges, discrimination against 
Armenians and Greeks, their expropriation, the state’s and individuals’ appropriation of 
their property, destruction and theft). It also asks in how far these acts were legal, what 
happened to their property, how it was meant to be assigned and how it was actually 
assigned, who benefited the most from its appropriation and what impact the elimination of 
Armenians and Greeks and the redistribution of their property had on economic life in 
Turkey. The chapter closes with a critique of the CUP’s nationalization policies and with 
what I call the Istanbul-Izmir paradox.  
Chapters six and seven cover the first five decades of the Turkish nation state. 
Chapter six focuses on the removal and assimilation of Armenians and Greeks up to the 
1960s. Constant steady pressure and discrimination (to only speak Turkish in public, 
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exclusion from state employment) and periodic harsh measures (killing and expulsion from 
the South  
east in the 1920s, denaturalization in the 1930s and 40s, the wealth tax in 1942-43, 
the pogrom of 6.-7. September 1955, expulsion and expropriation in 1964) led to waves of 
emigration until the number of the surviving Armenians and Greeks had dropped to less 
than 0.8 per cent. 
Chapter seven is about the Turkification of the economy in Republican times and 
deals with the economic effects of discrimination and expropriation, the wealth tax, and the 
events of 1955 and 1964. It argues that until mid-century, two parallel bourgeoisies were in 
existence and that the ‘national’ bourgeoisie only became successful after the last remnants 
of minority competition had been removed and minority business expertise had been co-
opted. This chapter also asks how the continuity from the 1910s to the 1960s can be 
explained, how successful Turkish nation building was and at what cost it came with regard 
to the development of civil society, class formation, education and academia, living 
standards, industrialization, and the project of getting on a par with Europe. Chapter eight 
concludes this thesis. 
ation Building 
Nation building offers the most persuasive explanation for the (mis)treatment of 
minorities in Turkey or the Turkish part of the Ottoman Empire from the late 19th century 
to the mid-20th century. For certain events or with a different focus, though, other 
explanations are equally good or even better. Thus Levene’s thesis that Eastern Anatolia 
became a zone of genocide because its traditional, multi-ethnic societies were subjected to 
the West’s political, economic and ideological pressures (secularism, liberalism, 
nationalism) which first impeded and then cancelled out pluralist accommodation and 
which led to several genocides in an area where there had not been major intercommunal 
massacres in centuries8 is entirely valid. So is the case for greed in the expropriation of the 
                                                 
8 Levene (1998: 398 and 419).  
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rich Arabic-speaking Greek-Orthodox of Cilicia in 1922/23 or Dadrian’s argument for the 
crucial role physicians played in planning and carrying out the Armenian genocide, and for 
misled loyalty to Social Darwinism as opposed to the Hippocratic Oath in their medical 
procedures and experiments.9 But within the frame chosen (the territory of today’s Turkey, 
the period from the 1890s to the 1960s, Armenians and Greeks), nation building offers the 
best explanation for the discrimination, expropriation, expulsion and killing by a religious 
as well as a secular regime, in times of war and peace, during single-party and democratic 
periods, seemingly in and against the majority’s economic interests and in imperial and 
post-imperial times.  
Time Period 
Of course, studying these developments and events with a view to nation building 
also imposes certain limits, especially regarding the start date since anti-minority acts had 
taken place for a long time before the idea of nations came into existence. And even after 
the new ideology spread, anti-minority action could take place that was not necessarily 
inspired by it (Hamidiyan massacres). Similarly, there were events that contributed to 
Turkish nation building that were not intended as such, for example the waves of Muslim 
war and genocide victims from the Balkans and the Caucasus that sought refuge in the 
Ottoman Empire. Their presence increased the percentage of the population that was 
Muslim which agreed with Ottoman-Turkish nation building goals but was not part of a 
plan, it just happened and contributed to it.  
I set the late 19th century as the start date since this is when we see the first signs of 
the Ottoman government identifying (Turkish) Muslims as the core of the Empire’s 
population, being concerned with its welfare and trying to increase the growth of this part 
of the population. It is also during this period that Christians start to be viewed with 
growing distrust. Both of these concerns should become key features of CUP and Kemalist 
nation building. The fears apparent during the reign of Abdülhamid II would become 
                                                 
9 Dadrian (1986: 169-192). 
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formulated, systematized and translated into action during the following decades which 
today is called nation building. Nevertheless, there is some fluidity here both in terms of 
dates and events to be included. I will consider events that contributed to Ottoman-Turkish 
nation building after the idea first came up and indicate in how far they were part of a 
policy or merely happened but were recognized as advancing the nation building project. 
 
The difficulty in settling on a start date for nation building is equally present in 
setting an end date since the process of nation building is ongoing. It may change direction, 
temporarily lose momentum or gradually become less rigorous, but it does not stop since 
the imaginary nation continually needs to be reconstructed. I end my analysis in the 1960s 
since this is the last time that a drastic act took place against one of the two minorities 
under consideration for which the government took responsibility. This was the 
expropriation of and expulsion of 11,000 Greeks that had stayed on in Istanbul in spite of 
the decades-long discrimination against their community, their expropriation and partial 
expulsion. After that time, Turkish nation building both significantly decreased in intensity 
(with regard to Armenians and Greeks) and changed direction. It is true that everyday 
discrimination against and selective attacks on the few remaining Greeks and the more 
numerous Armenians and their property are continuing until today but they are no longer 
on the same scale as during the previous periods, there have not been large-scale attacks on 
their property or lives since the 1960s.   
As for the change in direction, Turkish nation building has been severely and 
increasingly openly criticized and questioned and alternative definitions of Turkishness 
have been proposed. This is a result of both external (EU) and internal (Turkish civil 
society) pressures and happened in the context of a reexamination of the state’s and the 
military’s role in society and their relation to each other. Another aspect of this public 
debate was calls for the respect of human dignity and women’s rights in Turkey. At the 
same time that Turkish nationalism is gaining strength, the advocates of diversity, 
multiculturalism and tolerance in politics and civil society are making themselves more 
heard than ever before. Many individuals working in small organizations, publishing 
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houses,10 foundations,11 and some public and private universities12 are openly 
acknowledging the existence of minorities in Turkey, highlighting their contribution to 
Ottoman and Turkish society and fighting for their rights. They write columns in dailies, 
organize exhibitions,13 publish books,14 organize conferences,15 hold vigils,16 stage 
demonstrations17 and fight in court to ultimately “raise a critical and open-minded new 
generation.”18 A recent incident from Diyarbakır illustrates how an almost century-old 
policy and conviction (‘the more homogenous the population, the better’) can be 
counteracted. The mayor of that city offered a reward of 25 TL to anyone speaking 
Kurdish, Assyrian or Armenian.19 Most of these attempts at undermining and replacing the 
                                                 
10 “Institutions such as the History Foundation (Tarih Vakfı), the Turkish Foundation of 
Social and Economic Studies (TESEV), publishing houses like Đletişim, Aras, Belge or the 
newly founded Birzamanlar, private universities such as Sabancı University [...].” Goltz 
(2006: 181). 
11 Such as the Hrant Dink Foundation, established in 2007. 
12 See the many courses in Turkish Studies, Ottoman History and Cultural Studies at Sabancı 
University that deal with minority experiences in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey. Another 
example is Kadir Has University which is planning to offer an Armenian language course; 
‘Turkish University to Offer Armenian Language Course’, The International Herald 
Tribune, May 16, 2011.  
13 For instance the photo exhibition “Tümamiral Fahri Çoker’in Arşivinden: Ellinci Yılında 
67 Eylül Olayları” at the Karşı Sanat Çalışmaları in Istanbul in 2005 or the project “EBRU: 
Reflections on Cultural Diversity in Turkey” (URL: 
http://www.ebruproject.com/EN/index.asp) or the exhibition Horovel at Depo in Istanbul in 
2011 (URL: http://www.depoistanbul.net/en/activites_detail.asp?ac=47). 
14 Both academic books and ‘memory literature’ written by members of the minorities who 
recall their childhood or tell their parents’ story. 
15  See the conference ‘Ottoman Armenians During the Decline of the Empire: Issues of 
Scientific Responsibility and Democracy’ which was held at Bilgi University in 2005.  
16 In commemoration of 24 April 1915.  
17 See the tens of thousands of mourners at Hrant Dink’s funeral in 2007. 
18 Goltz (2006:181). 
19 “Belediye Kürtçe bilen personeline 25 lira daha fazla verecek – Diyarbakır”. 
Diyarbakır Sur Belediye Başkanlığı, Kürtçe'nin Kurmanci ve Zazaki lehçeleri ile Süryanice 
ve Ermenice bilen personeline 25 lira daha fazla ödeme yapılacağını açıkladı”, 11 Mayıs 
2011. URL: 13:08http://www.medya73.com/belediye-kurtce-bilen-personeline-25-lira-
daha-fazla-verecek-haberi-638313.html 
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unitarian concept of society were unthinkable only twenty years ago and would have landed 
one in prison. Today, they no longer do so automatically.  
Some of those approving these developments do so wishing to tie back to the 
supposedly harmonious coexistence of all millets in Ottoman times while others seek to i) 
make the often unjust treatment of minorities in Turkish history known and, with thereby 
sharpened senses, ii) end their discrimination, the suspicion against them and the attacks on 
them still taking place today. Even though numerically still weak, the move to acknowledge 
and appreciate diversity has had a big impact on the interested public and, together with the 
EU’s conditionality, changed the Turkish state’s dealings with some of the minorities. Parts 
of society started to see multiculturalism as an asset rather than a shortcoming and the state 
had to improve its treatment of minorities.20 Consequently, the nation in the making today 
is different from the one in the making fifty years ago. In this sense, the Turkish nation 
building project has changed direction which is why the period under consideration here 
ends in the 1960s. 
Armenians and Greeks 
Among the many ethnic and religious groups in the Ottoman Empire, those 
recognized as separate millets by the Ottomans (Armenians, Greeks and Jews), as 
minorities in the Treaty of Lausanne (Armenians, Greeks, Jews) or unacknowledged as 
minorities (Kurds, Circassians, Arabs, Chaldeans, Laz, Bosnians, Albanians), why did I 
choose Armenians and Greeks? Like them, Jews were victims of expropriation, Kurds were 
killed, expelled and deported, Circassians forced to give up their languages and Chaldeans 
to convert to Islam. The Ottoman commercial bourgeoisie, too, consisted not only of 
Armenians and Greeks, but also of Jews, Levantines and Dönmes. The reason I chose 
Armenians and Greeks is that they best show how Turkish nation building through the 
homogenization of the population and the ‘nationalization’ of the economy worked. 
                                                 
20 Içduygu,Toktaş and Soner (2008: 361). 
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First of all, the Armenian and Greek communities were bigger than the Jewish and 
Assyrian ones (about four million as opposed to less than two million) so that whatever 
happened to them had a bigger impact on society as a whole than actions against a 
numerically smaller group. 
Secondly, Armenians and Greeks were present both in the cities and in the 
countryside 21 and, taken together, were found almost everywhere in Anatolia. Jews, on the 
other hand, inhabited mostly cities and primarily those in the West of Turkey. Assyrians, 
for their part, inhabited only rural areas and were concentrated in the Southeast of Turkey. 
Therefore, any action against Armenians or Greeks as a group would affect life both in the 
cities and in the countryside whereas action against Jews or Assyrians would mostly affect 
either urban centers or the rural parts and only a limited geographic area. More specifically, 
those urban Greeks and Armenians that made up the bourgeoisie also dominated it. 
Therefore, policies targeting Armenians or Greeks affected both the make-up of the 
bourgeoisie and the make-up of Anatolia’s population at large whereas policies against 
Jews only affected the bourgeoisie and city dwellers to a limited extent and those against 
Kurds or Assyrians mostly the rural population but not the bourgeoisie. Since Turkish 
nation building first destroyed and then remodeled the bourgeoisie and the ethnic make-up 
of Turkey, Armenians and Greeks are the only two groups that demonstrate the effects of 
both policies thanks to their numbers and membership in the bourgeoisie.  
 
But the Armenian and Greek communities also differed from each other which 
explains the different treatment they received by the Turkifying state, namely why Greeks 
were mainly expelled whereas Armenians were also killed in the hundreds of thousands. 
The two communities were concentrated in different geographies, Greeks mainly on the 
Aegean, in the world’s eye, as opposed to Armenians whose main settlements were in the 
east of Anatolia. The Armenian challenge (consisting in revolutionary parties, namely the 
Daşnaktsutiun and Hınçaktsutiun in Ottoman cities and in Europe, fedayeen in the eastern 
border areas, an Armenian population living on the other side of the border on Russian 
territory, and the existence of the Armenian Question in European diplomatic circles) was 
                                                 
21 25 per cent of Armenians were urban, 75 per cent peasants and fewer than 10 per cent of all 
Armenians lived in Constantinople, over 90 per cent in the provinces. Göçek (2002: 28). 
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much greater than the Greek one: Ottoman Greeks were separated from Greece by the 
Aegean, the Greek kingdom did not serve as a base for guerilla activities and there was no 
comparable Greek question. In addition, the Ottoman Greeks were backed by a Greek state 
with an army that the Ottomans feared whereas there was neither an Armenian state nor an 
Armenian army to take action in case the Ottoman Armenians were attacked. An Ottoman 
attack on the Armenian community therefore bore a much smaller risk and higher rewards 
than one on the Greek community which posed a smaller risk and an attack on which would 
be more costly. 
Significance 
The study of the Ottoman-Turkish case of nation building after the end of Empire is 
important because of its similarities with and differences from other cases of nation 
building and because it is crucial to understanding much of what is happening in Turkey 
still today. The ideology underlying the CUP’s and Kemalists’ destructive nation building 
policies (one religion: (secular) Islam, one language: Turkish, one past, one future, belief 
that non-Muslims cannot be Turks) did not end with the Republic’s establishment, the 
vision of the nation to be built remained basically the same, only the means of achieving it 
were less excessive with regard to Armenians and Greeks (expulsion, destruction of 
property, expropriation but no more large-scale killing). Kurds, though, suffered the most 
under Turkish nation building measures during Republican times which illustrates the 
ideological continuity from the CUP’s to the Kemalist regime. And this ideological 
continuity is no coincidence since many Young Turks who were guilty of having planned 
and carried out the violent elimination of the Armenians and Greeks turned into Kemalists 
and were awarded high posts in Republican Turkey. The best example of this is Celal 
Bayar, later Turkey’s president (1950-1960), who in late Ottoman times was involved in 
the expulsion of the Aegean Greeks in 1914 and in the Armenian genocide in 1915-17, as 
well as in Republican times in the 1955 pogrom.22 
                                                 
22 Göçek (2011: 20).  
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The events of the 1910s and 1920s were so momentous that, a century later, they are 
still crucial to understanding important aspects of Turkish reality. Without having an 
understanding of the events and ideologies of the time, on cannot make sense of the 
material realities and discourses in Turkey in the 21st century. For example why there are 
so few Armenians and Greeks left even though they had supposedly lived in harmony with 
their Muslim neighbors in the Ottoman Empire. Why the Jewish community is dwindling 
even though there is said to be no anti-Semitism in Turkey. Why it is an insult to be called 
a Dönme. Why calling for the right to teaching Kurdish in schools exposes one to the 
accusation of supporting separatism. Why Alevi cems are not regarded as houses of 
worship. Why it was necessary to set up a new bourgeoisie even though there had been a 
prosperous one in place, and many more such questions. The path Turkey followed had and 
still has all kinds of implications for its treatment of minorities, state-society relations, civil 
society, democracy and its relations with various neighboring states and other countries 
which is why it is important to study the beginnings of Turkish nation building.  
Material, Omissions, Limits and Opportunities 
I used most of the material on the topic available in English and some in French and 
German. Due to lack of time and my limited knowledge of Turkish, I was not able to use 
important secondary literature in Turkish except occasionally, nor did I use works in 
Armenian. I am also leaving out any discussion of the origins of the idea of a national 
economy and the origins of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie. Furthermore, the amount of 
material available does not always correspond to the significance of the event. The 
deportation of the Pontus Greeks, for example, clearly merits inclusion, but only Turkish 
studies were available on the topic.  
Beyond personal constraints, there are others that exist for any scholar working on the 
topic, namely the dearth of oral and written testimony, the inaccessibility of certain 
archives and the fact that little research has been done so far. The passage of time, around a 
hundred years, means that all eyewitnesses are deceased by now so that we have to rely on 
the accounts of their descendants, friends and neighbors, whose accounts get less concrete 
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and reliable with every transmission. Nevertheless, Leyla Neyzi calls oral history the “only 
significant approach”23 for learning anything about the 1910s and 1920s. 
As for written testimony, there is the problem of illiteracy, certain information never 
having been put to paper and other information having gotten lost or being inaccessible. 
Certain statistics or figures that scholars wish they had were simply never drawn up, such 
as a precise census or a socioeconomic survey at a certain point in time or an early oral 
history project. These undertakings were either not possible with the instruments of the 
time or there was no interest in collecting such information. One reason for the lack of 
personal written history is that only 10 per cent of the population knew how to read and 
write when the republic was founded and still only 40 per cent in 1960. 24 Only a small 
minority of the population was therefore able to write letters, keep a diary or write their 
memoirs, if they wanted to. And even when such written testimony existed, it could easily 
get lost, be destroyed or kept locked away, inaccessible to researchers. The inner circle of 
the CUP, for instance, burnt “suitcases full of documents” 25 before fleeing on a German 
submarine to Odessa. And certain Turkish and Armenian archives (for instance the 
Daşnaktsutiun’s in Boston) are partly or fully closed to researchers.26 Thus there are 
questions that we will probably never be able to answer, especially those involving 
psychology, such as how the remaining minority businessmen felt about working for 
Muslim companies in the 1950s and 1960s, how people who had committed crimes dealt 
with their feeling of guilt and how Armenian and Assyrian orphans experienced growing up 
in Turkish state orphanages.  
But there remains a lot to discover and a lot that can be found out. Much of the 
material evidence and many of the surviving documents have not been used to full potential 
or the findings are still awaiting publication (see Edhem Eldem’s research in the Ottoman 
Bank archives).27 Also, the extensive literature on other cases of nation building or state-
directed violence could be used to improve our understanding of the Turkish-Ottoman case 
                                                 
23 Öztürkmen (2003: 181).  
24 Karpat (1973: 23).  
25 Üngör (2008 b: paragraph 33).  
26 Pers. com. Berktay.  
27 Pers. com. Berktay.  
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by giving researchers ideas for questions to address to Ottoman-Turkish sources. That 
literature covers the side of the victims and of the perpetrators, the short- and long-term 
consequences as well as material and psychological effects. The experiences of aboriginal 
and Polish orphans and foster children, the effects of forced labor on Nazi concentration 
camp and GULAG camp survivors, the redistribution of plundered Jewish property in Nazi 
Germany are only a few of hundreds of examples that could inspire the study of nation 
building in Turkey.28  
One could for instance try to find out how many and which firms were established in 
1916. Or investigate the foundation history of the big industrial firms in Turkey. Or 
uncover the ownership history of all kinds of grand buildings in Istanbul and provincial 
cities and uncover regional and social differences. One could find out in how far Jews, 
Christian Arabs and Levantines profited from the elimination of Armenians and Greeks. 
And how the representation of minorities in academia and certain professions changed. Or 
how exactly Muslim or Turkish industrialists became rich and in how far they profited from 
the acquisition of minority property, the elimination of competition and the cooptation of 
minority know-how. Other questions worth investigating are what kind of resistance there 
was to the deportation of Armenians. Who the ‘righteous’ were that saved Armenians by 
disobeying orders or hiding them, and what their motives were. Göçek gives the example of 
Hüseyin Nesimi who opposed the deportation of the Armenians because CUP policies 
contradicted the sharia. She notes that religious opposition to the CUP has been 
downplayed throughout Republican times.29 Casting light on minority- and nation building 
related issues would therefore contribute to our overall understanding of Republican 
history. Some of these questions will come up again in the course of this thesis and I will 
attempt to give preliminary answers to them.  
 
 
                                                 
28 Pers. com. Berktay.  
29 Göçek (2011: 236).  
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Terminology 
Finally, a note on terminology which is particularly necessary considering that 
literature on this issue is, sometimes unconsciously, colored by a nationalistic and 
apologetic mindset which produces misnomers and euphemisms.30 For a start, I call what 
happened in Thrace in 1934 and in Istanbul and Izmir on 6.-7. September 1955 not an 
‘incident’ which belittles terror tactics, violent robbery, rape and murder, but ‘pogrom’ 
since it was an attack on the life and property of a minority group and in part carried out by 
a mob. 
The terms ‘national bourgeoisie’ and ‘nationalization of the economy’ stem from a 
nationalist mindset which declares non-Muslims or non-Turks to be outsiders and refuses to 
accord them the same rights as other Turkish citizens. I therefore only use them with 
quotation marks. In the context of Turkey’s ‘national’ economy, ‘national bourgeoisie’ and 
‘Muslim bourgeoisie’ are often used interchangeably. But it is only correct to call the 
bourgeoisie that came into existence during the war years ‘Muslim’ in the sense that they 
were not ‘Christian’. It was not ‘Muslim’, though, in two other senses. Firstly, its members 
were not pious Muslims. Rather, the bourgeoisie the CUP and Kemalists created consisted 
of men who resembled them, whom they promoted for sharing their views and for being 
politically loyal to them. Consequently, they did not set much store by Islam, they were 
skeptical of religion or even antireligious. It would therefore be more accurate to call the 
bourgeoisie that came into existence from the 1910s and twenties onwards an anti-minority 
non-religious bourgeoisie of Muslim origin. There was no truly Muslim bourgeoisie until 
the emergence of the ‘Anatolian Tigers’ in the 1980s. Secondly, it was not ‘Muslim’ since 
possibly an important part of it consisted of the Salonicans who were for a large part 
Dönme. ‘National’ and ‘Muslim’ are thus equally inaccurate for describing the new 
economy or bourgeoisie, but since ‘national’ conveys the nationalist and secular outlook 
better, I will use that term.  
‘Homogenization of the population’ and ‘nationalization of the economy’ in the 
Ottoman-Turkish case refers to efforts at making the population and economy more 
                                                 
30 Kaiser (1997). 
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Muslim and then more Turkish Muslim. From CUP times onwards, one can therefore speak 
of the Turkification of the population and economy. My understanding of Turkification, 
though, is substantially different from that of Bali and some other Turkish authors. For 
them, Turkification means the conversion of non-Muslims into Turks of Christian or Jewish 
faith in the 1920s and 30s. 
It was a social contract. It could even be seen, from the non-Muslim perspective , as 
an upgrading of their social status, from the dhimmi status they held until 1923, to a 
citizenship status that they might obtain after the foundation of the Republic, so long 
as they became ‘Turks’.31 
 
I share Aktar’s view who defines Turkification as “[...] a set of policies aimed at 
establishing the unconditional supremacy of (sic!) Turkish ethnic identity in nearly all 
aspects of social and economic life.”32 This supremacy could only be achieved through 
pressure and use of force and is thus a negative, harmful policy that, far from ‘upgrading’ 
minorities, denied them full citizen rights no matter how much they turkified.  
The terms ‘Turkish’ and ‘Armenian’ I use fully well knowing that there is no such 
thing as Armenian blood or Turkish genes. It does not refer to citizenship but to the ethnic 
and communal adherence a person claims for himself or is claimed to have by others on the 
basis of his mother tongue, his religion, his descent or his way of life. Thus I refer to a 
Turkish citizen who thinks of himself as a member of the Armenian community or who is 
thought of as such by non-Armenian Turkish citizens as ‘Armenian’. The term ‘minority’ I 
use in the sense in which it was used in the Treaty of Lausanne, namely only for Jews, 
Armenians and Greeks, except in chapter three where it refers to any ethnic group that was 
not in the majority.   
 
                                                 
31 Bali (2008: paragraph 41).  
32 Aktar (2004: 9). 
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2. 
 
 
THEORIES OF CAPITAL ACCUMULATION AND NATIONALISM  
 
 
 
 
This chapter outlines several theories and concepts that are useful for better 
understanding the expropriation and elimination of Armenians and Greeks as well as other 
minorities in the Ottoman Empire and in the Turkish Republic. In this chapter, though, only 
brief references will be made to the case at hand while chapters four to seven will deal with 
the expropriation and elimination of Armenians and Greeks in great deal. Marx’s theory of 
capital accumulation, constructivist theories of nationalism and Weber’s concept of the 
ideal type serve to explain some of the many changes that took place in the Ottoman 
Empire within a couple of decades: the growing intolerance towards non-Muslims and non-
Turks, the expropriation and almost total disappearance of non-Muslims, the redistribution 
of their property, Turkey’s economic development, and the contradictions and unexpected 
consequences of these changes.  
Marx’s theory of capital accumulation states that the onset of industrialization in 
Europe depended, among many other factors, on huge funds that owed their existence to 
the extensive use of violence. One may ask where the funds for the industrialization of 
Turkey came from and whether the plundering of the non-Muslim minorities had anything 
to do with it. Constructivist theories of nationalism recognize that there is nothing natural 
about nations and that the characteristics its members supposedly or actually share are to a 
large degree the outcome of the sustained and violent suppression of other traits. Turkish 
nationalists suppressed and eliminated anything they deemed non-Turkish which accounts 
for some of the dramatic changes the Ottoman-Turkish population and its society 
witnessed. Weber’s concept of the ideal type highlights the substantial difference in basic 
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social organization between Empire and nation which is highly relevant to the Ottoman-
Turkish case since it deals with the transition from Empire to nation state.  
Capital Accumulation 
Marx distinguishes between primitive (meaning original) capital accumulation and 
capitalist accumulation in the modern era.33 The latter came about as industrialists invested 
capital, produced commodities, sold them, and channeled the profits back into the capital 
fund and reinvested. This was a strictly economic process that operated through market 
forces. But in order to be able to produce goods on an industrial scale, industrialists needed 
lots of capital. So the question is how they acquired this capital in the first place, how 
primitive capital was accumulated.34  
Since the beginning of the modern era, wealth was accumulated rapidly in Western 
and Southern Europe (primitive accumulation) through plunder, exploitation, dislocation 
and mass murder. Examples of it are the Spanish conquest of much of the Americas, 
English piracy, the slave trade, the colonial exploitation of the Irish and the exploitation of 
a given country’s own rural population.  In all of these, the early modern European state 
played a central role in that it financed, planned and advocated these undertakings and 
condoned their frightful human cost. Thus this first accumulation of capital did not obey 
market forces but came about through violence. The primitive capital thereby accumulated 
started to be converted into industrial capital in the late 18th and early 19th century. 
The enclosures in England and Scotland are one example of the primitive 
accumulation of wealth. The act for the enclosures of commons (16th century) was a 
parliamentary form of robbery that deprived peasants of their commonly held land, 
assigned it to large landowners and thereby concentrated extensive estates in few hands. 
The second stage in the robbery of the rural population was the so-called clearing of estates 
which drove peasants out of their huts and destroyed the basis of their lives. To give an 
example from the estate of the Duchess of Sutherland: 
                                                 
33 Marx (1974: 531-724). 
34 Pers. com. Berktay.  
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From 1814 to 1820 these 15,000 inhabitants, about 3,000 families [who had 
remained after an earlier clearing], were systematically hunted and rooted out. All 
their villages were destroyed and burnt, all their fields turned into pasturage. British 
soldiers enforced this eviction, and came to blows with the inhabitants. One old 
woman was burnt to death in the flames of the hut, which she refused to leave.35 
As a result, masses of former peasants migrated to the cities and would later provide 
the workforce for the emerging industries:  
The spoliation of the church’s property, the fraudulent alienation of the State 
domains, the robbery of the common lands, the usurpation of feudal and clan 
property, and its transformation into modern private property under circumstances of 
reckless terrorism, were just so many idyllic methods of primitive accumulation. 
They conquered the field for capitalistic agriculture, made the soil part and parcel of 
capital, and created for the town industries the necessary supply of a ‘free’ and 
outlawed proletariat.36 
 
Marx rightly concludes that “capital comes dripping from head to foot, from every 
pore with blood and dirt.”37 To return to the topic of this thesis, one may wonder where 
Turkish primitive capital accumulation came from. Referring to Akçam,38 Öktem states that  
 
[c]apital accumulation through dispossession is not alien to the logic of capitalist 
development, yet a closer examination of how this has been done in Turkey might 
reveal how significant this dispossession was for the country’s future development. 
While the transfer of capital took place on several occasions, the infamous law of 
deportation and the subsequent Armenian massacres of 1915 was probably the most 
significant turning point in this respect.39 
 
Chapters five and seven argue that the expropriation of Armenians and Greeks 
contributed substantially to capital accumulation in the hands of nominally Muslim Turks.40 
                                                 
35 Marx (1974: 682).  
36 Marx (1974: 685).  
37 Marx (1974: 712).  
38 Akçam (1996). 
39 Öktem (2004: 566-67).  
40 It was not the only source of primitive capital accumulation nor did the overall amount of 
capital in Turkey increase. Rather, it decreased due to war-time destruction and losses 
which, along with other reasons, probably delayed Turkey’s industrialization. However, it 
could be that capital in Turkey, though overall reduced, became more concentrated with its 
redistribution in the 1910s and 1920s which would make the Ottoman-Turkish case a good 
example of Marx’s thoery of primitive capital accumulation.  
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Theories of ationalism and the Relationship of ationalism and Capitalism 
According to the ‘objective’ approach to nationalism, a nation is a large group of 
people that have a common descent, a common language and a common religion and whose 
members live in the same locality.41 Variations of this definition add “material interest [...] 
and military necessity”42 or include the economic element, such as Stalin’s definition of the 
nation from 1913: "A nation is a historically constituted and stable community of people 
formed on the basis of common language, territory, economic life, and psychological 
makeup revealed in a common culture"43 
Knowing that the common characteristics of nations that nationalists see before them 
or seek to bring out (common language, religion, etc.) are the result of state interference, 
one may ask how exactly they come into being. The answer is that they are very often the 
result of displacement, killing, expropriation, forced assimilation, a national school 
curriculum, indoctrination, the use of loaded symbols such as the national flag and anthem 
and many more. The process of bringing these common characteristics into being is called 
nation building. In this thesis I will show how gravely minorities, and especially non-
Muslim minorities, were affected by Turkish nation building.  
 
The next question is how capital accumulation and capitalism on the one side and 
nationalism and nation building on the other are related. They are both historical 
phenomena of the last few centuries. Significant capital accumulation started with the 
reconnaissance and Europe’s gradual conquest and subjugation of most parts of the world. 
The amounts amassed became critical around the 18th century and, in conjunction with 
complicated other factors, made possible industrialization, first in England and then other 
                                                 
41 Pers. com. Berktay.  
42 These were two characteristics of what was commonly held to be a nation. Renan refutes 
this view in his famous essay ‘What is a Nation’ in 1882. Renan (1996).  
43 J. Stalin, Marxism and the National Question, Prosveshcheniye, Nos. 3-5, March-May 
1913, Marxists Internet Archive, URL: 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1913/03a.htm#s1 
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countries. It also brought a bourgeoisie into being many of whose members were receptive 
to the idea of the existence of nations.  
The ideology of nationalism depended on developments that started in Central 
Europe in the 16th century, at the same time as primitive capital accumulation.44 
Nationalism spread first in Europe and then beyond it in the 19th century and nations 
started to be built both top down (by states or governments) and bottom up (by 
intellectuals, enthusiastic activists unrelated to the government, and the pressure of 
nationalist masses). The same was the case with primitive capital accumulation (the 
monarchy funded imperial enterprises and settlers collaborated in the exploitation of the 
colonized). Both nation building and capital accumulation often went hand in hand with 
violence. Lastly, both nationalism and capitalism were in complicated ways related to the 
emergence of a bourgeoisie.  
Thus both primitive capital accumulation and nation building are outgrowths of 
modernity and depend on the same method (violence) and are closely related in that capital 
accumulation is often part of nation building and in that nation building can be one of the 
results of capital accumulation. This is not to say that the driving motive for the elimination 
of people is the desire to accumulate capital but that acquiring the victims’ property could 
be one motive among several and that even when it was not, nation builders appropriated 
what was left behind as a result of their actions. 
What we can say is firstly that there seems to be an affinity between nationalism and 
capitalism though no causal connection and secondly that capitalism and nationalism can 
contradict each other because capitalism strives for rationality and economism whereas 
nationalism often demands uneconomical and irrational policies because of its emotional 
and appeal.45 The elimination of Armenians and Greeks, for instance, was in total 
agreement with Turkish nationalism, but contradicted capitalist rationality which would 
have left these two communities, or at least their bourgeoisies, in place. I will return to this 
point in chapter seven under Counting the Cost.  
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Ideal Types of Empire and ation 
Weber’s concept of the ideal type is useful in highlighting the characteristics of, for 
instance, empire, better than a definition could. The ideal type is neither a description of 
reality nor a hypothesis but a concept, “a utopia which has been arrived at by the analytical 
accentuation of certain elements of reality,”46 which helps one arrive at them. 
An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view 
and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and 
occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to 
those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct.47 
 
According to Suny, the ideal type of ‘empire’ is marked by i) institutionalized 
difference, meaning that people are grouped into dominant and subordinate groups (in the 
Ottoman Empire Muslims over Christians or Turks over other ethnicities) and ii) 
institutionalized inequity or distinction that gives the right to subordinate (in the Ottoman 
Empire the concept of dhimmitude).48 This nicely contrasts ideal social and institutional 
characteristics of empire with those of nation since a nation is thought of as a “fraternity of 
equals”49 But since these are imaginary models, no real-life empire or nation agrees with 
them completely. All empires have national characteristics and all nations have imperial 
qualities.50 
This is highly relevant to the Ottoman-Turkish case at hand since, broadly speaking, 
it deals with the transition from empire to nation, from subjecthood to citizenship and from 
a religiously defined population to an ethnically defined nation. This transition period 
started before the Tanzimat and explains the existence of national characteristics in the late 
Ottoman Empire such as the state’s increasing attention to Muslims and then Turks and the 
Republic’s continuing equation of non-Muslims with second-class citizens. The Empire had 
been tolerant of difference and had institutionalized inequity in the concept of dhimmitude. 
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The Turkish nation state in principle treated all citizens equally, but not before eliminating 
those that could not be equals. And even then, certain groups of citizens were factually 
treated as lesser citizens. 
The ational Idea and ation Building 
The question why the nation came to be equated with the people and why the nation 
as the people came to be the ‘winning’ unit of political organization in the 19th and 20th 
centuries is very complicated.51 I will therefore confine myself to the Ottoman-Turkish case 
in saying that there were strategic and ideological reasons for the espousal of the national 
idea by certain Ottoman leaders and intellectuals. The strategic one was the recognition that 
the powerful, imperial states of Europe were all nation states or nation-empires. Educated 
Ottomans increasingly concluded that in order to withstand their encroachments and 
pressure, the Ottoman Empire had to take on more national characteristics. At a later point, 
possibly as late as 1918, the CUP realized that its only realistic chance of preventing at 
least Anatolia from falling under occupation was to concentrate on that area. Thus in order 
to defend their turf, the Young Turks turned national.  
Equally important, but probably coming second in chronology, were ideological 
reasons for the espousal of the national idea.52 First intellectuals and then the masses came 
to believe that nations are facts of nature, that they have always existed and that it was their 
duty to reconstitute them, that ‘lost’ or alienated members of the community had a right to 
know their affiliation and to be included. They also believed that anybody potentially 
harmful to the nation needed to be identified and removed from it. The interplay between 
security and ideological reasons is complicated but what can be said is that the two factors 
reinforce each other.  
As mentioned earlier, nation building is the process by which the ‘objective’ 
characteristics of nations such as language and religion are brought into being. It affects the 
whole population to different degrees because some parts of it resemble the nation already 
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more than others. Nation Building has intellectual, political, cultural and economic 
dimensions that each have a different weight at different stages of the nation building 
process and in different countries.  In the Ottoman-Turkish case, it encompasses anything 
from the replacement of the fez by the Western hat to the de-ethnicization of folk dances,53 
the abolishment of the caliphate, the expulsion of Greeks, the types of architecture 
promoted,54 the kind of compulsory military training young males receive, the boycott of 
Armenian shops to the history that is taught at school, and countless other measures that 
change the physical, mental and psychological makeup of the population.  
 
Hroch distinguishes three stages in the nation building process in Europe: Firstly, 
there need to be certain objective preconditions for the formation of a nation such as some 
common past, linguistic or cultural ties and a conception of the equality of all members of 
the group.55 Only then can intellectuals of this non-dominant group develop their national 
ideas and get a response to them. As yet, they do not make political demands, it is merely 
an intellectual pursuit. In the second phase, a new activism seeks to win over people to the 
political project of creating a future nation. The third phase is reached when it becomes a 
mass movement and a full social structure comes into being.56 
This can be applied to the Ottoman Empire with certain modifications: Turkish 
Muslims, if not the majority, were the dominant group, Turkish nationalism developed not 
out of intellectual curiosity but with the aim to counter subject populations’ nationalisms 
and it was able to affect and change the social structure without or before having become a 
mass movement. 
What is totally absent from Hroch’s periodization, though, is the practical side. He 
gives the impression that nation building is a benevolent, democratic process when it is 
actually very often an egoistic and authoritarian undertaking. I will deal with the violence 
necessary for the ‘full social structure’ to come into being in the next chapter. However, 
Hroch is right in stating that three processes are decisive for the transition from one stage to 
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the next: i) “a social and/or political crisis of the old order, accompanied by new tensions 
and horizons,”57 ii) “the emergence of discontent among significant elements of the 
population”58 and iii) “loss of faith in traditional moral systems, above all a decline in 
religious legitimacy.”59 All of this was true for the late Ottoman Empire: the crisis of the 
Sultanate consisted in its inability to maintain the Empire, to reject Great Powers’ 
encroachments and to remain solvent (bankruptcy), among others. Discontent emerged 
among Muslims who had become victims of Christian states and nation builders and sought 
refuge in the remaining Ottoman Empire; among artisans who were unable to compete with 
European imports, among Kurds who were unwilling to give up their unofficial autonomy 
with the state’s increasing centralization, among secular and constitutionally-minded men 
who found Sultan Abdülhamid II’s religious absolutism distasteful and among Muslims 
who felt resentment against Christian nouveau-riches who enjoyed all the advantages of 
association with Europe. As for the loss of faith in traditional moral systems, it was 
probably directed against the Caliphate and sharia. 
Yet this is not enough to pass from the second to the third phase. Karl Deutsch 
suggested that in addition it takes an intensive growth of communication and a high rate of 
mobility. Hroch adds to this “a nationally relevant conflict of interests – in other words a 
social tension or collision that could be mapped onto linguistic (and sometimes also 
religious) divisions.”60 In the Ottoman case, this was the complex field of the capitulations, 
the minority bourgeoisie’s affluence, the demands for reform in the Armenian provinces 
and the nationalism of Christian populations in the Balkans. All of these issues threatened 
the viability of the Ottoman Empire and concern for them crystallized into Muslim 
Ottoman opposition to Christian Ottomans and the question of how to hold the latter in 
check. In other words, the nationally relevant conflict of interests was a struggle over who 
would ultimately wield more economic or political power in the Empire, Ottoman 
Christians or Ottoman Muslims.  
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How ation Building Proceeds and Why it is Often Violent 
The next two questions, how nations are built, how its ‘objective’ characteristics are 
brought into being, and why nation building is often violent, are interlinked. Nation 
building is often a violent process because there is no other way of bringing about the 
demographic changes that nation builders deem necessary within a couple of decades and 
often within a few years. Nationalists believe that the more uniform the population or 
nation is, the better it withstands inside and outside threats (separatism, dissolution, 
aggression, occupation, etc.). Depending on how heterogeneous the population, how 
narrowly defined the nation, as how threatening the international environment or the 
internal enemy is perceived, nation building is a more or less violent process. Öktem notes 
that 
[a] growing body of literature highlights the role of ethnic cleansing in the 
making of modern Europe, in particular during the transition from empire to nation-
state. The authors of this new school have shown convincingly that the modern 
nation-state is established on the blood of others, be it based on the territories of 
colonized indigenous people as in the United States, fuelled by stages of ethnic 
cleansing and forcible assimilation as in Spain and France (Mann 2004; Marx 2003), 
or by large-scale expulsions and massacres as in the Balkans and Turkey (Mazower 
2004) yet also during and in post-world War II central Europe (Liebermann 2006).61 
 
Nation building and demographic engineering overlap in that nation builders often 
employ demographic engineering (the ways in which the state changes the relative weight 
of the ethnic or social groups in its territory in order to enhance its own power) but the 
latter can also occur outside that national frame. A modified version of Zarkovic 
Bookman’s overview over measures employed in demographic engineering may therefore 
be useful in summarizing some of the ways in which states build nations, namely by: 
• population measurements/census, manipulation by changing how populations are 
defined and measured 62 
• pronatalist policies to increase the size of one population relative to others, includes 
financial stimuli, prohibition of birth control63 
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• assimilation: for increasing one group’s size quickly, the smaller or weaker group 
has to conform to the bigger/stronger one in religion and language64 
• population transfers: to alter relative sizes of groups; variants are a: to dilute a 
preexisting population, b: to consolidate the presence of the desired group and c: to 
force a group out of a region 
• boundary changes: secessionist or irredentist65 
• economic pressures: “These pressures include selective tax policy, discrimination in 
hiring, employment restrictions, migration laws, laws pertaining to land ownership 
and property rights, etc. While these pressures may force people to relocate or 
induce a decrease in fertility, they also may simply be tools of harassment in order 
to induce assimilation.”66 
• killing (clearing a certain area, genocide, killing the intellectual elite or a certain 
social class) 
By the early 20th century, the Ottoman Empire had employed all of the above tools of 
demographic engineering, many of which will be illustrated in the following chapters. 
Zürcher who termed the period from 1850 to 1950 Europe’s age of demographic 
engineering therefore called the Ottoman Empire its laboratory.67  
Every state and society pursues a different road to nation building but within a single 
state, the goal and the way to achieve it are also constantly modified. This is because the 
answers to questions such as who is to be a member of the nation, how those that cannot be 
members are to be dealt with, how potential members of the nation are to be made into 
members and the like are answered differently depending on circumstances and the person 
in question. There are inevitably disagreements between different groups of nation builders; 
there are inconsistencies, contradictions and different priorities. Nation building also 
happens in stages because it depends on responses, outside events and is affected by 
                                                                                                                                                    
63 Zarkovic Bookman (1997: 32).  
64 Zarkovic Bookman (1997: 32).  
65 Zarkovic Bookman (1997: 32).  
66 Zarkovic Bookman (1997: 33-34).  
67 Zürcher (2008: 1). 
  30
unexpected consequences. So there is no clear-cut plan, but every government, regime or 
era has a general idea of the direction its nation building should take. 
Extreme Violence in Advanced Stages of ation Building 
The Nazi’s plundering and killing of Europe’s Jews is a good example of the fact that 
violence does not only occur during early nation building. German nation building was 
already a century old68 when the Nazis started realizing their vision of the German nation 
which, among many other characteristics, excluded Jews. This case also illustrates that the 
physical removal of people and the appropriation of their property can go hand in hand, as 
was the case with Ottoman Armenians and their property. 
Aly’s studies of Nazi rule were novel in that they turned attention away from the 
elites to the masses and the ways in how they profited under Nazi rule. He also showed 
convincingly that there were strong material incentives for loyalty to the Nazis besides 
ideological ones or Hitler’s personal charisma. In his book Hitler's Beneficiaries: Plunder, 
Racial War, and the azi Welfare State,69 he shows in detail that the Nazis financed their 
wars by plundering the Jews of Germany and of the occupied countries. German Jews were 
eliminated and plundered at the same time since alongside legislation that curtailed their 
citizen rights more and more, they were forced to pay extra taxes. When they were deported 
and their property was sold, they were forced to invest the meager revenues into 
government bonds. In any case their capital ended up with the state treasury and the army. 
The same model was followed everywhere in occupied Europe, from the Netherlands to 
Bulgaria and Norway.  
The lower and middle class in Germany benefited from this large-scale plunder in so 
far as its members never had to pay a direct war tax but instead saw tax exemptions and 
certain health insurance benefits. Besides many other ‘treats’ this was a conscious effort on 
the part of Hitler to secure the German population’s loyalty month by month and year by 
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year. This alone also meant that millions of Germans, virtually everyone, became guilty of 
the expropriation and murder of Europe’s Jews. This can be compared to the Ottoman-
Turkish case in that the Ottoman state and wide strata of its population benefited from the 
plundering of the Armenians during the genocide, though redistribution was less orderly 
and on a much smaller scale than in Nazi-occupied Europe. Non-Jewish German 
businessmen, too, profited from the expropriation of Jewish-owned companies because this 
gave them the opportunity to acquire them cheaply which is exactly what happened under 
CUP rule, too, as chapter five will show. 
Upon being awarded the Heinrich-Mann Prize in 2002, Aly pointed out the following 
in his speech “Hitler’s Volksstaat: Anmerkungen zum Klassencharakter des 
Nationalsozialismus” (Hitler’s People’s State: Remarks about the Class Character of 
National Socialism): National Socialism was one of the great egalitarian movements and 
utopias of the 20th century because it sought to level out class differences by promoting 
upward social mobility. It thus went beyond national homogenization and included social 
homogenization. This is an interesting parallel to the Ottoman-Turkish case because the 
Young Turks were the result of new opportunities for upward mobility. During the war 
years, they allowed unlikely people to make a career and to rise to prominence along with 
them which led to significant shifts in social structure. The Young Turks originated from a 
lower-middle class background but thanks to the recently established military and medical 
schools gained a standing in society that they would previously have been denied. As we 
will see in chapter four, the CUP’s elimination of the Ottoman Armenians allowed Muslims 
from all walks of life, but especially those close to the CUP, to take over their property and 
to improve their fortunes. World War I in Turkey and World War II in Germany thus both 
went along with the vast redistribution of property and unprecedented opportunities for 
social mobility.  
Actors Engaged in the Destructive Aspects of ation Building 
Mann’s categorization of perpetrators of so-called ethnic cleansing can be adapted to 
our example of nation building since the violent clearing of a population from a territory 
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was part of Ottoman-Turkish nation building. First, he names radical elites running party-
states which in our case was the CUP. Second come bands of militants forming violent 
paramilitaries such as the Ottoman Special Organizations and less organized gangs of 
released convicts and thirdly “core constituencies providing mass though not majority 
popular support.”70 These can be 
ethnic refugees and people from threatened border districts; those more dependent 
on the state for their subsistence and values; [...] those socialized into acceptance of 
physical violence as a way of solving social problems or achieving personal 
advancement – like soldiers, policemen, criminals, hooligans, and athletes; and those 
attracted to machismo ideology – young males striving to assert themselves in the 
world, often led by older males who were socialized as youths in an earlier phase of 
violence.71 
 
In our case, again, these could be Muslim refugees from the Balkans and the 
Caucasus, Kurds and the gendarmerie. During Republican times, these actors are joined by 
two more, the bureaucracy and deep state in addition to nationalist activists in the 
population. The former played a role during the pogrom of 1955 and the latter during the 
Citizen Speak Turkish campaign, the renaming of places and again in 1955. Mann rightly 
notes that thus 
[p]ower is exercised in three distinct ways: top-down by elites, bottom-up by 
popular pressures, and coercively sideways by paramilitaries. These pressures interact 
and so generate mundane relations like those found in all social movements – 
especially of hierarchy, comradeship, and career.72 
 
In the Ottoman-Turkish case, the state exercised most power, whether under the 
Sultan or in Republican times. But for the success of its nationalization project it depended 
on the cooperation of a large part of its citizens whose contribution to the ‘national’ project 
cannot be measured but must have been considerable. This is confirmed by Đçduygu, Toktaş 
and Soner who write 
While the ‘top-down’ character fo the nation-building process in Turkey has been 
noticeable, it appears that here has also been a considerable degree of ‘bottom-up’ 
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societal participation [...] It was this ‘populist’ feature that also contributed to the 
gradual demise of non-Muslim populations at many levels of society.73 
 
This point will be taken up again in relation to the Citizen Speak Turkish campaign 
and the migration of Turkish Christians to cities from the 1950s onwards. Paramilitaries 
played an important role at certain times, notably during the decade of wars from 1912-
1923 (Special Organizations and armed gangs) and in the 1990s during the state’s war 
against the PKK in the Southeast of Turkey.  
Alternatives to Turkish ation Building and Alternative Paths of Turkish ation 
Building 
Turkish nation building was no more violent than nation building elsewhere nor is 
Turkish nation building intrinsically more ruthless than Armenian, Greek, Kurdish or any 
other nation building. But for various reasons Turkish nation builders got the upper hand 
and were the ones to decide that a Turkish nation was to be built in Anatolia and who 
carried out their plans. Rival nation builders did not get the chance to carry out their visions 
because the degree of their ideologization, urgency, Great-Power support,74 mass support, 
the type of leadership,75 military capability and relative numbers were different or lacking. 
To analyze Turkish nation building, one can analyze actions in addition to statements 
whereas for nation building that did not take place one has to rely on pronouncements and 
plans. According to Hovannisian, the Armenian revolutionary parties’ various manifestoes 
remained vague and conflicting and “largely circumvent[ed] the issue of what future 
relationships would be with the other non-Armenian peoples and communities of Eastern 
Anatolia”76 if an autonomous Armenian region or an independent Armenia were to be 
established. The following two plans and statements, however, are fairly clear on this point:  
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Russia’s 1913 reform plan for the Armenian provinces foresaw the unification of the 
six Armenian vilayets into a single province that would be headed by an Ottoman or 
European Christian. Among other things, it sought to extend the franchise only to sedentary 
elements (which would have excluded many Kurds and Turks from obtaining citizenship 
rights and excluded “Moslem refugee-immigrants”77) from the new province. It is unknown 
which percentage of the population of the six vilayets would have fallen into either 
category, but these are clearly vague enough to justify far-ranging expulsions. This nation 
building could still have been less violent than what happened in the following two years to 
the Ottoman Armenians, but it is clear that the potential for at least violent mass expulsions 
was there. The other example of Armenian exclusivism comes from the Paris Peace 
Conference in 1919. 
At the Paris peace conference, the Armenian delegation was uncompromising in its 
demand that a large national state encompassing most of Eastern Anatolia and Cilicia 
be repopulated with Armenians at the expense of Turkish and Kurdish ‘incomers’ 
who would be expelled, and also in offering any remaining ‘indigenous’ Kurds only 
the opportunity of domicile ‘protected by its laws.’78 
 
Again, the terminology is vague since an ‘incomer’ could be someone who had been 
settled in the area only the same year that the Armenians were evicted or someone who had 
come much earlier. It is likely that the Armenian nation state to be would have interpreted 
the term as widely as possible.  
Of course, the potential and actual exclusivism of Armenian and Turkish nation 
building derived from different sources, Armenian nationalism resented Turks or Muslims 
as oppressors and murderers (de facto more rights, plundering and killing without being 
held accountable) whereas Turkish nationalism resented Armenians as traitors and 
exploiters (because there were national parties, Armenian presence in Russia, guerrilla 
activities, a well-off bourgeoisie, foreign passport holders). Chronology is also important 
(Armenian exclusivism at the Paris Peace Conference followed the Armenian genocide), 
but the tendency was the same: removing the distrusted population from the national 
territory by whatever means. The plans for a detached or autonomous Armenia thus show 
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that it followed the same exclusivist logic as Turkish nation building and that, had it had the 
chance, it could have used the same means for achieving its goals.   
Even Turkish nation building could have taken a different course, but with every 
defeat or new threat, the exclusivists among Turkish nation builders seemed to be given 
right that their path was the only one to salvation. Levene outlines two alternatives to CUP 
nation building that could have been peaceful and accommodating but may not have saved 
independence. One was Sabaheddin’s Đtilaf, a reformist group and the main parliamentary 
opposition to the CUP’s growing Turkism. But it lost power with the Ottoman defeat in the 
Balkan Wars and even if it had not, says Levene,  
there is little evidence that the Itilaf program could have thwarted Ottoman 
disintegration. The grouping has been described as one of Europeanizers, not 
modernizers. [...] The result would likely still have been a Western carve-up, if not 
through Sykes-Picot, then something similar.79 
 
The other alternative was  
an Eastern Anatolian autonomy based on cooperation and confederation between its 
Armenian, Kurdish, Assyrian and other peoples. [...] Whether under different 
conditions these indigenous forces could have cooperated to create some type of 
political entity remains speculative. Whether they could have done so without 
Western support and, by implication, interference, seems wholly doubtful.80 
  
All the above shows that Turkish nation building was no more violent than many 
other cases of nation building nor more exclusivist than for instance Armenian nation 
building could have been, had it had a chance to realize its vision of the nation in Anatolia. 
As it happened, it was a Turkish national project that was realized and in the course of 
which Armenians and Greeks were removed from Anatolia and expropriated. 
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3. 
 
 
THE TREATMENT OF MINORITIES DURING OTTOMAN-TURKISH TIMES AS 
PART OF NATION BUILDING 
 
 
 
 
The following overview of Turkish nation building deals with how it affected 
linguistic, ethnic and religious minorities. From among the range of policies, it will focus 
on demographic, economic and linguistic policies and give examples of the erasure of the 
minorities’ material and immaterial heritage. This part is divided into six periods which are 
marked by changes in government and more or less different views on the nation and ways 
of shaping it: proto nation building under Abdülhamid II (1880s to 1908), CUP nation 
building - phase I (1908-1913), CUP nation building - phase II (1913-1918), interim nation 
building by the Istanbul government and the nationalists in Ankara (1918-1923), Kemalist 
nation building (1923-1950) and multi-party nation building in the 1950s and 1960s. This is 
not a complete account, but an analysis of instances of nation building which treats 
economic and demographic changes together. It will deal both with policies that were 
meant to contribute to Turkish nation building and with events or trends that contributed to 
it without having been intended.81 This chapter will also leave out those events that concern 
Armenians and Greeks since the main part of this thesis (chapters four to seven) will deal 
with them at length. 
 
                                                 
81 Öktem also takes this into account as in the following example: The construction of GAP in 
Southeastern Turkey was not carried out in order to destroy non-Turkish material culture, 
but this was one of the consequences of the “inundation of villages, cemeteries and 
churches.” Öktem (2004: 566). 
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Hamidiyan Phase 
It is a misconception that nation building starts only once a nation state exists. 82 In 
the Ottoman case, nation building started at least two decades before the Turkish nation 
state was proclaimed and was its precondition. Indications of a proto-national 
consciousness are even older and go back to the late 19th century. In the course of the 19th 
and early 20th century, the definition of who had a right to live in the Ottoman Empire 
changed fundamentally. At the beginning of the 19th century, it was not an issue at all as 
long as there was peace within the Empire’s borders. The population’s heterogeneity was 
taken for granted and non-Muslims were unquestioned subjects as long as they accepted 
dhimmi status. The terms Muslim and Turk were often used interchangeably, they rarely 
had an ethnic and even less a racial meaning. 
A gradual change in the categorization of the Ottoman population occurred during the 
second half of the 19th century with the spread of the ideology of nationalism, the 
increased threat of an imperialist takeover, the growth of Christians’ and Jews’ economic 
power, the defeat of the Empire’s Muslim armies, various subject populations’ fight for 
their independence, minorities’ demands of equal rights with the ‘ruling millet’, and 
Muslims’ expulsion from neighboring states and empires. The Ottoman state came to see 
Muslims as the wronged party, as loyal but oppressed, whereas Christians were associated 
with the imperialist great powers, with treachery and the exploitation of Muslims. Muslim 
Ottomans therefore became more ‘worthy’ of state protection than Christian Ottomans. 
In response, the Sultan started to devise plans for increasing population growth 
overall and especially the growth of the Muslim population in the hope that this would even 
out the high fatalities its soldiers suffered in battle as well as strengthen Muslims’ 
economic power. 83  He also started to emphasize the Muslim character of the subject 
population and to consider how the Muslim hold on land could be strengthened.84 Non-
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84 The Ottoman government was concerned about the sale of Muslim-owned land to 
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Muslims and non-Turks were still seen as an integral part of the subject population and 
state administration (almost one third of civil servants were non-Muslim)85, but they were 
required to recognize Muslim-Turkish dominance and if they did not, they were punished 
(see the Hamidiyan massacres). Thus the first step in the narrowing-down process of who 
were the most legitimate occupants of the land occurred under Sultan Abdülhamid II. The 
next step would be limiting the right to live in Turkey to Turkish Muslims which, starting 
in 1913, was a goal pursued during CUP and Republican times. It was never achieved, but 
the tendency was clear in the Turkification of Muslims and the pressure on non-Muslims to 
leave the country.  
One field in which this narrowing down, this identification of the core subject group 
and the focusing on the Muslim population, is clear is in the field of public health. The 
earliest attempts at limiting abortion in the Ottoman Empire date from the late 18th 
century.86 In the course of time, more systematic and effective measures were taken at 
saving the lives of unborns, babies and mothers in particular, and irrespective of their 
religion. Midwives were given professional training, the sale of abortion-inducing 
pharmaceutics was forbidden and families that raised twins, orphans, or were poor received 
monthly benefits. Other measures were the compulsory medical inspection of prostitutes 
(1880s) and state control over physicians and pharmacists. This was more than a 
humanitarian gesture to improve people’s welfare. These initiatives were also an indication 
of the state’s increasing centralization, control over and interference with its subjects’ lives. 
Welfare measures were therefore also disciplining mechanisms. “The authoritarian and 
regulatory attitude of the Ottoman state toward abortion became an integral part of the 
social engineering projects of the reformist bureaucrats and intellectuals during the 
Tanzimat period [...].”87 An important shift occurred under Abdülhamid II: 
After 1878, [...] the official procreationist and pronatalist approach acquired a 
specifically ethnic and religious character. Unlike the universalist attitude of the edict 
of 1838, state policy during the regime of Abdülhamid II clearly aimed mostly at 
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protecting the progeny of the Muslim and Turkish population by openly stating the 
military reasons for this policy and its fears about ethnic and religious minorities 
within the Ottoman Empire.88 
 
This is a significant turning point that justifies calling Abdülhamid II’s demographic 
measures proto-nationalist. He identified the Turkish Muslim population as the core of the 
subject population, was concerned about minorities imperiling it and employed modern 
methods to keep track of and promote its development. Only a few decades later, the CUP 
would formulate its nation building goal that centered around Turkish Muslims at the 
expense of all other ethnicities in Turkey and which would take radical steps to reach its 
goal.  
CUP ation Building - Phase I, 1908-1913 
During the first phase of CUP nation building, which started with the reinstitution of 
the constitution, all Ottoman subjects were considered equal citizens, irrespective of their 
religion or ethnicity. It was thus an unprecedented improvement for Christians and Jews, 
but a relegation for Muslims. The CUP and the Armenian revolutionary Daşnaktsutiun 
were allies and for a while it looked as if a modern, yet heterogeneous, state and society 
were in the making. According to Göçek, 
the CUP was very secular in orientation and did not adhere to any religious 
principles in any of its actions. It had actually substituted belief in the divine with 
belief in the sacredness of the Ottoman state and did not heed what Islam dictated.89 
 
But catastrophic political events brought about an upsurge of Turkism, Islamism and 
anti-Christian feelings so that the CUP changed course (see the Balkan Wars and boycotts 
of Christian shops in chapter five).  
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CUP ation Building - Phase II, 1913-1918 
Levene rightly points out the constraints under which the CUP acted during the 
second phase of nation building, namely after the Balkan Wars, which explains its 
radicalization:  
Responsibility for the Empire’s 1914 descent into war and genocide can 
undoubtedly be leveled against them, the CUP central committee, and its acolytes 
within the administrative and military apparatus. But their conscious radicalization in 
this direction may have been less the result of ideology than of pragmatic, if 
increasingly desperate attempts to combat, outmaneuver, and ultimately transcend the 
outside – and to their mind entirely malevolent – forces which seemed intent on 
finally liquidating their imperial trust.90 
 
This phase was characterized by the belief that only the reliance on Muslims with no 
separatist aspirations could save the Empire or part of it, and that the population had to be 
homogenized into Turkishness through the resettlement of assimilable populations and the 
killing and expulsion of non-assimilable, ‘dangerous’, populations. The CUP also believed 
that an economy in Turkish hands with as few ties abroad as possible would be the best 
way out of their serious predicament. The main victims of this phase of nation building 
were Armenians, Greeks and Assyrians who were not coincidentally all Christians.  
 
During much of the CUP’s time in power, there was war and defeat (Libya 1911, 
Balkans 1912-13, World War I, Arab revolt 1916, Sevres, Lausanne, occupation, former 
provinces become French and British mandates). The defeat in the Balkan Wars was the 
turning point in the CUP’s relations with Christians and minorities in general. The loss of 
almost all European territory was catastrophic for its members personally since most of 
them had been born there and their families became refugees as a result of the lost wars. To 
Ottomans in general and the state, the Balkans had been the heart of the Ottoman Empire 
and its richest and most developed parts. Their loss meant a significant decrease in 
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revenues. 91 The sense of humiliation was compounded with the threat of impoverishment 
and disease. 250,000 refugees were crowding in Istanbul and the Bulgarian army was a 
mere 40 miles from the capital in which cholera spread. The CUP panicked and came to 
decide not to trust any Christians and to rely only on what was in their eyes the most 
trustworthy part of the population: Turkish Muslims. 
 
The two main features of the CUP’s nation building during those ten years was its 
focus on security92 and its anti-Christian, anti-minority character. Most Young Turks were 
professional soldiers, which alone accounts for their security centeredness, but having 
witnessed defeat and the fear of being colonized added to it. They sought to rebuild the 
nation in their own image namely that of soldiers (von der Goltz).93 European ideologies 
such as Social Darwinism and methods such as detailed record keeping and planning took a 
strong hold of them. They pursued an “isolationist, inward-looking modernization and 
nation-building based on uniformity in all aspects: unitary political establishment based on 
one-religion, one-language, one-nation, one-legal structure, and one-geography.”94 
The population within the Empire’s borders could no longer be a mix of different 
ethnicities and religions, and central sectors of the economy could no longer be in 
supposedly untrustworthy, exploitative hands. The Empire’s subject population would have 
to transform into a nation, the Turkish nation, and whoever was not Turkish was to be 
either excluded or made Turkish. 
The borders within which nation building would take place were not yet fixed and 
different CUP leaders had different views on the matter. Enver Pasha was particularly 
drawn to pan-Turkism and expansion into the Caucasus and Central Asia whereas Talat 
was oriented towards creating a smaller Turkish nation within Anatolia and his deportation 
and relocation scheme was executed within these boundaries.95 The defeat in war, the 
alliance with Soviet Russia, its financial support of the nationalists, and possibly practical 
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considerations (How was such a far-flung country to be administered with Anatolia looking 
towards Europe, Central Asia elsewhere? How could Turkish nationalism in Central Asia 
take foot if its dominant other, the Armenians and Greeks, were unknown there?) all put an 
end to pan-Turkism.96  
Settlement Policy 
The Law for the Settlement of Immigrants came into force on 13 May 1913. “Under 
this Law (sic!) a Directorate was established which would be reorganized as the General 
Directorate for (sic!) Settlement of Tribes and Refugees on 14 March 1916.”97 The IAMM 
organized the deportation and settlement of people and for this purpose collected economic 
and geographic data on the emptied villages as well as information on educational facilities 
to gage their ability to absorb immigrants.98 It also conducted anthropological research into 
the minorities of Turkey. There were sections for the study of Kizilbashs, Bektashis, Ahis, 
Armenians, tribes, sects, Alevis, Kurds and Turcomans.99 The motivation behind this was 
probably in part scholarly (interest in races during the period) and in part political (the wish 
to control them and ‘elevate’ certain groups, especially Kurds and nomads, to a ‘higher 
civilizational level’. Like the health provisions under Abdülhamid II, they both improved 
the population’s welfare and made it easier to control and regulate.  
The directions of displacement and resettlement were as follows: Kurds were moved 
from East to West across Anatolia; Bosnians and Albanians were moved in the opposite 
direction and Arabs, Assyrians100 and Circassians were moved from South to North across 
Syria and Anatolia. 
Certain zones were forbidden to certain ethnic groups. Strategic areas, islands, 
coastlines, the area along the railway lines and rivers were reserved for [‘]loyal[‘] 
elements. Moreover the Committee wanted to destroy the traditional structure of all 
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non-Turkish Muslim populations, and for this reason it separated them from their 
traditional chiefs, settling them among the Turkish population at such a rate as to 
constitute less than 10% of the total population.101 
 
Talat personally oversaw their Turkification and over a period of time inquired for 
example how many Kurds there were in a certain locality, whether they spoke Turkish or 
Kurdish and what kind of relations they had with Turks. He demanded that Kurds not make 
up more than five per cent of the population anywhere.102 Many of the deportees to the east 
were housed in empty Armenian and Syriac villages where they found the agricultural 
instruments they needed103 and the government provided them with seeds.104 This mass 
deportation went along with enormous suffering. Among the tens of thousands of Kurds 
who were deported in 1916, many died of the cold and hunger. 105 
Within five years a third of the Muslim population to live in Anatolia after WWI was 
moved: about two million Kurdish and Turcoman nomads, 5,000 Arab families from Syria, 
almost 1,5 million refugees from eastern Anatolia, nearly 400,000 Balkan refugees and 
several smaller groups.106 If we add to this two million Armenians and two million Greeks 
who were uprooted, we arrive at the staggering figure of eight million people who lost their 
homes and who had to make a new beginning elsewhere. This is almost two thirds of the 
13.6 million people living in Turkey in 1927.107 This far-flung resettlement program was 
part of Turkish nation building in that the uprooting and dispersion of millions of people 
deprived them of the strength their home territory and community had given them. With 
weakened communal and personal spirits, their assimilation into Turkishness was 
facilitated.   
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Assyrian Genocide
108
 
The Assyrian genocide extended geographically from the Southeast of Turkey 
(Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Van and Siirt) into northern Iran (Azerbaijan). The Ottoman army 
killed the primarily rural population of these regions both in its attempt to prevent 
communications between Ottoman Assyrians and the Russian forces in Iran and in order to 
clear the area of Assyrians forever.109 At least 250,000 Assyrians were killed, but probably 
more which equates to two thirds of the Assyrian population.110 The survivors were 
dispersed and either fled the region or settled again. Russia estimated that 8,000 Assyrians 
sought refuge in its empire.111 
Assyrians started to be removed from villages on the Iranian border long before the 
Ottoman Empire entered the war and. With the beginning deportation of the Armenians, 
Assyrians were often killed in place by Kurdish tribes and local militias after the 
Armenians had formed columns and been marched out of town.112  This often gave 
Armenians the false impression that Assyrians were spared from death.113 
Assyrians in some localities were indeed in contact with the Russians and received a 
small amount of arms and ammunition from them.114 The Assyrian tribes of the Hakkari 
mountains refused to be conscripted and in turn the Ottoman army attacked and killed its 
members and burnt down their villages to prevent them from ever returning. By Mai 1915, 
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massacres had become so frequent that an Assyrian tribal council declared war on the 
Ottoman Empire.115 As the fighting prolonged, the Assyrians withdrew higher and higher 
into the mountains in the summer of 1915 where many starved.116 Others fled to Iran where 
they died from exposure in the following winter. In the countryside, a higher percentage of 
Assyrians was killed than in the cities which leads Gaunt to suggest that “an important 
material objective was to seize land.”117 Thus, “[...] the annihilation of the Assyrians did 
not occur through deportations, but rather through an enormous military invasion that 
pushed them out of their ancestral homes.”118 Their houses, churches and relics were 
destroyed immediately to erase all signs of Assyrian culture.119 
As for the number of Assyrians killed and those surviving in place, in Diyarbekir 
vilayet 140,000 disappeared or were killed and 30,000 remained after 1916. In the sanjak of 
Mardin 50,000 disappeared or were killed and 30,000 remained after their persecution.120 
Surviving women and girls were married to Muslims as were Armenians during the same 
period. Interestingly, officials who refused to carry out orders were removed from office or 
even killed121 which had not happened in 1895-96, when many Muslim officials had 
prevented the killing of Armenians under their jurisdiction. This points to the determination 
and ruthlessness of the CUP in reaching its goal once World War I had broken out.  
Gaunt concludes his analysis of the Assyrian genocide with a comparison to the 
Armenian experience: 
They were targeted for eradication and ethnic cleansing for some of the same 
reasons – suspected disloyalty and collaboration with the enemy. Even the weakest 
sign of self-defense met with disproportionate violence. Both groups were pushed out 
of their home territories at the same time in 1914 and 1915. they were subjected to 
indiscriminate mass violence orchestrated by high Ottoman officials, backed up by 
neighboring tribesmen.122 
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Elimination of Armenian, Greek and Assyrian Heritage 
Nation builders require a slate as clean as possible for their building activities. The 
mere removal of unwanted populations is not enough since proof of their former existence 
in the country still exists, especially in the form of place names, buildings, monuments and 
graveyards. Between 1915 and 1990, Ottoman and Republican authorities undertook four 
campaigns to replace non-Turkish place names by Turkish ones, from 1915-22, 1922-50, 
1950-80 and in the 1980s. As for the first wave, the CUP changed the names of Armenian 
villages that had been evacuated within weeks of declaring the deportation law on 27 May 
1915.123 Military commanders fighting Greek troops in Western Anatolia often renamed 
places on the spot and against the wishes of the government that feared it would impede 
military communications.124 According to Öktem, this was not yet a systematic effort at 
erasing all non-Turkish place names but rather “a spontaneous initiative by military 
commanders, local administrators and [p]arliamentarians, competing to outdo each other in 
proving their nationalist credentials.”125 The fact that they were more eager Turkifiers than 
the government is an interesting observation that will recur in later waves of renaming and 
that also has a parallel in the Citizen Speak Turkish campaign in which activists likewise 
outdid the government.  
As for Assyrian, Armenian and Greek material heritage, it was deliberately destroyed, 
ruined through neglect or ‘reinterpreted’, i.e. given a Muslim ancestry. This started almost 
right after the act of expulsion or killing or assimilation and continues, somehow modified, 
until today. To give a few examples of Assyrian monuments, in Mardin, the Syriac Catholic 
Patriarchate was turned into a gendarmerie in the early years of the republic and the 
monastery flattened in 1930 and first turned into a park, then into the Square of the 
Republic.126 In Sis, the Armenian monastery was destroyed. But in spite of the nationalists’ 
efforts, this erasure was not complete because locals did not always cooperate with them. 
As Öktem notes, “many hints and traces of the city’s [Urfa’s] once multicultural heritage 
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remain. Pockets of semi-conscious resistance seem to exist at the local level, defying ethno-
religious readings of history, and therefore allowing for a reconstruction of the city’s 
bygone heterogeneity.”127  
Interim Period: Istanbul Government (1918-1923) and Provisional Government 
(1920-1923) 
In the five-year period between the end of CUP rule and the establishment of the 
Turkish Republic, there were two opposed nation building projects under way, that of the 
last Ottoman government in Istanbul and that of the nationalists in central Anatolia and 
Ankara. For most of the interim period, the party in government in Istanbul was the 
Freedom and Coalition Party (a.k.a. Liberal Entente), which was the CUP’s sworn enemy. 
“The very day after their rise to power, they immediately began reversing CUP policies: 
Armenians and Kurds were encouraged to return, orphans were allowed to go back to their 
families”128 and commissions for the restitution of property were set up that consisted of 
local Greeks, Armenians and Muslims. The rates of return, though, varied widely.129 Most 
importantly, “the Ottoman press broadly exposed and discussed CUP war crimes.”130 Under 
British pressure, four major trials were set up as part of the courts martial in the period 
1919-1920 with the aim of prosecuting those guilty of having killed Ottoman Armenians. 
The trials dealt with the massacres in Trebizond and Yozgat, lower-level CUP leaders who 
were involved in the Special Organizations and wartime Turkish cabinet members.131 Many 
more trials were planned but never held. Nevertheless, at least some of the accused were 
sentenced to hard labor or death and hanged.132 The Liberal Entente’s vision of the nation 
was heterogeneous; it meant Christians to be equal citizens and sought their redress in the 
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trials. However, it only lasted for as long as the nationalists in Anatolia took to organize 
themselves and to defeat the occupiers and therefore had little effect in the long run. The 
nationalists in inner Anatolia perpetuated the radicalized CUP vision of the nation: 
When these verdicts were announced, there were angry protests, especially among 
the new nationalists of Mustafa Kemal’s movement. [...] Kemal Bey was hanged on 
April 10th, and the funeral that followed created mayhem as hundreds of CUP 
members with wreaths reading ‘to the innocent victim of the nation,’ and the softas 
rallied vowing to destroy the English.133 
 
By the end of 1919, the Ottoman and British commitment to the prosecution of those 
guilty of crimes against the Armenians waned. “More and more, the British looked on as 
the Ottoman officials who were running the trials appeased the Kemalists by freeing 
prisoners or handing out light sentences.”134 By 1921, the British had abandoned the idea of 
war crime trials in Turkey and agreed on exchanging their Turkish prisoners held in Malta 
against British prisoners held in Turkey. The majority of perpetrators thus escaped 
punishment. With the nationalists’ victory in the war of liberation and the establishment of 
the republic, they were in a position to determine nation building in the whole country and 
for decades to come.  
Kemalists ation Building 1923 - 1950 
The nation the Kemalists had in mind was to be limited to Turkey (with the exception 
of Mosul and Hatay, they had given up irredentist plans) but to grow fast which is why they 
invited the immigration of, preferably Turkish, Muslims from the Balkans. Their nation 
building was pseudo-scientific and marked by scrupulous planning and recordkeeping. 
Every citizen was to become ‘modern’ by deemphasizing his religiosity, becoming 
exclusively Turkish speaking, being proud of his Turkishness and aware of Turks’ 
civilizational achievements in history. The main victim of Kemalist nation building were 
the Kurds, Jews and remaining Armenians. 
                                                 
133 Balakian (2003: 337).  
134 Balakian (2003: 344).  
  49
When the CUP dissolved itself in 1918, it continued functioning under other names 
and succeeded in launching Mustafa Kemal to organize the Anatolian resistance it 
had planned since 1914. After a transition process many of the CUP’s diligent social 
engineers ended up working for Mustafa Kemal’s Republican People’s Party (RPP). 
[...] The ultimate totalitarian aim of this cohort of men was to continue recreating the 
population in their own image and to extinguish the plurality and differentiation of it 
[...] As such, the Greco-Turkish and Armeno-Turkish wars (1919-1923) were in 
essence processes of state formation that represented a continuation of ethnic 
unmixing and exclusion of Ottoman Christians from Anatolia.135  
 
“[Early] republican nationalism was premised on an ethnically-defined Turkishness, 
and remained hostile to alternative constructions of identity.”136 It targeted not only the 
remaining members of the Christian minorities, but also Muslims and speakers of 
languages other than Turkish (e.g. Albanians and Arabs). By far the largest group, probably 
the vast majority of the population, were Muslims, Turkish, Bosniak, Albanian and others. 
Most Muslim communities were seen as “assimilable raw ethnic material”. As for non-
Muslims, there was disagreement over the degree to which they were turkifiable and 
whether this was desirable as seen in the Citizen Speak Turkish campaign and in the 
context of Jewish schools.137  
 
‘Secularization’ meant that Muslim religiosity was brought under state control and 
discouraged, because the state was no longer pro-Islamic as under the Sultan, but anti-
religious. Pious Muslims were excluded from state offices and could not become big in 
business.138 For Turkish nationalists, the golden age of Turkism was pre-Islamic times, not 
the early Ottoman Empire. As Aslan rightly marks, one of the paradoxes of the definition of 
Turkishness was that it was marked by an individual’s faith, or more precisely by whether 
he was Muslim or not, even though secularism was one of the main pillars of Kemalism.139 
This is an example of imperial heritage in a nation state. 
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[The] founders of the republic differed from early Turkists in one important respect: 
whereas Gökalp and his predecessors saw Ottoman history as part and parcel of 
Turkish history, they strove to cut off the new republic from its immediate past, 
which they depicted as a period of decay and self-denial. Instead, they romanticized 
the Turks’ pre-Islamic past, presenting it as a quasi-mythical ‘golden age’. The main 
tool used to inculcate this new historical vision was education.140 
 
For the purpose of increasing the percentage of Muslims in the population and for 
increasing its size overall, Turkey concluded treaties with Greece, Bulgaria and Romania to 
settle the Muslims of these countries in Turkey. Within ten years, between 1923 and 1933, 
around 600,000 Muslims arrived in Turkey. They were primarily settled in Thrace (which 
had been devastated by the wars and where the conditions of settlement were still desolate 
and chaotic in the mid-thirties) as well as in the East. The government therefore proclaimed 
a stop to further settlement in 1934.141  It is probably no coincidence that the Thrakia 
pogroms took place just then because the immigrants’ living circumstances were very 
difficult. 
Law on the Unification of Education 1924 
This law brought all schools under the control of the government, imposed a state 
curriculum and stipulated a year later that at least five hours of Turkish had to be taught at 
minority schools. Subsequently all teachers at minority schools had to speak Turkish as 
their mother tongue and in 1931 all Turkish children had to get their primary education at 
Turkish schools.142 
The Jewish case is curious and contradictory. According to Pekesen, the Jewish 
community was forced to renounce its minority status which ended its communal self-
management and brought Jewish institutions, schools and social foundations under the 
control of the state.143 It also implied that Jewish minority schools become Turkish state 
schools. Bali, however, suggests that a Jewish community leader decided that the Jewish 
                                                 
140 Özkirimli and Sofos (2008: 91).  
141 Pekesen (2010: 12).  
142 Aslan (2007: 251).  
143 Pekesen (2010: 7).  
  51
community had no option but to get turkified. He therefore went to Ankara to suggest that 
the Jewish minority private schools were turned into state schools, with the expenses 
covered by the community. However, this was refused. 
[The] only explanation given by the anonymous Jewish leader about why Ankara 
refused is that according to him the Turks wanted the Jews to remain Jews and not 
assimilate into Turkishness so that they could be identified. The idea was, ‘We don’t 
need them to be turkified, we need to be able to identify them so that, eventually, we 
can squeeze them financially.’144 
 
According to Bali, there were two factions among the nation builders in the 1920s, 
the one that thought that non-Muslims could be turkified and that this was desirable and 
another that maintained that non-Muslims could never become real Turks and that they 
were better marked as outsiders.  
Suppression of the Şeyh Sait Revolt 1925  
With the deportation and killing of the Armenians, Kurds became the biggest 
minority in Turkey. In the country as a whole they represented 20 per cent of the population 
and their territories made up 30 per cent of the total land mass.145 In Eastern Anatolia, these 
figures were of course much higher. Van Bruinessen is right in noting that as “cynical as it 
may sound, it was the [Armenian] massacres that made a Kurdish state feasible”146 because 
Armenians had been about as numerable as Kurds there and made claims to the same 
territory. The Armenians’ removal meant that the percentage of Kurds in the eastern 
provinces shot up and made the realization of a Kurdish national project less unlikely, 
though it never became a mass project. 
The Şeyh Sait revolt was one of many Kurdish revolts in late Ottoman and early 
Republican times. What sets it apart from the earlier ones like the Koçgiri rebellion (1921) 
is that the new Turkish state departed from the established pattern of dealing with 
rebellions by using massive violence and crushing the revolt rather than negotiating a 
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compromise. The revolt had Islamic religious and Kurdish nationalist motives and was 
supported by Zaza-speaking Sunni Kurds under the leadership of Şeyh Sait and other 
traditional dignitaries. “It was as much a revolt against the secularist and anti-Islamic 
tendencies of the new regime as it was the first stirrings, albeit regionally circumscribed, of 
Kurdish nationalism.”147 The abolition of the Sultanate, the dissolution of the First National 
Assembly and the proclamation of the Republic without popular consultation148 for them all 
meant an end to the Ottoman legacy and to Muslim fraternity. For as long as Kurdishness 
had been identified with Islam, Turks and Kurds had been in alliance.149 But as soon as 
Islam as the unifying factor was largely replaced by ethnicity as the touchstone for 
inclusion into the nation, Kurds feared that they would suffer the same fate as the 
Armenians in 1915. They, too, would be regarded as obstacles on the way to demographic 
homogenity.  
Earlier Kurdish rebellions and the state’s response had followed certain unwritten 
laws, their interaction was understood as a negotiation, a give and take, between the 
rebellious tribe and the Ottoman state. “The rebellion was an instrument for the renewal of 
the unwritten contract of rights versus obedience and legitimization.”150 However, the 
Turkish republic departed from the established pattern by crushing the rebellion.  
The massive coercion used to crush the rebellion (the imposition of special military 
rule, installation of a General Inspectorate, massacres, the prohibition of symbolic 
resources such as the Kurdish language and culture, cartoons humiliating not only the 
chiefs of the rebellion, but the Kurds as a whole) showed clearly that henceforth the 
relations of domination between the state and the Kurds would involve systematic 
persecution, marginalization and humiliation of Kurdishness.151 
 
Its leaders were hanged, more than two hundred villages pillaged, over eight thousand 
houses destroyed and 15,000 Kurds killed. Bozarslan interprets the rebellion as a serious 
challenge to Kemalist power as evidenced by the fact that its repression cost one third of 
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the annual budget.152 Van Bruinessen disagrees with this assessment but states that it was 
significant in that it “accelerated the trend towards authoritarian government and ushered in 
policies which deliberately aimed at destroying Kurdish ethnicity.”153 This led to a chain of 
other rebellions that only ended in 1938.  
‘Reform Council of the East’ 1925 
Mustafa Kemal authorized a special council (‘Reform Council of the East’) chaired 
by Đnönü to devise a report that would serve as a blueprint for the pursuit of Young Turk 
social engineering in Eastern Turkey. 
On the one hand, these exhortations constituted a carte blanche to the various 
Young Turks descending on the East that the restraints under which they had 
operated thus far, if any, were now lifted. No one was going to be called to account 
for being too energetic or ruthless. On the contrary, ambitious Young Turks now had 
to prove themselves capable of living up to their rhetoric.154 
 
The final report, signed 24 September 1925, suggested that the Eastern provinces be 
indefinitely ruled by martial law, that the Kurdish intelligentsia and chieftain class be 
prevented from reviving as a ruling class once and for all, that undesirables be resettled and 
that no language other than Turkish be spoken east of the Euphrates.155 A detailed, top-
secret inventory of Kurdish tribes, their relationships and ‘loyalty’ to the state was also 
produced 156 which may be the precursor to the one that is in use among the upper 
bureaucracy until today.157 In Üngör’s words, this 
was nothing short of a radical expansion of existing Young Turk fantasies and 
methods of social engineering. It reflected a staunch belief in the feasibility of 
creating a society through large-scale, top-down authoritarian politics, coupled with 
an ethno-nationalist vision of ‘landscaping the human garden’ at distance. In previous 
explorations this approach had been characterized by Cemil Uybadın as a ‘colonial 
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administrative method’, thus explicating the plan as a form of internal colonization 
(Bayrak 1993: 467-480).158 
Law on Settlement 1926 
This law shows clearly that it was not only in the 1930s that Turkish nationalism 
assumed an ethnic slant but that this had already happened ten years earlier in the law on 
settlement which discriminated heavily against certain ethnicities. 159 The law was security-
centered in that it grouped prospective immigrants according to the threat they posed to 
Turkey in the state’s eyes. Those it thought of as harmless and easily assimilable were 
declared to be ‘of Turkish culture’ while those suspected of resisting Turkification were 
declared not to be of Turkish culture. Among the former were Pomaks, Bosnians and 
Tatars160 and among the latter Albanians. The latter’s immigration was restricted and the 
reason for this was probably that they had risen against the Ottoman Empire in 1912 and set 
up their own nation state.161  
The settlement provisions also reflect the law’s concern with security. The settling of 
Albanians or Bosnians in Thrace and Eastern and Western Anatolia was forbidden and the 
settlement of Georgians and Azeris regarded with suspicion. The immigration of White 
Russians was not permitted.162 People ‘lacking Turkish culture’ were not allowed to make 
up more than 20 per cent of the population of any town or village.163 Others not allowed 
into the country were people 
who are infected with syphilis, who are subject to leprosy and their families, who 
are imprisoned because of committing murder except [for] political and military 
reasons, anarchists, spies, gypsies, and [those] who are exiled outside of the country 
cannot be admitted.164 
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The Ministry of the Interior compiled extremely detailed lists that informed about the 
ethnic and linguistic makeup of a region not on village or hamlet level, but on a street-by-
street level. It would say, for instance, that 48 Bosnians inhabited Đhsaniye Street which 
made them 100 per cent of the population there whereas in another street 422 Turks 
constituted 99.2 per cent of the population.165Many immigrants left their designated place 
of settlement because the climate or soil did not suit them or because they were separated 
from family members. This flight was a problem for the Ministry of Exchange, 
Reconstruction and Settlement since it thwarted its assimilation efforts.166 After a 
parliamentary debate attacking the ministry’s failures, it was closed in December 1924.167 
Citizen Speak Turkish Campaign 1928 
This campaign put pressure on non-Turkish speakers to speak Turkish in public and 
was initiated by university students in 1928. It gained momentum in the early thirties and 
lasted into the 1940s, supported by the rise of fascism in Europe.168 Though there were 
many communities in Turkey that spoke languages other than Turkish (Kurds, Cretans, 
Arabs, Armenians, Albanians and Assyrians among others)169 and that were threatened, 
fined and arrested170 for not speaking Turkish in public, Jews were the campaigners’ prime 
target. 
In 1927, 85 percent of the Jews in European Turkey spoke Ladino as their mother 
tongue171 and Jews made up more than 10% of Izmir’s population.172 There were mainly 
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two reasons for the targeting of Jews who spoke Ladino and/or French. One was to curb 
their economic power and the other possibly to force Turkish Jews to take a clear stand and 
to either become indistinguishably Turkish or to choose ‘otherness’ and leave.   
Aslan states that the campaign was “first and foremost an attempt to mobilize for the 
creation of a Muslim-Turkish bourgeoisie by curbing the power of non-Muslims in the 
economy.”173 Jews had stepped into the void left in the economy with the Armenian-Greek 
absence.174 The idea behind the campaign was probably that the time it took Jewish 
businessmen to learn Turkish would give Turkish-speaking aspiring businessmen a chance 
to catch up or to take over their businesses. Additionally, the campaign may have served as 
a vent for the nationalists’ frustration at their continued lagging behind minority 
businessmen. Jews were an easy target since they could not expect support from any 
outside power.175  
As for the second reason, the Jewish community was the only one from among the 
minorities that had a chance of becoming Turkish in the eyes of at least one group of 
nationalists. While Armenians and Greeks were already beyond redeem (they had 
completely discredited themselves as candidates for Turkification during the war years), 
Jews stood a chance of being modeled into Turks in the eyes of the state. After all they had 
no record of ‘siding with the enemy’, harbored no aspirations for Turkish territory and 
seemed willing to assimilate as evidenced by their setting up Turkish language societies, 
classes and circles. For the state it was enough if Jews only spoke Turkish to become fully 
Turkish. But according to Aslan, the ‘missionaries’ (nationalist activists) who initiated the 
campaign were not content with Jews only speaking Turkish, they wanted them to become 
Muslim, too. According to her, the reasoning behind this was that Jews would never accept 
this which would give the state the right to exclude them from citizenship. 176 So according 
to this interpretation, the missionaries made demands on Jews that were impossible to 
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fulfill because they did not want them to become part of ‘Turkish culture’.177 The idea is an 
interesting one but not particularly well supported. It agrees, though, with Bali’s hypothesis 
with regard to Jewish schools. 
The state’s attitude towards the campaign was ambivalent, at times it supported the 
campaign and at times quelled it by ordering the campaigners to be moderate. What is more 
striking is that on the whole, the state was less radical than the campaigners. The state-
sponsored Türk Ocakları, for example, opposed the use of violence to impose Turkish on 
everyone and bills that aimed at making Turkish compulsory in public did not pass in 
parliament.178 The longevity and ardor of the campaign was due to the ‘missionaries’ who 
saw it as their civic duty to exhort their fellow citizens to be deserving citizens of Turkey 
by giving up any language other than Turkish. They were an important factor in nation 
building. 
Law on Family ames 1934 
Everybody had to have a family name but it was forbidden to take the name of a tribe, 
foreign race or nation as family name. “The Greeks of Turkey would Turkify their names 
by dropping the ‘-dis’ and ‘pulos’ suffixes. Most of the Jews would Turkify their names 
and surnames by finding a Turkish equivalent for each Jewish name.”179 Though in no way 
violent, it was part of Turkification in that it robbed the minorities of part of their 
distinctness and their own culture and forced them to fit in more. Many members of the 
minorities chose to give their children names that did not mark them as members of a 
minority and expose them to discrimination, for example names that were used by both 
Armenians and Turks. One could call this a form of self-censorship, the state did not 
require it, there was no law against using Christian names, but the disadvantages of bearing 
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one were so great that many decided against it and assimilated themselves further than was 
demanded.180  
Thrakia Pogrom Against Jews 1934 
The Thrakia pogrom against Jews took place in the summer of 1934 first in 
Çanakkale and then Edirne, Kırklareli, Uzunköprü, Kırklareli and Babaeski. Non-Jewish 
residents attacked their Jewish neighbors, plundered their stores and homes, boycotted their 
shops, prevented them from doing business, abused them and raped women. In some cases 
the police intervened, in others they were bystanders. The authorities made empty promises 
for the victims’ safety and then deported them to Istanbul.181 Between 3,000 and 10,000 
people fled to Istanbul, the Balkan states or Palestine, often at night to avoid being 
robbed.182 About half of those who had fled to Istanbul returned to Edirne and Çanakkale 
but as their discrimination  continued during the following years (boycotts, humiliation, 
press attacks, the factual expropriation through the wealth tax and the recruitment into the 
army during WWII), the returnees left for good so that virtually no Jews were left in that 
part of Turkey.183  
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Bali gives three reasons for this attack on Jews in that part of Turkey and at that 
particular time: The militarization of the Thrace region, economic nationalism and the 
continuing drive to homogenize the population. I would add as a further motive the 
government’s wish to divert the anger and frustration many of the destitute Muslim 
refugees felt against the Turkish government.  By channeling these sentiments against the 
Jews of the district, the government avoided its own blame and for the refugees it was an 
opportunity for improving their material condition by moving into Jewish houses and using 
their household goods. 
To return to the economic motive, Jews were concentrated in the upper economic 
class of Thrace’s main cities.184 In contrast to the other two official minorities, they had not 
suffered through expropriation and expulsion until then but stayed in possession of their 
goods and their possession. This changed with the pogrom of 1934 during which people 
fled in such haste that they could take only few or no belongings with them, or had to sell 
them for a pittance. When Inönü officially visited Thrace, he did not visit the Jewish 
community leadership nor did the state compensate the Jews for their losses.185 It was local 
CHP bodies and nationalist groups that took the initiative in expelling Thrace’s Jews when 
they heard that within the next weeks the 1934 settlement law would be applied.186 There is 
also evidence that at least parts of the government knew what was going to happen. The 
general inspector for Thrace Ibrahim Tali, for instance, recommended the removal of Jews 
from the economy of Thrace.187 Thus the government and administration were at least 
willing to expel the Jews, even if they did not (fully) plan it.  
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Law on Settlement 1934 
This law divided the country into three zones of settlement and the population into 
three groups according to their degree of ‘being of Turkish culture’. According to this law, 
any Muslim who spoke Turkish and no language besides it was considered as being ‘of 
Turkish culture’. Non-Turkish speaking Muslims such as Pomaks, Bosnians, Tatars and 
Karapapaks, Muslim Georgian, Lezgi, Chechen, Circassian and Abkhazians188 were 
regarded as being ‘close to Turkish culture’. They were allowed to immigrate and given 
papers but had to become assimilated to Turkishness as quickly as possible by learning 
Turkish and not passing on their mother tongue. Whoever was neither Muslim nor 
exclusively Turkish-speaking such as Jews, Armenians, Greeks, Assyrians was ‘not of 
Turkish culture’ and to be treated as a foreigner. 
According to one’s degree of ‘having Turkish culture’, one was then assigned a place 
where one could settle, had to settle, or was under no circumstances allowed to settle. 
Immigrants ‘of Turkish culture’ were settled in Kurdish areas,189 ‘sensitive’ areas by 
railways, highways, natural resources, borders and bridges190 and probably also in the 
border region Thrace191 because they were regarded as loyal and able to dilute the 
population ‘of non-Turkish culture’. These immigrants ‘of Turkish culture’ were given land 
from the public treasury as an incentive for settlement. 192 Individuals ‘close to Turkish 
culture’ were forbidden from establishing villages and districts or to concentrate away from 
‘Turks’. People ‘not of Turkish culture’ were forbidden from settling in the security zone. It 
is probably for this reason that some Armenians were forced to abandon their homes in the 
East for urban centers in the West during this period.193 The settlement law only legalized 
practices that had been happening all along, since the 20s or actually the Balkan wars,194 
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namely the assimilation of ‘non-Turkish’ Muslim immigrants by settling them among 
‘Turks’ and the assimilation of Kurds by settling ‘Turkish’ Muslim immigrants among 
them. Van Bruinessen writes that “[t]his is clearly more than just legal discrimination; the 
Law on Resettlement provides the legal framework for a policy of ethnocide.”195 
In the 1920s and 1930s, the Turkish state actively promoted the immigration of 
Muslims from the Balkans. The rationale was that Turkey was depopulated after the wars 
and therefore needed repopulation and that Muslim immigrants would strengthen the 
cohesion of the nation in the making. In the years from 1923 to 1939, 800,000 people 
entered Turkey from Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia.196 The idea that there 
were millions of Turks in the Balkans, some of whom were unaware of their Turkishness 
and who had to be brought to Turkey, had been formulated as early as 1923.197 
The provinces with the highest percentage of people who were considered not to be 
‘of Turkish culture’ were of course the Kurdish ones. “While the rebellious Kurds were 
deported to the western parts of the country, the government intended to colonize the 
Eastern Provinces with the Turkish immigrants of [...] Caucasian and, especially, Balkan 
origins.”198 In the course of this forced resettlement, they were also expropriated. “Their 
[the Cemilpaşazade family’s] businesses and property, including a huge mansion in 
Diyarbekir city, were transferred to the state and to Turkish owners.”199 Also included was 
the settlement of nomads, such as the Armenian-speaking Hemşinli from Artvin province, 
whose lifestyle was regarded as contradicting that of civilized, modern people.200 
The settlement and assimilation policies were nation-building policies more than 
anything else. Sure, the country and population were devastated, and needed rebuilding, but 
the government could have done this by improving infrastructure, housing, agriculture and 
industry. Instead, it increased the housing problem by bringing hundreds of thousands of 
people into the country who were poor, had no special skills and who were often unfamiliar 
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with the climate and crops of their new place of settlement. This created social tensions and 
exacerbated the existing problems. Ülker writes that “[i]ncreasing the population was 
regarded as an urgent necessity for both economic and social reasons. Thus bringing the 
Muslims residing outside of the country was seen as a solution to the demographic 
problems.” The government must have thought that in the long run the gain of a bigger, 
more homogenous population would be worth the short-term difficulties.  
Suppression of the Dersim Revolt 1936-1938 
Dersim was a mountainous and extremely poor area inhabited by mostly Zaza-
speaking Alevis that had never been under government control. 201 In 1936, the Turkish 
state established a military government in the area and started building roads, bridges and 
setting up police posts to bring it under state control. What the state perceived as a rebellion 
against centralization may have been merely an instance of intertribal violence that it 
misinterpreted or took as a convenient excuse for starting the confrontation.202 If it was a 
rebellion, its main motive was probably resistance to the state’s ‘civilizing mission’ and to 
government interference with tribal affair.203 The government presented its war on the 
Kurds of Dersim as a fight against ‘feudalism’ and backwardness, when actually, it was a 
fight against “Kurdish ethnic identity. The brutal Dersim campaign was but the culmination 
of a series of measures taken in order to forcibly assimilate the Kurds [...].”204 Ironically, it 
was already taboo to speak of Kurds by that time, so that the attacks were carried out 
against ‘Turks’ who were not Turkish enough.  
In the course of two campaigns in 1937 and 1938, the Kurds of Dersim were attacked 
from the air and on the ground and thousands, including children, were massacred, burnt 
alive, suffocated in caves, tortured and possibly attacked with poisonous gas. The members 
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of tribes that had always been loyal to the government were targeted as well. 205  Girls and 
women committed suicide en masse and even the young men from Dersim who were doing 
their military service were taken from their regiments and shot.206 “The British consul in 
Trabzon specifically likened the mass killings there to those of the Armenians in 1915-
16.”207 Van Bruinessen estimates that up to ten per cent of the entire population of Dersim 
may have been killed.208 The survivors were robbed of their cattle, their fields and villages 
burned and they themselves deported to central Anatolia. No reliable survey has yet 
succeeded in accurately estimating the casualties of these three attacks against Kurds. 
Levene writes that the Turkish communist party calculates that between one and one and a 
half million were (sic!) Kurds deported and massacred between 1925 and 1938.”209 
Denaturalization of Turkish Jews 1940-45 
Laws and decrees to ensure the legality of denaturalization were passed in 1927, 
1928, 1933, 1935 and 1938. They established a legal basis for the withdrawal of citizenship 
from citizens who had not taken part in the war of liberation, who had deserted the army, 
not done military service or fled abroad and not registered with a Turkish consulate within 
five years or who were regarded as not being ‘of Turkish culture’.210 “[...] the laws were 
designed to deprive unwanted sections of the population of their Turkish citizenship.”211 As 
is clear from the fact that they were never used against Muslims and that they were used 
against people who had no way of satisfying the law (such as when women and babies were 
stripped of their citizenship for not having taken part in the war of liberation or when Jews 
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living in the West were punished for not having taken part in the national struggle in central 
and southern Anatolia).  
Before and during World War II and at the same time that Turkey invited dozens of 
German-speaking Jewish scholars and scientists to seek refuge from the Nazis in Turkey, 
Turkey also denaturalized more of its own Jews (Turkish Jews living in Europe) than at any 
earlier time. It was concerned that its Jewish citizens would otherwise return to Turkey en 
masse, play a role again in the economy and swart the homogenization project. At the 
beginning of WWII 20,000 Turkish Jews were living in Europe, about half of them in 
France.212 Most of them had emigrated to Europe in the period 1909 to 1923 because they 
wanted to avoid being drafted into the army, suffering in the wars and because of the 
Turkification of the economy.213 The Nazis, who were interested in good relations with 
Turkey, gave Turkey several opportunities to repatriate the Jews it had denaturalized, and 
extended the deadline repeatedly between 1941 and 1944.214 But far from protecting its 
former citizens, the Turkish state increased its rate of denaturalization, thereby exposing 
more Jews to the risk of being deported and killed by the Nazis. In 1943 and 1944, 2,000 
Turkish citizens were deprived of their citizenship and between 80 and 90 per cent were 
Jewish.215 Turkey even collaborated with the Nazis in that it asked them to interview 
Turkish Jews living in areas occupied by the Nazis and to deliver to them Turkey’s decision 
to denaturalize them. This meant that the Nazis knew immediately who had become 
stateless and was therefore without protection so that they could deport him.216 Görgü 
Guttstadt notes that “[c]ompared with the total number of Turkish Jews in Europe during 
the Holocaust, the number of rescue attempts appears minimal.”217 
Only in spring 1944, when the German defeat was obvious and Turkey started to 
bet on the winning horse in its foreign relations, did international pressure enable 
several hundred Jews to be transported from France to Turkey in six trains.218 
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But even as late as spring 1945, Turkish authorities did everything to prevent the now 
stateless Jews from entering the country. The ship Drottningholm arrived in Istanbul on 11 
March 1945 as part of an exchange of civilian prisoners of war between Turkey and 
Germany. It carried 137 Jews of Turkish origin who were survivors of concentration camps 
in Germany. Even though the horrors they had experienced were known to Ankara, it 
allowed only a minority of them to disembark and only after lengthy negotiations did it 
allow the rest to leave the ship and to be “interned in three hotels in Istanbul, with the 
Jewish Agency covering the costs.”219 
Labor Battalions 1941-1942 
During World War II, non-Muslims had to work in labor battalions rather than serve 
as regular soldiers carrying weapons. This was either because the state felt it could not trust 
them enough or because it meant to humiliate them. In any case this must have brought 
back very bad memories of World War I during which virtually all Armenians working in 
labor battalions were shot. After a year, in 1942, the labor battalions were discharged from 
duty. But the next visitation followed on its heel, namely the wealth tax (see chapters five 
and seven).220 As a consequence of this humiliating and exploitative treatment of the 
minorities, 4,000 Turkish Jews emigrated and another 5,000 applied for emigration in 1943 
and 1944.221 From among the 77,000 Jews still living in Turkey in 1945, forty per cent 
emigrated between 1948-49 which shows that there were not only push factors at play but 
also a considerable pull factor, the establishment of the state of Israel. The exodus of Jews 
gathered pace again after the 1955 pogroms, with almost 10,000 more Jews leaving Turkey 
for various countries as of 1960.222 
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The 1950s and 1960s 
The year 1950 was the end of the Young Turk period according to Zürcher’s 
definition of Young Turks, it was the beginning of the multi-party period and of the 
reestablishment of democracy in Turkey. Üngör states that 
[o]nly when the Young Turks lost power in the elections of 1950 their high-
modernist projects of social engineering were halted. By that time, the human map of 
Eastern Turkey had been radically altered.223 
 
As we will see, this was not the case, nation building through social engineering 
continued of which the pogrom of 1955 is the best example.  
Renaming in the 1950s 
Öktem recognizes that the change of the party in government made no change at all 
as long as the bureaucracy remained unchanged. “In the wake of multi-party politics in 
1950 and the ascent to power of the culturally conservative Democrat Party, the most 
systematic phase of the renaming of villages and topography began.”224 The Democrat 
Party, though, was not too keen on change, it would have liked to revert the language 
reform and it was discontent with the secularization of toponyms (those with religious 
connotations such as şeyh, molla, hacı, kilise, keşişlik had been replaced).225 The state 
apparatus established a commission but, surprisingly, local resistance in the provincial 
councils slowed down name changes since these had to be confirmed by elected councils, 
not by the Ankara-appointed governors.226 In 1959, however, an amendment conferred the 
right to decide on name change to the provincial administration. From then on, name 
change was “a project of the bureaucratic elites that would be continued irrespective of the 
political party in governments.”227 After the 1960 coup, the military-appointed government 
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reinforced the principles of the language reform and renaming policy.228 The commission’s 
directory introduced more than 12,000 toponyms, thereby replacing thirty percent of the 
45,000 village names in Turkey.229 
 
The migration from the countryside to the cities that assumed large proportions in the 
1960s, though no nation-building design, probably contributed to the homogenization of the 
population even though unemployment affected Muslims and non-Muslims equally. But 
once in the city, Kurds or Assyrians who may only have spoken Kurdish or Syriac in their 
villages were in close contact with Turks all the time and had to learn Turkish or speak 
Turkish rather than their mother tongues so as not to be conspicuous. They probably also 
had to compromise some of their customs so that they assimilated to their Turkish 
surroundings.  
Emigration from Turkey is another case in point: Among the tens of thousands of 
people who started emigrating from Turkey in the 1960s in search of work, for political 
reasons or because of war and persecution at home, there was a disproportionately high 
number of minorities. One reason is that, being minorities, they faced more social pressure 
and discrimination than mainstream Sunni Turks. Another reason is that in the 1980s the 
Southeast of Turkey which was still the most heterogeneous part of the country (Alevis, 
Yezidis, Assyrians, Armenians, Muslims, Kurds), turned into a war zone. Many never 
returned which was at least in part a result of Turkish nation building and certainly 
contributed to it.  
Renaming in the 1970s 
The 1970s saw the fourth wave of the country-wide renaming of places. By the end of 
the decade, about 36 per cent of all villages in Turkey had been renamed. In Western and 
central Anatolia the percentage of changed village names was below a third, but in the East 
and Southeast it was anywhere between 44 and 91 per cent because these had been the most 
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ethnically mixed parts of Turkey. At the same time, in 1978, the commission was again 
resolved, reportedly because the prime ministry objected to its zeal in changing historical 
place names which caused confusion in the tourism industry as ancient Roman and Greek 
sites could no longer be found on the new maps.230 This is another instance of disagreement 
over the extent and pace of Turkification. 
Öktem concludes his observations of name change by stating that 
the period between the 1950s and the 1980s hosts the most momentous changes to 
Turkey’s toponymy, with the grip of the commission getting ever tighter and reaching 
out ever further, into hamlets, alms, pastures, mountains and rivers. A new pattern 
also emerges: Democratically elected governments even if they do not always stop 
the practice [of] renaming, are remarkably less inclined to support and facilitate the 
commission’s work. Considered in this light, the turkification of Turkey’s time and 
space emerges as a policy of bureaucratic elites that lingered on during democratic 
periods and was imbued with renewed vehemence during the interludes of military 
rule.231 
 
This is a very good point that was also made with regard to the Citizen Speak Turkish 
campaign. It would be worth investigating disagreement over Turkification during the war 
years, whether at that time the roles between the government and bureaucracy were 
reversed, the bureaucracy holding back and the government pressing for radical change.  
Conclusion 
Minorities in the sense of linguistically, religiously or ethnically distinct groups 
suffered heavily under Turkish nation building because the more the definition of who 
could legitimately live in Anatolia was narrowed, the more groups were either forcibly 
excluded from the nation or forcibly included into it. The first to be eyed suspiciously and 
then to be for the most part excluded were Christians of various denominations. In the 
1930s, under the influence of European fascism, Turkish Jews, too, saw themselves 
denaturalized. All along, Muslims of various ethnic backgrounds were denied entry into the 
country if they were thought hard to assimilate into Turkishness or, if deemed assimilable, 
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subjected to resettlement and assimilation. Đçduygu, Toktaş and Soner are therefore right in 
concluding that the “demographic, linguistic, cultural and economic policies of nation-
building have, therefore, advanced at the expense of [the] non-Muslim minorities’ ethno-
cultural, demographic and economic presence in the country.”232 
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4. 
 
 
HOMOGENIZING THE NATION IN PRE-REPUBLICAN TIMES 
 
 
 
  
This chapter is concerned with the Turkification of the Anatolian population which 
was to a large degree brought about by the elimination of Armenians and Greeks. This 
elimination could take many forms. In the case of the population, it happened either by 
removing members of these two communities from Turkey (after expulsion they continued 
to live elsewhere), by killing them so that their existence ceased altogether (starvation, 
drowning, exhaustion, disease etc.) or by ending their existence in Turkey as Armenians or 
Greeks namely through (forced) assimilation. The latter could take the form of 
deracination, conversion to Islam, imposition of Turkish as the only language to be spoken 
and giving Turkish-Muslim names. This chapter will show in how far the motives for and 
outcomes of elimination were part of nation building. The events grouped under each of the 
three headings (expulsion, killing, assimilation) are to be seen as instances of nation 
building, not as a complete history, though they will be dealt with chronologically. 
Denaturalization, Flight and Expulsion from Anatolia and Prevention from Returning 
There 
This heading summarizes policies and actions that had the result that Armenians and 
Greeks left the Ottoman Empire or Turkey for good. They were either forced to by law or 
treaty (expulsion), or they feared for their lives (flight), or they were deprived of their 
citizenship (denaturalization) and forbidden from returning or made to leave because of a 
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combination of all three factors.  Tens of thousands of Armenians emigrated after the 
Hamidiyan massacres of 1894-6 and the Cilician massacre of 1909 because their lives had 
been destroyed and they saw no future for themselves and their children in the Ottoman 
Empire.233 In the forty-year period between 1870 and 1910 some 100,000 Armenians 
emigrated as a result of dire living circumstances, lawless and frequent assaults on their 
lives and property.234 None of these people were formally expelled or deprived of their 
subjecthood, but the Ottoman authorities made no effort to keep them in the country which 
suggests that their departure was anticipated and approved. In the eyes of Ottoman officials, 
it decreased the troublesome presence of Christians whose mistreatment foreign powers 
kept taking as a pretext to meddle in Ottoman affairs. 
 
In early 1914, after an economic boycott had not driven out the Aegean Greeks, Talat 
Pasha instructed Mahmut Celal (later to become Turkey’s third president) to remove them 
with the help of the Special Organizations which were eight to ten thousand strong.235 They 
used threats of force and actual force to clear Greek villages.236 They set the inhabitants an 
ultimatum for leaving, stole their cattle, drove them from their farms, abused the women 
and killed some of them.237 As a result, more than 100,000 and up to 200.000 Greeks fled 
from the Aegean coast and Thrace and moved to the Greek islands of the Aegean.238 
Muslim Albanians and Cretans, who were themselves refugees from formerly Ottoman 
territories, moved into their houses.239 
The simultaneous attacks on the Greeks of the Kara Bournou peninsula, which 
coincided with the landing of 600 muhadjir families at Kato-Panayia and with the 
landing of a number of other such families at Chesmé who were to replace the Greeks 
of Alatsata, [...] indicate that a major, organized, and effective anti-Greek campaign 
took place.240 
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Their flight simultaneously provided housing for Muslim immigrants, cleared the 
local economy of Greeks and made their other property available. As in the case of 
Armenian refugees in late Ottoman times, the Aegean Greeks were not officially expelled, 
but fled economic discrimination and physical abuse. 
The motivation behind this drastic step was at least twofold: political and security 
oriented on the one hand (to put pressure on the Greek government to solve the island 
dispute in favor of the Ottoman Empire, to eliminate the concentrations of non-Muslims in 
the region241, to eliminate potential collaborators with the enemy) and economic on the 
other (to ‘nationalize’ the economy). 242 There is disagreement over whether lack of space 
and scarcity of arable land also played a role. While Bjørnlund says that the Aegean region 
was sparsely populated and that it had plenty of arable soil for Greeks and muhajirs 
alike,243 Terzibaşoğlu repeatedly states that arable land was scarce everywhere in Western 
Anatolia because of the influx of masses of immigrants and that there was constant fighting 
over this limited resource.244 If this is true, it was an additional incentive for driving the 
Greeks out of the region.  
Bjørnlund attributes the relative restraint of the Special Organization (after all the 
Greeks were only expelled and not massacred) to uncertainty over the international reaction 
and the Ottoman Empire’s insufficient preparation for war. “[...] even though Turkification 
through persecution was CUP policy, it was a policy that, at this point at least, could not be 
followed too openly or with any widespread use of regular military forces.”245 The Ottoman 
Empire was not ready to go to war and feared that Greece would attack it if it killed Greeks 
on a large scale. More particularly, the Ottoman authorities halted the persecution of the 
Greeks because the two dreadnoughts the Ottoman Empire had bought from Britain had not 
yet been delivered (and actually never would be).246 
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An additional reason for holding back was probably that at this point, there were still 
moral restraints acting upon the CUP, which it would throw off with the progression of 
WWI and the brutalization of all warring parties. But the absence of a stern response to the 
expulsion of the Greeks emboldened the CUP and convinced them that more radical 
measures could be employed for the Turkification of the Empire.247 This interpretation 
makes 1914 a testing ground for the empire-wide deportation and killing of Armenians in 
1915. 
 
In the same year in which the Aegean Greeks were driven out, several Armenian and 
Greek professors at Constantinople University were fired without warning or cause other 
than their ethnicity.248 This act was totally insignificant in terms of numbers but is 
significant in terms of motivation since it targeted members of the Christian intelligentsia. 
Only one year later, on 24 April 1915, over two hundred Istanbulite Armenian intellectuals 
were deported and most of them killed, which deprived the Armenians of an important part 
of their leadership. This is a method commonly used in genocide in order to reduce the 
resistance of the victim group. Knowing this suggests that the firing of a handful of 
Armenian and Greek professors in 1914 was not a random incident but a test.  
 
The biggest wave of Armenian emigration occurred during and immediately after the 
genocide of 1915 when hundreds of thousands fled to the Russian Empire, Persia and the 
Middle East as well as to Europe, the USA and South America. Some fled in anticipation of 
deportation, others during the deportations and yet others months or years later. It seems 
that the first group was the smallest one since the order usually came at short notice so that 
people were not able to avoid the roundup unless they lived right by the Russian border and 
were given assistance.249 Thousands of Armenians returned to their homes with the Russian 
army when it advanced into Ottoman territory (Kars, Van) but had to withdraw with it so 
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249 Dersim was the only refuge for Armenians who sought a safe passage to Russia. According 
to Nuri Dersimi, 36,000 Armeniens were saved thanks to the systematic rescue efforts of 
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that their stay was not of long duration. The vast majority of the Armenians that resettled in 
French- and British-occupied Cilicia and southeast Turkey were likewise forced to leave 
when the French and British armies withdrew, as will be explained in more detail below. 
The motivation for the Armenians’ expulsion was the same as that for the expulsion of the 
Aegean Greeks in 1914, but it did not end with unofficially inducing them to leave the 
Ottoman Empire or Turkey since many were subsequently forbidden from reentering.  
 
During the interim period, there were two governments with opposing views on the 
future nation in Turkey, the Ottoman government in Istanbul and the provisional 
government in Ankara (1921-23). In addition, there were French, British, Greek and Italian 
occupying forces that stayed for various lengths of time. The extent of their authority was 
constantly changing and except for the nationalist government in Ankara, none of the other 
parties were in power for long enough to have much of an effect on the population under 
their control.  
Thousands of Armenians who had survived in Anatolia or returned continued to be 
persecuted, massacred, deported and expropriated.250 In this decade, tens of thousands left 
the country due to harassment, threats and being deprived of citizenship. Local authorities 
scared them away in the well-tested fashion through media campaigns,251 by denying them 
any rights in court and by threatening to take their lives.252 They also hampered foreign 
relief efforts - the American hospital in Kharput, for example, could only receive patients 
approved by the nationalist authorities. Many Greeks and Armenians were therefore turned 
away and died on the doorstep.253 Many Armenians left for Syria and Lebanon then but 
many others, especially further east in Marash, Aintab, Urfa and Kilis stayed after 1922.254 
In the Kurdish countryside, thousands of Armenians came to live like serfs, dependent on 
and exploited by the agha or sheikh but at the same time protected from being killed.255 
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The provisional government employed a double strategy for getting rid of the 
remaining or returned Armenians and for preventing those that were abroad from returning. 
It issued the Travel and Traffic Decree which stipulated that “[all] those who had left the 
country with Ottoman documents or without a valid passport had to apply to Turkish 
diplomatic representations abroad for permission to return.”256 Since the provisional 
government had not given passports or certificates of citizenship to non-Muslims, any 
Christian or Jew who wanted to return had to apply to a Turkish consulate and have his 
application reviewed by the General Directory for Public Order. Applications made by 
Armenians were apparently routinely turned down since Görgü Guttstadt notes that the 
decree “mainly prevented Armenians in the United States from returning to Turkey, while 
Turks and Jews there got permission, even if they only possessed Ottoman documents.”257 
This shows two things: Firstly, the provisional government was determined not to allow 
Armenian communities, however weakened, to take foot again in Anatolia. Secondly, 
Armenians were considered enemies of the state while Jews were not. This should change, 
though, within the next two decades. In the 1930s and 40s, Jews, too, would be targeted and 
denaturalized because they were the only remaining minority that had a standing in the 
economy. 
The Armenians of southern and southeast Turkey were feeling relatively safe for as 
long as these regions were under French and British control. The British were neutral 
towards the various ethnicities under their rule whereas the French were openly pro-
Armenian, employed them in the local administration and security forces or militia and 
tried to restore their property. But when the last French contingents left Cilicia in January 
1922 in accordance with the Ankara agreement, the region came under Turkish rule and 
Armenians had to fear for their lives again. 
 
After Greece’s failed occupation of parts of Western Anatolia and its defeat in the 
war with the Turkish ‘national’ resistance, between 400.000 and 500.000 Ottoman Greeks 
fled in great haste258 because they had become victims of the Turkish army’s atrocities just 
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like Muslim Ottomans of the Greek army’s. In addition, Greek Ottomans feared to be 
punished for real or suspected collaboration with the enemy. This huge exodus was not 
planned but nevertheless fit neatly in with the overall thrust of clearing Turkish territory of 
Christians. 
The Turkish-Greek population exchange of 1922-23 was the third of three suggested 
population exchanges and the only one that was carried out. The first exchange was agreed 
on in September 1913, two months after the end of the second Balkan war, and was to take 
place between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire. It was to be voluntary but it never 
materialized because of the outbreak of WWI.259 The second proposed exchange, in May 
1914, should have been carried out between Greece and the Ottoman Empire, and likewise 
be voluntary, but did not realize either because of WWI. It seems that both these exchanges 
were intended to legitimize expulsions that had already taken place, in the first case of 
Muslims and in the second of the Aegean Greeks.260 The third exchange, between Greece 
and Turkey in 1922-23, actually took place. In contrast to the other two, it was not 
voluntary but forced everyone out who had not already fled. Those affected by the treaty 
were the Karamanlıs in central Anatolia (200,000), the Pontian Greeks on the Eastern Black 
Sea coast (200,000) and several hundred thousand Greek Orthodox in and around 
Constantinople.261 If the latter could prove that they were long-standing residents, they 
were exempted. Anybody else, though, was harassed and made to leave. All in all 430,000 
people, who in many cases spoke only Turkish, had no wish to leave and lived the same 
lives as their Muslim neighbors were affected by the exchange. But since ethno-religious 
homogeneity was thought to be of higher value in the long run than immediate practicality 
or necessity, it was carried out anyway and only the Greeks of Istanbul and the Muslims of 
Western Thrace were exempted. With this move, Turkey rid itself of most of its Greek 
citizens of old standing almost completely. Due to the reciprocal intake of Muslims from 
Greece, Turkey not only homogenized its population, but also increased its size which was 
in line with overall population policies since Hamidiyan times (see chapter three). 
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To summarize, more than a million Armenians and Greeks respectively left the 
Ottoman Empire and Turkey within one generation, from the 1890s to the 1920s. Their 
departure was prompted by the fear of losing their lives, withdrawal of citizenship and an 
international agreement that forced them to leave their homes. Most of this outbound 
population move took place under the CUP which sought to build a strong Turkish nation 
by removing those ethno-religious groups that it identified as dangerous, prime among 
them the Armenians and Greeks.  
Killings 
Having dealt with the removal of Armenians and Greeks from Turkey which still 
allowed them to live elsewhere, we are now coming to how their existence was ended 
altogether as part of the homogenization of Anatolia’s population. The Hamidiyan 
massacres of 1894-96 directly took the lives of 80-100,000 Armenians and indirectly those 
of tens of thousands more. 
In terms of their function for the Ottoman state, the 1894-6 massacres combined 
political elements of a ‘cull’ of a proto-national element, including terrorization and 
expropriation, with a neo-conservative religious backlash against an ‘inferior’, upstart 
religious group.262 
 
Gaunt argues that Armenians were less likely to be killed in rural places than in urban 
places such as Diyarbakır because in the cities there was a higher degree of economic 
stratification and rivalry in which Armenians stood above Muslims which created ill feeling 
among the latter.263 These massacres “were also a warning to Armenian nationalists and the 
powers not to press the reform issue. The extent of Abdülhamid II’s direct complicity in the 
full spectrum of the massacres is, however, unclear.”264 Some officials, military and police 
protected Christian lives and property whereas others participated in their destruction.265 
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According to Bloxham, the participation of the Hamidiye should not be exaggerated. 
“Ordinary Muslims and muhajirs came to the fore, particularly Kurds (including some who 
had not hitherto taken part in abuse of Armenians), and, notably, Muslim religious leaders, 
students, and brotherhoods.”266 Even though the idea of Turkish nation building had not yet 
been formulated,  these massacres fit into the bigger picture of the removal of Christians 
and they had the same result as later nation building measures would: they homogenized 
the population and de-Christianized the economy. Interestingly, the killings of 1895-6 and 
of 1915 had opposite intentions, the earlier one was meant to basically preserve the status 
quo by killing a limited number of Armenians whereas the latter was meant to totally 
change the status quo by getting rid of all Armenians.  
 
In the Cilicia massacre of 1909, up to 20,000 Armenians were killed along with 
several hundred other Christians and up to 2,000 Muslims. We know even less than in the 
Hamidiyan case in how far the government was responsible for this massacre. It was 
prompted by Muslim resentment at the Christians’ constitutional freedoms, Armenian 
nationalistic celebrations of this freedom, dissatisfaction with economic inequalities and 
ethnic tension in an area that had recently seen famine, the influx of Muslim migrant 
workers and Balkan and Caucasian muhajirs.267 As with the Hamidiyan massacres, 
Armenians were neither killed as part of a Turkification plan, nor was it a coincidence that 
Armenians were killed rather than, say, Circassians. Rather, they fell victim to massacre 
because there was a tendency of large-scale violence against Christians rather than Muslims 
in the late Ottoman Empire. Gaunt notes that in the massacre of 1909 possibly for the first 
time, no distinction was made between Armenians and other Oriental Christians.268 
According to him, this is the point where ‘Armenophobia’ turned into general anti-
Christian feeling. 
In the course of the expulsion of the Greeks in 1914 killings occurred, such as the 
massacre of Phocea (today: Foça) north of Smyrna on June 12th269 and the killing of 
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everyone who tried to resist expulsion in the village of Serekieuy in the Menemen 
district.270 Overall, though, the Greek exodus was not marked by massive killings. The fear 
of it was enough to make people flee and the Ottoman state sought to avoid a confrontation 
with Greece at that point.  
During the period reviewed, the greatest number of people of one community killed 
as part of nation building were the Armenians between 1915 and 1917. Armenian women 
and children were directly killed before, during or after deportation or died of hunger, 
thirst, exhaustion or disease. The same was true for their men except that they were placed 
in labor battalions. 
Few of these soldiers survived the war as most of the labor battalions were being 
worked to death, at times even liquidated though the task was unfinished. In April 
1915, the government ordered an assembly of 4,000 slave-labor soldiers for major 
road construction outside Diayarbekir and found that there were so few left that 
Christian women had to be pressed into filling out the ranks.271 
 
This may have cost the lives of half of the Ottoman Armenian population of two 
million.272 In eastern Anatolia, all Christians were deported, Armenians as well as 
Assyrians. Protestants and Catholics were not generally spared but in certain localities they 
were.273 One breakdown of fatalities by denomination, given by the French Dominican 
Jacques Rhétoré, shows that the death toll of Protestants and Catholics was as high as that 
of other denominations. In the vilayet of Diyarbakır, for example, 97 per cent of Gregorian 
Armenians, 92 per cent of Catholic Armenians, 90 per cent of Chaldeans, 62 per cent of 
Syriac Catholics, 72 per cent of Syriac Orthodox and 67 per cent of Armenian or Syriac 
Protestants were killed.274 
While during the Hamidiyan massacres officials could protect the Armenians under 
their authority without risking their lives, this was no longer possible in 1915. Officials 
who refused to have Christians deported or killed were replaced or killed which reflects the 
changes brought about by “the Young Turk rise to power, [and] the development of new 
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nationalist Turkish ideologies, which contributed to the identification of all Christians – no 
longer just Armenians – as subversive elements and allies of the enemy.”275 
 
In 1920-21, after the end of CUP control and before a new, countrywide government 
had been established, the massacring of Armenian survivors of the genocide resumed with 
Kemalist units attacking cities in the South in which Armenian survivors had sought refuge:  
5.000 Armenians in Cilicia276 and 8.000 in Adana were killed and many more in Mersin, 
Marash and Aintab. Armenians in the interior were no better off.277 In Hajen (Hadjin), 
Armenians put up a fight for seven months but were defeated and the five hundred 
survivors fled the torched city.278 Deportations, for example from Malatia, also resumed in 
these years. On the governmental level, the reason for hunting down the remaining 
Armenians was that the government wanted to establish an Anatolia free of Christians 
before the Lausanne Peace Conference would oblige it to guarantee the safety of the 
Anatolian Christians. It wanted any obligations resulting from the peace agreement to be 
null and void.279 On the personal level, this 
all-out effort to eradicate the Armenians was related to the recruitment of former 
Ottoman officials implicated in the wartime deportation and massacres, including 
some who were released from detention on the island of Malta in April-May 1921, 
into the ranks of the rulers in Angora.280 
 
They feared losing the property they had stolen and to be held accountable for the 
crimes they had committed in the name of preserving the Empire. They tried to liquidate 
the surviving witnesses so that they would not raise any claims against them. Thus both the 
government and individuals engaged in ‘finishing the genocide’, as Marashlian puts it, in 
order not to have to deal with Ottoman Armenians in the future.  
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Whereas in the previous section on emigration, expulsion and denaturalization, there 
was no marked difference in the treatment of Armenians and Greeks, there is in this part on 
killing. Roughly 1,200,000 Armenians were killed during the period under consideration, 
while Greeks lost their lives in large numbers only during the Greco-Turk war (which is 
excluded from this analysis).281 The reasons for this Greek-Armenian difference were given 
in the introduction under ‘Armenians and Greeks’. As for the motives for killing 
Armenians, they were different under Abdülhamid II than during the latter CUP period. 
Under Abdülhamid II, killing was used as punishment, it was a terror tactic meant to scare 
an ‘unruly’ people into submission. Misgivings at the Armenians’ perceived economic 
superiority, resentment of their newly-gained equality with Muslims and religiously-
inspired distaste of them played a secondary role. After the lost Balkan Wars, on the other 
hand, security considerations became paramount. The CUP feared that Armenians would 
collaborate with the Russian, French or British enemy and fight its rule from within the 
country. The CUP believed that in the long run it could only resist incursions into Anatolia 
and be free from traitors within by gradually turning everybody into a member of what they 
thought of as the most loyal population, the Turks. To achieve this, they had to deal with 
the greatest threat first (Armenians) and in the harshest manner necessary and then take on 
the lighter problems (Muslim minorities). The killing of Armenians at the same time 
eliminated them from the economy (see chapter five) and, a welcome side effect, provided 
housing for Muslim immigrants that kept coming in huge numbers.  
From the CUP’s point of view, killing Armenians rather than exiling them had the 
advantage that they would never again cause trouble, that they would neither go to war with 
Turkey, nor reclaim property or witness against it. It was the most ruthless but also the 
‘safest’ way of removing them. At the same time, the international response had to be 
calculated, and general killings could only be ordered and carried out at an advanced stage 
of radicalization, brutalization and sense of encirclement.   
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Assimilation 
One could distinguish in this part between men and women which would give us 
interesting clues as to their different capabilities in the CUP’s eyes – women being seen as 
weak and reprogrammable but also as valuable mothers of the new nation and men as 
strong and carriers of the ethnic identity and therefore a constant threat if left alive.282 But 
since very little information exists on how grown men survived the massacres and 
deportations, since indeed very few men did survive, it seems to make more sense to regard 
the survivors as undistinguished with regard to gender and to differentiate between 
institutional and non-institutional assimilation and non-assimilation. 
Armenians and Greeks who had survived and wanted to stay in Anatolia had in the long run 
little choice but to assimilate and lose their Greek or Armenian identity, or at least to hide it 
to the degree that only very few people knew of their true identity. It is true that there were 
short-term alternatives such as working in a trade or profession that was for the moment 
indispensable and therefore saved one from immediate death (e.g. smithery, medicine).283 
Doing forced labor such as the men who worked in the Amanus Mountains on the railway 
falls into the same category. Some women could pretend that they were doing 
indispensable labor in factories when this was actually part of a rescue program.284 
Becoming the mistress of a Turkish officer could be a means for women to avoid 
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deportation altogether and not to negate their Armenianness (though it precluded a return to 
the Armenian community). But in the long run, assimilation through conversion, restricting 
oneself to speaking or learning to speak only Turkish or Kurdish, accepting a new name 
and not talking about the past was the way forward for most Armenians and Greeks who 
survived in Turkey. It is important to note, though, that there were Armenians and possibly 
Greeks as well who either managed to survive and assert their Armenian identity in the 
province or who resurfaced as Armenians or Greeks after a time and lived in Anatolia for 
decades after their respective catastrophe. Also, conversions to Syriac Orthodoxy and 
acceptance of the Alevi faith occurred which was not in the intent of the Turkish state but 
nevertheless allowed Armenian survivors to blend in and it was less of a change for them 
than conversion to Sunni Islam. The following part is divided into institutional and non-
institutional assimilation and non-assimilation with the caveat that it is not always possible 
to draw a line between the three.285  
Institutional Assimilation 
The CUP counted on children’s ability to adjust to changing circumstances and their 
inability to remember their families or mother tongue, if it was not Turkish or Kurdish 
already, if separated from both at a young age. Child survivors of massacre or deportation 
were therefore the most likely to be left alive. Armenian, Greek or Assyrian children in 
state orphanages grew up as Turks, maybe even particularly nationalist Turks, because of 
the education they received there and out of a sense of indebtedness for having been raised 
at all. During the war years, 
Turkish authorities collected thousands of children on the roads of exile and placed 
them in newly opened establishments where they received an education characterised 
by strict disciplinary codes that was aimed at ‘turkifying’ them and converting them 
to Islam. Such institutions could be found the length and breadth of the empire, for 
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example, in Aleppo, Mardin, Urfa, Kayseri, Istanbul, Adana, Damascus, Aytura and 
elsewhere.286  
 
Greek deportees in 1914 as well as Armenian deportees in 1915 were often given the 
choice between conversion to Islam and deportation and/or death. An unknown number of 
Greeks who converted in 1914 were left in place rather than shipped to Greece and an 
equally unknown number of Armenian women, men and children converted to save their 
lives. According to Tachjian, “[...] the majority of the Armenians deported to the areas 
around Hama, Homs, Damascus and Kerek, be they men or women, [...] accepted Islam to 
survive.”287. Sensing that these conversions were not sincere and fearing that the policy of 
survival-through-conversion could backfire, the Ottoman authorities sometimes did not 
accept conversion and deported the people anyway. 
on-Institutional Assimilation 
Non-institutional assimilation must have been the more widespread variant in those 
chaotic times, especially in the East of Anatolia. Armenian women and children were 
sometimes picked up and taken into Turkish, Kurdish or Arab homes and raised out of 
charity and pity and sometimes allowed to go when it was safe to leave and go abroad. 288 
So they assimilated only temporarily. Others stayed with their new families or clans their 
whole lives, either because they did not want to be uprooted again or because they had no 
hope of finding surviving relatives or, in the case of children, because they had accepted 
their foster parents as their new parents. In the case of women who had born a child from a 
Muslim, they may not have had the heart to leave it behind but at the same time knew that 
they could not take it back into Armenian society, either. Others were taken in and used as 
servants or serfs and they could only either completely fit in or flee. Yet others, in the 
cities, were sold as (sexual) slaves. They, too, had no choice and could at best flee, though 
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they were unlikely to be accepted back into Armenian diaspora communities because of the 
shame they had supposedly brought on themselves. 
In Mardin, there were Armenians who assimilated not to Turkish or Kurdish Muslims 
or Alevites but to Syriac Christians which is an interesting alternative.289 Apparently that 
was possible and a lesser step to take than to completely change one’s religion, if only 
outwardly. What is also interesting is the degree of unorthodox religiosity that existed for a 
generation or so after the deportations and possibly until today. Biner, for instance, 
mentions Kurds who married islamized Armenian women but allowed them to quietly 
attend service with the Syriac Christians on Sundays.290 Margosyan recounts the story of an 
Armenian girl from Diyarbakır province who had been deported and disappeared. 
Years later, by chance, she appeared in front of her again-found relatives as the 
long-beared Sheikh Seyhmus’ [...] wife Zeyno. Not having children of her own, 
Zeyno brought up as her own Şeyhmus’ [...] three sons from his deceased first wife, 
who also treat[ed] her like their own mother. Zeyno Bibi used to come a couple of 
times a year during Christmas and Easter to celebrate the holidays of her relatives. 
The children of the house approached, with wonderment, this woman who quietly 
moved to the antechamber to pray during the day whenever she heard the call to 
prayer.291 
This shows that on the very local or individual level, there could be a lot of tolerance 
and that some survivors were able to move back and forth between their adopted Muslim 
family and their former Christian one. What we see is that there were all kinds of motives 
for taking in Armenians and Greeks and that there were many degrees of assimilation. On 
the part of the rescuers, too, there was the whole range of behaviors and motivations from 
self-sacrifice and altruism (danger of being killed as a punishment for having hidden 
Armenians) to pragmatism to exploitation and sadism. And the Armenians, too, ranged 
from those that planned their escape all along and only simulated assimilation to those that 
had no chance of remembering or did not want to remember and who spoke nothing but 
Turkish, embraced Islam, and kept all their memories to themselves.292  
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on-Assimilation 
As hard as it is to imagine, there were Armenians who set up new lives for 
themselves as Armenians in Anatolia. Exactly under which circumstances this was possible 
is not known. Margosyan mentions that many Armenian widows worked in men’s jobs at 
construction sites as laborers, plasterers and painters.293 In the 1960s, there were still or 
again whole streets with Armenian shops and even signs written in Armenian in Sivas.294 
How many Armenians assimilated, how many continued to live as Armenians and how 
many left the country after a while is very difficult to estimate. The former figure must be 
at least in the tens of thousands since by late 1919, foreign charities recovered ten thousand 
women alone from harems and this was probably the smaller part of those forced into 
them.295 By late 1921, diaspora Armenian organizations took an estimated 3,000 out of 4-
5,000 Armenian orphans out of households in Constantinople. Armenian authorities 
estimated that 100.000 orphans remained in inner Anatolia.296 
Conclusion 
The CUP’s preferred way of eliminating Armenians and Greeks was to make them 
leave the country. If this failed or seemed too dangerous, it organized their killing, if they 
were Armenian. The last option for those left behind, the women and children, was their 
assimilation into the new nation. The efforts made at assimilating those Armenians and 
Greeks that had neither fled nor been killed, both institutionally and privately, show that the 
CUP did not tolerate the remaining minorities, however weakened, to continue to exist as 
such. It tried to force them into giving up their distinctness and to blend into the new nation 
in the making. At the same time, the minorities could never be too assimilated for the state 
to give up its suspicion of them (for which there is ample evidence in chapters six and 
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seven). The pressure to conform was not the same everywhere, though, so that in certain 
localities, notably Izmir and Istanbul, Armenians and Greeks were able to rebuild a 
community life and continue to live as Armenians and Greeks. How the Turkish Republic 
continued the nation building project, chapters six and seven will show. 
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5. 
 
 
ISLAMIFYING AND NATIONALZING THE ECONOMY IN PRE-REPUBLICAN 
TIMES 
 
 
 
 
It is no easy task to group the events and actions under this heading since all 
distinctions are more or less artificial and imprecise. For example, the distinction between 
legal and illegal actions suggests that the former were somehow ‘right’ and the others 
‘wrong’ and that it is possible to draw a clear line between legal and illegal when actually 
there was a great deal of intentional vagueness. Another way of grouping the events, acts 
and measures is the formal versus informal divide, the former including any type of 
redistribution that had an official stamp, whereas the latter sums up any act of expropriation 
and appropriation that was carried out without it, spontaneously, and by private people. But 
this already opens up another dilemma: Much of what happened unofficially was wanted by 
the authorities and many authorities enriched themselves privately. 
I settled on distinguishing between measures that privileged Muslims over non-
Muslims and measures that deprived non-Muslims of their property and redistributed it. 
The difference lies in that the former is less severe than the latter and that the coexistence 
of Armenians, Greeks and Muslims would still have been possible. A new modus vivendi 
could have been found, had the CUP contented itself with abrogating the capitulations 
which favored non-Muslims and with only discriminating against non-Muslims. But the 
large-scale expropriation of Armenians and Greeks, among others, took their livelihood 
from them and made their continued existence in the country almost impossible so that they 
left in large numbers. Discrimination, expropriation and appropriation also constitute 
roughly consecutive stages in the nationalization process in the sense that almost 
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everywhere Armenians were first discriminated against and then, during ongoing 
discrimination, also expropriated. When discrimination alone did not achieve the desired 
result and when with WWI the opportunity for more radical measures came, the CUP made 
the most of it and systematically removed the Armenian population from its homes and 
took its property.  
Issue of Legality 
The Armenian case being the best researched case concerning the issue of legality, I 
will mainly draw examples from this one, but many characteristics of CUP legislation are 
transferable, which I will indicate as I go along. In a nutshell, CUP legislation can be 
characterized as reactive, retroactive, serving the lawmakers rather than justice, non-
binding, vague, contradictory and misleading. Laws were nevertheless issued because the 
semblance of legality was crucial in suppressing international and internal voices of protest.  
The CUP’s laws were often made ad-hoc, on the spot, as events unfolded and necessities 
arose. The beginning deportation of the Armenians in 1915 prompted the Entente powers to 
state that they would hold those implicated in the persecution of Armenians personally 
responsible. Only two days later, on 26 May 1915, Talat submitted a memorandum to the 
Ottoman cabinet. Four days later, the Ottoman cabinet sanctioned his earlier orders and the 
new deportation law.297 
This at the same time illustrates another characteristic of the CUP’s legislation, its 
retroactive nature, since it legalized acts after they had been carried out. 
The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) launched both the deportation and the 
dispossession of Armenians well before the promulgation of any laws or official 
decrees. The deportation decrees of May 23, 1915 and the deportation law of May 27, 
1915 were issued after the deportations had already begun. Decrees and laws merely 
served to unite the hitherto diverse practices and render the overall policy more 
consistent. So too was the CUP’s approach to confiscation. Telegrams to various 
provinces ordering the liquidation of immovable property were followed by the 
streamlined program of June 10, 1915 that established the key agency overseeing the 
liquidation process – the Abandoned Properties Commission (Emval-ı Metruke 
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Komisyonu). These were not yet christened ‘Liquidation Commissions,’ but 
nevertheless mostly fulfilled that function.298 
 
The CUP had no interest in justice but only in guarding what it had gained against 
competing claims, for example the property owners’. It did so by restricting the claimants’ 
rights, by setting very high hurdles to appeal and by giving absolute powers to its agencies, 
for example the commissions. A report by legal experts at the German Consulate-General 
in Constantinople characterized one law as the ‘legalization of pillage’. 
Quite correctly, the report stated that the procedures for the liquidation of Armenian 
property were sheer formalities that only outwardly appeared in common with the 
law. The new law was evidently not intended to safeguard the interests of the foreign 
creditors, but to free the Ottoman government of any responsibility for the damages 
incurred [...].299 
 
Another example for the primacy of appropriation over justice is the prohibition to 
rent or sell property to neighbors, acquaintances, foreigners or other Christians such as 
Greeks or Christian Arabs which would effectively prevent the seizure of their property. 
They were also forbidden from 
sending it abroad to family members, giving valuables to American missionaries 
and consuls, mailing it directly to their new residences at their final destinations. It is 
these kinds of prohibitions that shed light on the rationale behind the expropriations. 
They strongly suggest that there was no intention of either compensating Armenians 
fairly for their dispossession, or offering them any prospect of a future return to their 
homes. Hilmar Kaiser has rightly concluded that these restrictions were ‘a plain 
admission of official criminal intent’.300 
 
According to the Abandoned Properties Law, 
[all] proceeds from sales had to be transferred to the Finance Ministry, which would 
safeguard the funds in the name of the sold property’s original owner. Owners could, 
however, only claim their money after the end of the ‘present situation.’ Thus, the 
payment was postponed indefinitely. In cases where property rights were contested, 
the owner had no right to intervene but had to leave the matter to state officials, who 
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would represent him. [...] Property transfers up to 15 days before the deportation were 
illegal.301 
 
These provisions give the impression of justice but they were actually a masked 
expropriation notice since claimants had no chance against the state. Under the 
circumstances, an Ottoman state official would not decide in an Armenian claimant’s favor 
nor did an Armenian have the chance to sell anything more than two weeks before the 
deportation date if he was only notified days or hours in advance.  
Laws were also often vague or contradictory in themselves to leave room for 
interpretation and to legalize a wide range of actions. Another feature of CUP legislation 
was that it was not binding. While at times, officials stressed that their acts were in 
conformity with the law, at others they made no such effort and blatantly disrespected their 
own laws. “The Ottoman authorities themselves implicitly admitted that the new laws and 
regulations had no practical significance. The authorities had effectively refused to follow 
their own rules when they failed to officially establish the liquidation commissions.”302 
What was binding, though, if not the law, was orders, given directly or in encrypted 
telegrams: 
a simple order by a department director in the Interior Ministry was sufficient to 
overcome limitations set by Ottoman law.”303 “[...] orders issued by Talaat Bey, the 
Ottoman Interior Minister, and his assistants carried greater weight than published 
provisional laws. In other words, these laws – and, accordingly, the legality of 
Ottoman government policies – were merely a fiction.304 
Purpose of Legislation 
As we have seen, CUP laws were vague and not always binding, they could be passed 
retrospectively, they were often passed on the spot when the necessity for them arose and 
there was no concern for justice. One may ask why they were needed at all then. I suggest 
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there were at least three reasons for passing such laws: to appease international criticism, to 
ensure the Ottoman state against restitution claims and to silence the qualms of internal 
critics by pointing out that everything that happened was legal. The German government 
and German (insurance) companies, for instance, threatened to sue the Ottoman 
government for the losses they had sustained as a result of its policies.305 A petition by the 
Deutsche Orient Bank states that the liquidation commissions’ activities were 
illegal as no law existed that legitimated the forcible sale of property owned by 
deported persons. The bank’s statement came at a most inopportune moment, as most 
Armenian communities had already been destroyed and the property confiscated. 306 
 
But in practice the law that was consequently passed made little change, it did not 
account for the commissions’ policies. “It was an attempt to disguise illegal Ottoman 
government policy and pre-empt claims by legal owners and their creditors.”307 Many of 
the state’s actions were thus legal in the sense that laws existed that covered them though in 
spirit these laws violated the idea of justice and equality since there was virtually no legal 
recourse or appeal and because they legalized the killing of innocent people.   
Passing such laws was nevertheless possible and acceptable because it took place in 
the context of a single-party state where there was no legal opposition, where critics were 
assassinated and because it happened during war. Emergency situations such as war are 
propitious times for the passing of laws that would otherwise be unacceptable because they 
massively infringe upon citizens’ rights. But the necessity of ‘standing together against the 
common enemy’, of ‘being vigilant’, ‘detecting traitors early on’, of ‘making sacrifices for 
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a limited period of time’ lessens objections to such laws, even or especially if they single 
out one or several groups that are to bear the brunt of the burden of such laws. In our case 
this group more than any other was the Armenians. Not only were Armenian soldiers 
disarmed and forced to work in labor battalions like the Greeks, the justified suspicion of 
certain Armenian settlements on the Russian and Persian borders of the Empire and in the 
Gulf of Iskenderun was extended to all Armenians anywhere in the Empire and was the 
justification for their systematic deportation and killing. And after the end of the war of 
independence, Armenians were denied entry into Turkey whereas other minority groups 
were not.  
There were justified reasons for singling out the Armenians during the war years 
namely the earlier formation of Armenian revolutionary parties and some Armenians’ pleas 
for the involvement of foreign powers which had both been longstanding threats to the 
territorial integrity of the Empire. With the outbreak of war, these concerns were 
compounded with the acute fear that Ottoman Armenians would join Russian Armenians or 
be armed by them and fight the Ottoman army the country. But the interpretation of their 
treatment during WWI should not be limited a military rationale. The treatment of 
Armenians before and after WWI was similar in that it tended towards reducing their 
numbers and forcing them to keep a low profile. The Hamidiyan massacres were intended 
to cow them into acceptance of their secondary status and the clearing of Anatolia of 
survivors in the 1920s was meant to remove whoever insisted on staying Armenian and to 
warn those that were in the process of assimilation not to raise their heads. The Armenian 
genocide should thus be seen as part of Turkish nation building for which the war provided 
only a suitable opportunity. “[...] the Armenian Genocide formed part of a government 
policy to destroy the Empire’s non-Turkish communities. Significantly, the Ottoman 
government had adopted this policy well before the beginning of the First World War and 
the Armenian Genocide.”308 
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End of Minority Privileges and Beginning Discrimination Against Minorities 
In its mildest form, nascent economic nationalism meant hindering non-Muslims 
from doing business by selectively firing them if they were employed by the state or 
Muslim businesses, and by boycotting their businesses if they were self-employed. The 
other side of the coin was the encouragement of Muslims to do business by providing them 
with credit and establishing Muslim-only business institutions.  
The first boycott that aimed at harming Christian business for the sake of setting up a 
Muslim bourgeoisie was proclaimed in 1909 upon the Austrian annexation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. It called for the boycotting of shops selling Austrian goods, many of which 
were owned by Christians. “[...] similarly, a general boycott of Greek commerce was 
undertaken during the 1909 declaration by Crete to unite with Greece.”309 Another boycott 
was declared in 1913 with the result that within a few months, 600 Muslim-owned shops 
sprang up in Istanbul.310 Besides the wish to create a Muslim bourgeoisie, resentment at the 
Christian bourgeoisie’s affluence and at income inequalities311 played a role in the call for 
boycott as well as doubt about the loyalty of the Greeks. These suspicions were not 
unfounded since the Istanbul Greek community had helped with the war expenses of 
Greece. In particular, Averoff, an Ottoman Greek citizen, had bought and donated a 
battleship to the Greek navy.312 Economic boycotts were not limited to the time of the 
Balkan Wars, in 1922 they were proclaimed again and exorbitant taxes imposed to drive 
out the remaining Armenians.313 According to Göçek, the Ottoman government 
“consciously placed Turks in jobs monopolized by the Greeks”314 in resettling the hundreds 
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of thousands of Balkan refugees. It is doubtful whether these refugees were able to fill out 
the positions the Greeks had held, but the CUP may well have tried it.  
The outbreak of World War I finally gave the CUP the opportunity to abrogate the 
capitulations whose impact had reached far beyond the economy and “effectively unraveled 
the nationality question.”315 Not only had they exempted those enjoying its privileges from 
Ottoman law and taxation, but they had also made them ‘outsiders’ of disputed loyalty by 
issuing European passports to them. In addition, the capitulations had given foreign powers 
the right to ‘protect’ Christian minorities against unjust Ottoman treatment which served as 
a pretext for their interference into Ottoman affairs. The capitulations therefore had a 
hugely negative impact on Ottoman sovereignty as well as on the Muslim millet’s 
perception as the ruling millet. According to Ahmad, the Turkish and Jewish communities 
therefore welcomed the abrogation of the capitulations as the “deliverance from foreign 
control; [but] the Christians mourned, uncertain as to their future.”316 
 
As for discriminatory measures, an instance of an employee being fired because of 
his ethnicity occurred in the same year when Greek employees of the Singer Co. in Smyrna 
were threatened that after the expiration of a certain period, they would be replaced.317 This 
was as yet a haphazard measure but it should become systematized before long and in 
Republican times, certain professions and offices would be limited to Muslims, both by law 
and by tacit agreement. Among the CUP’s establishments aimed at increasing the Muslim 
share in business were  joint-stock companies, cooperatives and banks which the state 
funded and which even small merchants and shopkeepers were encouraged to buy shares 
from in order to increase the participation of Muslims.318 Newly established banks that 
supported Muslim private enterprises were National Credit Bank, General Bank, National 
Economy Bank, Đşbank and the Bank of National Prestige.319 So-called national companies 
were set up in the capital and in the provinces and various professions and occupations 
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(artisans, merchants, farmers, etc.,) established Muslim-only associations which, not unlike 
guilds, were meant to control the market and set prices. However, this failed and most 
essential goods were unavailable except in the black market and at astronomical prices.320 
The National Consumption Society was to encourage people to buy local goods rather than 
imported ones [..], even if at higher prices.321 Thus a whole business infrastructure was set 
up that excluded non-Muslims.  
Keyder and Toprak make a significant observation from two different angles. Keyder 
notes that “[... ] there was usually [a] one-to-one correspondence between the roster of the 
committee of Union and Progress local organization and the shareholders of new 
companies.”322 Toprak for his part states that 
Muslim farmers and merchants who were integrated into the ‘national market’ and 
who benefited from Turkish nationalism played a very significant role in the post-war 
national movement and in the making of Republican Turkey.323 
 
In other words, the traditional Muslim bureaucratic bourgeoisie started to engage in 
business and Muslims who were willing to open a business only needed to demonstrate 
their loyalty to the CUP. This is a phenomenon we will come across again and again in the 
following decades – ownership of companies and access to business opportunities was a 
reward for political loyalty. As Toprak and Acar state, every subsequent government 
should create its own bourgeoisie. The link that was thus created between political power 
and economic power was a novelty that would have far-reaching consequences in 
Republican times (see Counting the Cost in chapter seven). 
Expropriation and Appropriation, Destruction and Theft 
As mentioned above, the expropriation of Armenians and Greeks was often the next 
stage of escalation, when boycotts were not effective in clearing the field economically or 
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demographically or if it did not happen fast enough. The property we are talking about here 
was varied, it was anything that had belonged to Armenians and Greeks – peasants’ land 
and urban estate in the cities, any kind of private houses from villagers’ huts to yalıs on the 
Bosphorus, communal buildings such as hospitals and orphanages, religious buildings such 
as monasteries and churches, business buildings such as workshops, warehouses and 
offices; tools and instruments such as agricultural tools, seed, livestock, machines, vehicles 
as well as private belonging such as clothes, books, furniture, jewelry, cash and financial 
wealth such as bonds, stocks and live insurances. 
As the examples given below will demonstrate, Armenians and Greeks were deprived 
of much of their property “as part of a conscious effort to facilitate Turkey’s drive to 
modern nation-statehood.”324 This happened either through theft or robbery when they were 
still with their property or in there absence, after they had had to flee i) without being able 
to take their property with them or ii) without being permitted to take it. Both the state and 
individuals working for the state and individuals unrelated to it were guilty of large-scale 
theft. The complicated issue of legality was discussed above. The contradiction between 
theory and practice is another one worth expanding upon. In theory, all Armenian and 
Greek property belonged to the state which distributed it according to material need and 
nationalist merit among the Muslim population. In practice, it often ended up in the wrong 
hands because of conflicting interests and competition over the ‘booty’, as will also be 
explained in more detail below. Akçam summarizes the aims of Armenian expropriation 
and the appropriation of the Armenians’ property as follows: They were meant to extend 
the Muslim bourgeoisie, to provide for the needs of new immigrants, to meet the needs of 
the military, to cover the expense of the deportations and to cover other state needs. I would 
add that another important aim was the generation of political loyalty and support.325 
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Expropriation of Armenians in the 1890s and of Greeks in 1914 
Kévorkian and Paboudjian state that in the period from 1890 to 1910 at least 741,000 
hectares of Armenian land were illegally taken or confiscated by state representatives.326 
This includes the land taken from Armenians during the Hamidiyan massacres and the 
Cilician massacres but is not limited to these episodes, since during the whole period 
Armenian peasants in the east of the Empire were struggling to hold on to their land. The 
land of Armenians who were driven away during or after the massacres was never 
returned.327 As a result of the killing of craftsmen, peasants and merchants and the 
destruction of their workplaces during both massacres, the ‘Armenian economy’ (and 
consequently the Ottoman economy) received a huge blow.328 Among other cities, Urfa 
“witnessed material destruction and a serious economic and demographic decline” after the 
pogroms of 1895.329 
The Greeks who fled the Aegean part of Turkey twenty years later in 1914 had a few 
days to take their most important belongings in some places whereas in others they fled in 
such haste “that their homes and possessions were left largely intact. It was the governors’ 
responsibility to arrange for the orderly redistribution of Greek property, but it was often 
plundered by locals or by muhadjirs arriving from Salonica before they could fulfill their 
task. 330 Appropriation on the basis of ‘first come, first served’ should happen again and 
again in the following decade. 
Expropriation of Armenians in 1915 
As soon as the Ottoman Empire entered World War I, (a convenient pretext for 
discriminatory treatment), it enacted a series of temporary laws that made wide-ranging 
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property confiscations in the guise of a war tax (teklif-i harbiyye) in the eastern provinces 
legal. The Armenian villages around Sivas, for example, had to give one thousand carts of 
goods to the army.331 A supplementary law from June 10, 1915 “contained instructions on 
how to register and protect the properties of the deportees, and how to dispose of others 
through public auctions (the revenues of which would be given to the owners upon their 
return from the war).”332 
The body in charge of executing this law was the Abandoned Properties Commission 
(Emval-i Metruke). It was supposed to keep detailed registers of Armenians’ movable and 
immovable property and to safeguard it until their return or to send it to their new place of 
settlement. The bureaucratic, scrupulous (and hypocritical) nature of its workings is 
apparent from the fact that the deportees were handed receipts to reclaim their property, the 
officials fully well knowing that there was no way they would ever get their property back. 
The migrants that were settled in Armenian houses were also registered along with the 
“type, quantity and value of the land distributed” 333 to them. “[Most] of the movable 
property was looted and parts of immovable properties were sold in auctions at a fraction of 
their original value or given as booty for Kurdish tribes to encourage them to participate in 
the war” (such as the Alevi Kurds of Dersim).334 The contradiction between what the state 
decreed and what it enacted is further evident from the fact that state officials would seal 
Armenian shops to prevent any losses, while the same state officials would juggle the 
accounts from the auctions and pocket a share or even break in and steal on a large scale.335 
Some Armenians tried to sell their houses before being deported but the prices were 
ridiculously low336 since potential buyers knew that a little later they would get the object 
for free and also because the market was flooded with Armenian property. 
Furthermore, there were so-called safety comissions (emniyet komisyonu) which took 
jewels, gold, stocks, bonds and other valuables from the Armenians during deportation, 
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supposedly to protect them from being stolen by Kurds on the way and with the intention of 
handing them back at the destination. In truth, the deportees were forced to part with their 
last property and the items were never returned. Finally, there were two more ad-hoc fees 
the deported had to pay in gold, one for their personal ‘safety’ (selametlik) and another for 
stepping on land (toprak bastı).337  
However, this is not the whole extent of the theft of Armenian wealth. The CUP also 
confiscated money and jewels deposited with the Ottoman Bank.338 According to Rev. 
Jernazian, the Abandoned Properties Commission seized the very sizable sum of 140,000 
gold pieces from the Ottoman Bank which Armenians had deposited there as a capital 
fund.339 The CUP also had an account with the German Reichsbank in Berlin that was most 
likely looted Armenian assets. 340 According to André Mandelstam, the Ottoman 
government deposited 5,000,000 Turkish Lira (the equivalent of 30,000 kilograms of gold) 
at the Reichsbank in Berlin in 1916. Üngör states that this “astronomic amount of money 
was most probably the aggregate of all Armenian bank accounts, as well as the total sum 
gained from the liquidations in the provinces.”341 
Der Matossian mentions that thousands of Armenians bought life insurances from 
European and American companies shortly before the genocide.342 It is not clear whether 
they would have done so in any case or whether they had any forebodings. In a 
conversation Talat Pasha had with Morgenthau, the former demanded that he provide him 
with a list of all Ottoman Armenian policy holders of ew York Life Insurance Company 
and Equitable Life of ew York.343 He argued that their policy holders were all dead with 
no heirs and that their policies consequently fell to the Ottoman government and state. But 
Morgenthau refused to do anything of the kind and so the CUP probably did not get hold of 
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this capital. To come back to the CUP’s gains at the expense of the Armenians, it needs to 
be mentioned that Armenian Ottoman citizens also held insurances with the Ottoman 
Public Insurance Company (Osmanlı Umum Sigorta Şirketi) and the Turkish ational 
Insurance Company (Türk Milli Sigorta Şirketi).344 That of course made it easier for the 
government to lay its hands on their deposits, but I have no figures that confirm this 
assumption. 
Apparently, the removal of most Armenian competitors alone did not succeed in 
establishing a ‘national’ bourgeoisie since in January 1916, when the Armenian genocide 
was almost over, Talat still felt the need to stress that “the Ottoman economy had to be 
become (sic!) an exclusively Muslim one. He decreed that Armenian property must fall into 
Muslim hands.”345 The government therefore encouraged the establishment of more 
Muslim joint-stock companies.346 “The new companies, however, had to be protected from 
falling under the control of foreign capital. Thus the government would exercise some 
supervision.”347 But apparently this failed since Keyder states that contrary to expectations, 
“the departure of the Greeks and the Armenians [...] left the field open to foreign 
capital.”348 
 
As mentioned earlier, the provisional government pursued the same policies as the 
CUP in continuing to expropriate non-Muslims. Probably in response to the Treaty of 
Sevres (1920), it passed an appropriation law. Article 144 of the Treaty of Sevres declared 
the Abandoned Properties Commission and the laws pertaining to it to be null and void and 
obliged the Turkish government to return any recoverable property that had been taken 
from Armenians since 1914. The provisional government’s law stated that whoever knows 
of abandoned or hidden assets and provides information about them will receive one tenth 
of their value. Thus far from returning any stolen goods, it tried to gain more.  
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Marashlian notes that the systematic plundering (and killing) of Christians continued 
in 1920-21 when the CUP was no longer in power yet Young Turks and others everywhere 
in the country were intent on keeping what they had gained at the Armenians’ and Greeks’ 
expense. Armenians were denied keeping or reclaiming their property through 
administrative and extra-legal methods,349 Armenian men were jailed solely to extort 
ransom from their relatives and Turkish officials frankly stated that the only way they could 
get money was by blackmailing Christians.350 Lawyers often refused to defend Christians 
so that these trials typically ended with the confiscation of all the defendant’s 
possessions.351 Armenian merchants were forbidden from operating unless they had a 
Turkish partner which was the first stage in the takeover of their businesses.352 Nazım 
Hikmet in his epic verse piece Human Landscapes From My Country creates such a 
character, Burhan Özedar.353 Özedar notices that a Greek company produces cigarette paper 
that is used all over Anatolia, a profitable business. He then intimates to the Ankara 
government that no cigarette paper should be used that comes without the Turkish flag’s 
star and crescent. Next, he makes the Greek business owner understand that he would do 
well to have a Turkish-Muslim partner. The Greek owner gets the point, they become 
partners, and as a consequence, Özedar’s wealth grows with every year that passes. He 
invests it in apartments and charitable foundations such as hospitals and also promotes the 
memory of Ahmet Paşa in Sivas, to connect himself to the local Muslim community 
there.354 Though this is a fictional character, it was very likely modeled on existing figures. 
Non-Muslim doctors and lawyers could also be forbidden from practicing their 
profession altogether.355 In the countryside, Armenian land, cattle and other movable assets 
were often stolen so that their former owners were forced to move to the cities where they 
were unable to earn a living. When they decided to leave the country, they were robbed one 
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last time when they were made to pay for passports and pay real or imaginary debts.356 On 
that occasion they were also forbidden from reentry. 
With the occupation and administration of the southern and southeastern part of 
Turkey by the British and the French, many deported but surviving Armenians returned and 
found their homes inhabited by Muslims and all their other property used or taken. The 
French were generally sympathetic to demands for restitution whereas the British were not. 
But even the property the returnees regained they lost again in many cases when they were 
driven out with the departure of the foreign forces. 
According to Der Matossian, the process of the liquidation of Armenian property 
began in WWI with its confiscation and ended in Republican times with its appropriation. 
357 This is correct in so far as the process of appropriation continued into Republican times 
and went on for years but this does not mean that it started only then. As is clear from the 
examples given above, most of what could be appropriated was appropriated on the spot, 
people did not wait for eight years or longer. Der Matossian makes a very important point, 
though, in stating that  
the movement of ‘Armenian capital’ from the Ottoman Empire to the Republican 
era does not only demonstrate a historical continuity, but also sheds light on capital 
movements during different political regimes and the role that this capital plays in the 
creation of new economic classes.358 
Expropriation of Greeks in 1922-23 
Information on what the Ottoman Greeks left behind and what they were able to take 
with themselves in the 1920s is rather contradictory and of course varies depending on 
which group is concerned. The Greeks that fled with the Greek army, for example, left in 
such haste that they could take only very little property with them. The 250.000 Greeks and 
50.000 Armenians of Western Thrace, on the other hand, had time to prepare for their 
departure. This was possible because British forces in the Bosporus and the Dardanelles 
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prevented Turkey from transferring its forces to Western Thrace and pushing the Greeks 
and Armenians out overnight.359 Like Armenians, some Greeks hid gold in their houses in 
the hope of returning or recovering it at a later point, which did not happen, though.360 
Others “managed to bring considerable cash and valuables” to Greece which allowed them 
to set up new businesses there.361 Keyder writes that a 
crude calculation, which is certainly an underestimate, suggests that the departure of 
the Greeks implied the transfer to Moslem landlords of close to one-fifth of the best 
land in Western Anatolia. In cities, the abandoned property and wealth, not to speak 
of the business positions thus made available, were surely of even greater value.362 
 
The question of who was compensated and to what extent is another one fraught with 
contradictions. The Lausanne Convention foresaw the compensation of the Turkish/Muslim 
and Greek/Christian exchangees for the property they had left behind, but in practice this 
did not happen, whether because of a lack of resources, documentation and funds, or lack of 
political will. Zürcher states that 
the task of assessing the value of the property left behind and disposing of it in an 
equitable manner proved simply too complicated. The mixed commission continued 
its work until October 1934, but the bulk of the migrants never saw any money.363 
 
This agrees with Köker’s assessment that most exchangees from Turkey in effect lost 
their property. This was in part because locals had already occupied the abandoned Greek 
property during the year that had passed between the Greeks’ departure and the Muslims’ 
arrival364 and in part because the extent of the authority of the Ministry of Finance and the 
Commission of Immigrants was not clear. 
Although the immovable property left by the Rums was supposed to be distributed 
to the newcomers through the commission, the Ministry had already disposed of 
much of it through public auction or through leases to locals, army officers and state 
employees.365 
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Army officers, for example, received only a small percentage of their salary in cash 
and the remainder was paid in kind, namely in drafts on the Abandoned Properties 
Commission, “so they have become dealers in old furniture.”366 “Furthermore, the 
reallocation mechanism was overtly political, especially in urban areas.”367 A point already 
stressed earlier. Even though mutual compensation was surely complicated, it could have 
been achieved had it been wanted. What was lacking more than anything on the Turkish 
side was the will to return anything after the government and locals had made every effort 
to appropriate as much as possible. 
It was not only left-behind property that was taken, but the nationalist government 
even tried to grab what was beyond its reach. In October 1922, it tried to get hold of the 
goods and securities deposited in foreign banks in Smyrna just as the CUP had successfully 
done with Armenians deposits. Using its April law on abandoned properties as justification, 
it demanded that the foreign banks in Smyrna furnish it with lists.368 I have no information 
on whether this was successful or not. Another example of the lengths to which the 
nationalist government went to attain more property is the case of around one thousand 
wealthy Arabs in Mersin, Tarsus and Adana who were expropriated as part of the 
population exchange. A minority within the minority, they belonged to the Antioch Greek-
Orthodox Church and had names such as Naccache, Barbour, Nader, Sursok, Boutros and 
Touweyni.369 They had opted for Turkish citizenship and stayed in Turkey after the French 
retreat so as not to lose their extensive properties.370 “They were generally extremely rich 
families that owned extensive areas of land and other valuable assets in Cilicia.”371 Even 
though the exchange agreement did not stipulate that members of the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate of Constantinople were to be exchanged, Ankara used it to “despoil the Greek 
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Orthodox Arabic-speaking families of Cilicia of all their assets with the object of seizing 
their rich lands.”372 Those that had stayed thus lost everything in the population exchange 
just as those community members that had left because they were forbidden from 
reentering Turkey.373 
Part of the Greek property that passed into Muslim hands was lost in the sense that it 
did not serve its new owners who, out of ignorance, often destroyed it. 
They [the muhacirs] landed on ready-made houses and lands. They cut down those 
beautiful vine-yards left from the infidels and used them as wood. They devastated 
this plain. Now they treat vineyards and olive as gold. Now they’ve learned.374 
 
According to another statement,  
 
[t]hose who came to Muradiye had to learn how to manage the vineyards and olive 
orchards. They were not familiar with the land, climate or the type of agriculture. It 
was the first time they had met with olive trees, and according to Haşim Akçasoy, 
muhacirs cut them down because they thought the fruit was inedible.375 
 
As a result, the government stopped allocating olive orchards to muhacirs and 
reclaimed the ones already assigned. 
 
The economic consequences of the population exchange for Turkey were thus at least 
twofold: the lack of skill through the removal of the Greeks and the waste of some of the 
remaining potential through mismanagement. The removal of the Greeks from Anatolia left 
the Turkish economy with a shortage of skills which the new arrivals could not replace. 
The poorly planned resettlement only aggravated the situation.376 “The arbitrary assignment 
of refugees to unfamiliar habitats eventually led to the degeneration of agricultural and 
natural resources: grazing land was denuded, water resources depleted, and the landscape 
deforested.”377 
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But in order not to paint too simplistic a picture of brain drain and success versus 
backwardness and gloom, we have to take into consideration that there were at least two 
groups of Muslim exchangees whose abilities and background were similar to the Christian 
bourgeoisie, the exchangees from Cunda and the Salonicans. Many Muslim exchangees 
from Cunda claim they retained their socio-economic status in the new country and that, 
thanks to their knowledge of both Turkish and Greek, the highly educated ones among 
them were able to act as political intermediaries between the Turkish state and the less 
astute Mytilinii.378 A few of them even said they were able to rise and place themselves in a 
niche market, namely the Greek tourism industry of Cunda and Ayvalık.379 Significantly, 
they also refused to be called muhacirs which they associated with destitution and preferred 
mübadeleci since they had come with their money and property.380 
The other group consisted in the Salonicans, Jews, Muslims and Dönme. Salonica 
had been the third largest economic center in the Empire and the part played by Muslim 
businessmen in its prosperity had been relatively larger than in Istanbul or Izmir. They were 
also the largest urban group to immigrate to Turkey,381 they had adopted bourgeois 
lifestyles and,382 most importantly, they had a capitalist tradition. The Dönme among them 
had become important businessmen in the 19th century in the textile trade and they 
continued to invest in textiles and related manufacturing after arriving in Turkey. In how 
far they were able to replace Armenians and Greeks is an open question, though. There are 
basically two opposing interpretations: One view holds that they were few, that they lived 
mostly in Istanbul (“the new republican government in Ankara treated all Istanbul 
businessmen with some coolness”383) and that they were distrusted as half-outsiders due to 
their religion (it seems that like the minority businessmen, they received no state 
assistance).384 In addition, they had not earned credentials in the war of liberation. 
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According to the proponents of this view, the Salonicans were not able to and were not 
given the chance to replace the minority bourgeoisie. They lost their relative standing with 
the imposition of the wealth tax and adopted a low profile to avoid further discrimination. 
Keyder writes that they  
generally forfeited the chance to expand into new fields; they remained within the 
confines of their initial business undertakings. By the 1960s they only supplied small 
niches in old markets. Of the entire non-Muslim group of businessmen only a small 
number of Jewish families retained their relative status in the economy, and even they 
did not regain [...] confidence in the political situation until the mid-1950s. 385 
 
The other view holds that Dönme had a huge, but hidden, impact on all aspects of 
Republican life, and that the CUP trusted them because of their common origins in 
Salonica. Advocates of this thesis tend towards conspiracy theories and anti-Semitism. 
Since there is very little reliable information about the Dönme in Republican Turkey, it is 
impossible to make a balanced judgment of their involvement in the Republican economy. 
But it seems likely that these two groups of new Turkish citizens absorbed some of the 
shock that the near disappearance of the former bourgeoisie had caused. Furthermore, it 
seems that one of the two groups, the Salonicans or at least the Dönme among them, which 
could have led the new bourgeoisie, was more and more marginalized until it lost all its 
significance with the imposition of the wealth tax. This is a good example of how capitalist 
and nationalist goals can clash, as suggested in chapter two.  
What Happened to the Property after Expropriation 
Some of the Armenian and Greek property left behind continued to be used as before, 
some was used differently, some was destroyed and some remained beyond anybody’s 
reach. The villa of the Kasabyans who were deported from Ankara and expropriated in 
1915, for example, was turned into the president’s mansion Çankaya.386 In the provinces, 
simple houses were used for the settlement of refugees with the double aim of sheltering 
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them and increasing the state’s hold on a given area. 387 Many churches were turned into 
mosques, granaries, stables, factories, prisons or electric power stations.388 Some property 
was actively destroyed such as the cemetery in front of the Armenian Church of St. John in 
Urfa. It was leveled to the ground by the first governor of the Republican regime, Fuat 
Pasha, to make space for a street, bypassing the old town.389 Many Armenian churches 
quickly turned into ruins when people used them as a stone pits to renovate or construct 
their own houses. However, disregard and need were not the only reasons for the 
destruction of Armenian heritage in Turkey. The wish to eliminate reminders of the 
Armenians’ presence also played an important role in it because it gave strength to the 
claim that Anatolia was Turkish land only and it removed indications that Armenians may 
not have left voluntarily and that some of the current inhabitants may have been guilty of 
evicting and plundering them. Some left-behind property remained beyond anybody’s reach 
such as the gold many more well-off families hid in their houses or gardens in the hope of 
returning. According to Biner, the search for ‘Armenian gold’ continues into the present390 
and has led people “to dig up their own or empty houses and cemeteries. [...] holes in walls, 
basements and courtyards are the marks of their obsessive search”391 
One big question is whether the newly gained property served people well. 
Öztürkmen observes that even “[...] today, one can hear stories how such property, once 
belonging to non-Muslims, was spent as fast as it was acquired, or else brought 
unhappiness to families who owned it.”392 This may be due to superstition or a self-
fulfilling prophecy but it could also be that people whose wealth doubled over night really 
did not know how to handle it, just like the stereotypical lottery winner who squanders the 
million within a few years and dies poor. Chapter seven will return to this question under 
Counting the Cost. 
                                                 
387 Zürcher (2008: 10).  
388 Öktem (2004: 571). 
389 Öktem (2004: 571).  
390 “[...] rumors accusing him [a young Kurdish man in Mardin] of hunting for treasure in the 
ruins of Christian houses and villages.” Biner (2010 b: 80).  
391 Biner (2010 b: 83-84). 
392 Öztürkmen (2003: 188).  
  110
Competition over the Distribution of Armenian and Greek Property 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, there was competition over who got what 
property. This was similar in the Armenian and Greek cases but since more information is 
available on the former, I will draw examples from that case. The contending parties were 
different ministries (the interior ministry which sought to establish a national economy and 
the Ottoman army which put forward military needs),393 different levels of government (the 
central government and local government)394 and the state versus individuals that had their 
personal enrichment in mind. This conflict of interests could, and did, often take place 
within the same person, for example when an army officer directed rations meant for his 
soldiers to his family and friends, or when an official in charge of auctioning off Armenian 
furniture and forwarding the proceeds to the state treasury picked the best items for himself 
before advertising the auction. There are plenty of examples of Young Turk officials who 
acted in their own interest, rather than the state’s.  
The beneficiaries of redistribution can be divided into three groups, those that the 
CUP had designated as deserving attention, those that were not officially designated as 
beneficiaries but that were meant to benefit and those that were not meant to benefit but did 
so anyway. Groups and parties officially intended to benefit from the redistribution of 
goods were, in no particular order, the army, the ‘national’ economy, the needy Muslim 
population and immigrants.  
The army received a large part of Armenian property, provisions such as wheat, soap 
and medical equipment.395 A section of the needy Muslim population was provided with 
the necessities of daily life like clothing and other goods.396 Migrants received land, 
housing, vineyards, orchards and agricultural instruments. Talat kept a precise record of 
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how much was attributed, down to the number of carts, animals and even seeds.397 
Prospective members of the ‘national’ economy were supposed to be chosen from among 
the skilled Muslim members of society and Armenian workshops were to go to Muslims 
practicing the same profession so that nothing would be wasted. In practice, redistribution 
was not that orderly, a lot of resources were wasted since not qualification but political 
loyalty were the main criterion for assignment. Though overt, this distribution mechanism 
was unofficial as the following will show.  
Groups not officially designated as beneficiaries of Armenian expropriation but 
meant to be so were the CUP and Young Turk loyalists and profiteers. The extent of this 
appropriation was very considerable. Authorities often confiscated or auctioned off only a 
fraction of the property that had originally been there because it had been stolen or they 
themselves had pocketed it earlier. “At Kerrassund, for instance, the authorities had 
officially confiscated Armenian property with a total value of only T₤102, while the real 
value had been estimated at about T₤10,000.”398 According to a contemporary, the CUP 
elite took the cream of the crop of Armenian property for itself rather than have it sold and 
the proceeds forwarded to the treasury. 
‘Eskişehir’s most modernized and pretty houses lay around the train station... A 
large Armenian mansion for the princes, two canary-yellow adjacent houses near the 
Sarısu bridge to Talaat Bey and his friend Canbolat Bey, a wonderful Armenian 
mansion in the Armenian neighborhood to Topal Đsmail Hakkı. All the houses 
convenient for residing near the train station have all (sic!) been allocated to the elite 
of the Ittihadists.’399 
 
Another example comes from a Turkish author called Hasan Amca who in the 5 and 
6 April 1919 issue of Alemdar declared that Reşid Bey went to his post in Diyarbakır with 
no more than two chests but returned to Istanbul with wagonloads of plundered Armenian 
goods. This illustrates how professional interests (setting up a ‘national’ bourgeoisie) and 
private ones (personal enrichment) could clash and greed win over ideology.  
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That political loyalty was rewarded through assigning property or that being assigned 
property was an incentive for future loyalty is a point stressed again and again in the 
accounts of appropriation. The following passage out of Sabancı’s memoirs inadvertently 
illustrates that nationalist credentials rather than management skill or professional expertise 
were required. 
In order to resume production, the government in Ankara was casting around for 
entrepreneurs competent to take over the abandoned factories and farms. For 
example, Nuh Nacı of Kayseri was summoned to Ankara by Celal Bey (Bayar). Nuh 
Nacı had participated in the Sivas Congress as delegate from Kayseri and had won 
Mustafa Kemal’s confidence during the years of the War of Liberation. He was 
elected Deputy for Kayseri in the post-war Assembly but subsequently resigned his 
seat. Celal Bey handed over to him one or two of the factories abandoned by the 
Armenians and Greeks and asked him to run them.400 
 
Celal Bayar had been involved in the expulsion of the Aegean Greeks and the 
Armenian genocide so this course of action was to be expected. Supporters of the CUP 
were not only assigned property but also given opportunities for profiteering, the exact 
same practice that was decried as unpatriotic when non-Muslims engaged in it. 
Under the guise of making provision for the capital city and the army, the CUP 
instituted allocation mechanisms which totally bypassed the market. The Ottoman 
trade monopoly system had returned in all but name, making use of the newly 
available technology: since means of transport were scarce, political favourites who 
could obtain the use of a railway freight car became instant magnates.401 
 
Another example comes from Kayseri where “a quickly formed Muslim company 
bought Armenian stores and goods wholesale, for 200 Turkish pounds. Shortly afterwards, 
the property was sold for 10,000 pounds.”402 Speculation was also widespread, but of 
course not official.403  
To come to the groups that profited from redistribution with neither the CUP’s 
official nor tacit approval, these were ordinary men, women and children who pilfered or 
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took what was left behind all along the expropriation process with this being neither a 
reward nor an incentive for political loyalty. The goods thus transferred were much less 
valuable than those traded in the examples above, probably mostly household goods, 
clothes, animals, houses in the villages and the like.  
Finally, we are coming to a small group of people who, unexpectedly, may also have 
profited from the Armenians’ and Greeks’ expropriation, namely the remaining minority 
members. As mentioned above under ‘legality’, Armenians were forbidden from selling or 
giving for safekeeping any of their property to fellow non-Muslims because this would 
have undermined the CUP’s ‘nationalization’ efforts. Evidence that the remaining 
Armenians, Greeks, Assyrians or Jews profited materially is scarce, probably because the 
whole question of redistribution is underresearched but maybe also because it is a sensitive 
issue (it blurs the line between exploiters and exploited ones). In the Southeast of Turkey, 
where most of the surviving Armenians and Assyrians lived, it is likely that Armenians and 
Assyrians moved into abandoned Armenian houses, though it is hard to call it ‘profiting’ 
when survivors of massacres seek a roof over their head not caring whom it belongs to. In 
the immaterial realm, there is ill feeling between the departed Armenians and the remaining 
Syriacs of Mardin. Armenians accuse Syriacs of having been collaborators by having re-
baptized Armenian children, by having made them part of their community and by claiming 
originally Armenian monuments, mansions and churches. They accuse them of having 
taken over their heritage and made themselves “the only ‘authentic’ Christian community 
within contemporary, cosmopolitan Mardin.”404 
What is beyond doubt is that the remaining minority businessmen benefited from the 
business opportunities that had opened up with the sudden absence of the majority of 
Armenians and Greeks. It created a demand for and scarce supply of their business skill. In 
Izmir, it was Jews who took on Armenian and Greek positions and in Adana Jews as well 
as Arab Christians. According to Sabancı’s memoirs, 
the outstanding businessmen of Adana [in the 1920s] were Corç Lutfullah and 
Alber Diyab, both Lebanese Catholics. These two had a monopoly on all matters 
relating to exports and agencies. Muslim businessmen, ignorant of foreign languages, 
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held them in high esteem, because they were regarded as totally competent in these 
fields.405 
 
Levantines, too, probably benefited from the vacuum that the Armenian and Greek 
removal had created in the economy. For instance, there was not a single Muslim among 
the founders of the Izmir Chamber of Commerce, they were all Levantines.406 
Extent of the Property Transfer 
World War I in the Ottoman Empire clearly provided favourable conditions for 
becoming rich within a very short time with little fear of being held accountable for the 
means employed. It did so not only the way most wars do for profiteers but even more so 
since most of the property of around four million people fell vacant within a mere ten years. 
This wealth must have been greater than the percentage of its owners in the overall 
population suggests (almost 20 per cent) since the commercial bourgeoisie was almost 
entirely made up of members of the Armenian and Greek communities. In principle, all 
Armenian and Greek property was transferred to the state to serve national interests and 
projects but in practice it was different as we have seen above. Kaiser is only partially right 
in stating that 
the entire Ottoman government apparatus that included several central government 
ministries, provincial and local authorities, as well as village elders, were involved in 
transferring the Armenian private, ecclesiastical and community property.407 
 
In fact, individuals of all social classes everywhere in the country took part in the 
plundering of Armenians. From the rich pasha in Ankara who took over his Armenian 
neighbors’ villa to the Muslim lady who got a box full of the lady of the house’s jewelry for 
a pittance to the government official who would only issue a receipt for the confiscated 
ware house against payment of a fee to the deportation guard near Kayseri who would take 
a bribe for not taking away their donkey to the nomad or peasant woman who squeezed the 
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last gold coin from those members of the family that reached the Syrian desert. Keyder 
states that “[...] not only the immigrants but probably every single wealthy Muslim in a 
position to make the transformation to bourgeois status had acquired some property from 
the departing Greeks and Armenians.”408 
Consequently, those who took the opportunity of enriching themselves did so not 
only at the Armenians’ and Greeks’ expense but also at that of their fellow Muslims’ and 
the military’s. According to Gerlach, ‘the rich of 1916’ who had made fortunes through 
speculation became proverbial. Their doings led to unrest in the capital in 1915 already and 
threatened CUP rule.409 More gravely, they were responsible for the starvation of tens of 
thousands of people in Istanbul and on the Smyrna plain. In 1916 and 1917, hundreds of 
people died every day of hunger in both cities.410 Gerlach rightly states that it is a bitter 
irony that many of the Turkish victims among civilians and soldiers go back not to 
Armenian acts but to the very people, the new bourgeoisie, who are praised as the heart of 
the Turkish nation.411 He also very aptly states that only though corruption, usury, political 
nepotism and violence was the new economic elite able to create for itself an invulnerable 
position; and that it did so with great brutality. “In the twenties, this economic elite 
dominated Turkey’s economic life not so much because of its own strength but rather 
because of the previous violent removal of other economic elites. It was so to say a belated 
original accumulation”, which is the point already made in chapter two. 412 
Impact on Turkish Economic Life 
The impact the elimination of the Armenians and Greeks had on the Ottoman 
economy was grave. The percentage of non-Muslims in the population dropped from 20 per 
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cent to about two per cent413 and the country thereby lost “the skills of an entire 
commercial and industrial middle class”.414 The role of non-Muslims in the bourgeoisie and 
urban artisan class became greatly diminished and that that of Muslims grew. Only in 
Istanbul, where the percentage of non-Muslims was higher than anywhere else in the 
country, a mere 1,200 out of 4,300 companies (28 per cent) belonged to Muslim Turks.415 
Elsewhere, the percentage of Muslim-owned businesses must have been much higher. 
Üngör states that “a whole generation of Turkish-owned firms ‘established in 1916’”416  
mushroomed across the Empire after the Armenian genocide.  
Though possessions and capital in Muslim hands greatly increased, these Muslims 
were unable to replace the absented Armenians and Greeks in terms of skills, experience 
and networks. Aktar rightly points out that 
not only the entrepreneurs but the most skilled section of the late Ottoman working 
population perished within ten years. [... The] Turkish bourgeoisie and urban artisans 
were far from replacing the minorities in all sectors of economic and social life. [...] 
As a newly developing social class their aspirations and actual capacity were limited 
and inadequate for a better vocation. Thus the development and dissemination of a 
more skilled industrial working population had to wait for some more decades.417 
 
Zürcher makes the same point: “In 1923 Turkey was not only a country almost 
without managers and engineers, but it was a country almost without trained waiters, 
welders or electricians. It would take at least a generation to rebuild the skills that had 
disappeared.”418 
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Critique of the CUP’s ‘ationalization’ Policies 
The question here is not whether what the CUP did was morally right – the answer is 
obvious- but whether the means it employed to reach its aim were effective. Üngör states 
that the “[...] practice of mass confiscation and plunder was in fact a shortcut to the notion 
of the aspired ‘national economy’.”419 The CUP may well have hoped so but I doubt it 
really was. On the surface yes, a ‘national’ bourgeoisie came into being within a few years, 
but it seems to have taken decades to more or less replace the minority bourgeoisie.  
Keyder states that the CUP members 
were unprepared for their sudden accession to power. They had no specific 
programme to implement, nor had they yet discovered the social group whose 
interests could provide an orientation for future policies. Consequently, they changed 
and evolved rather rapidly in the face of events.420 
 
He criticizes the CUP for not having studied the social structure or the mechanisms of 
imperialism to understand the Empire’s problems. Instead, he says, it upheld a discourse 
that was anti-absolutist, “tinted with an ill-defined resentment of economic dependence”421 
and “ill-understood desire to overcome economic backwardness.”422 The CUP “prescribed 
administrative reforms as the cure to the ills they could diagnose while remaining ignorant 
of their economic aspects.”423 While we may wish the CUP had indeed limited itself to 
administrative reforms, I agree with him that they lacked insight into economic and social 
processes as well as patience. The CUP’s infrastructural improvements (roads, postal 
addresses, communications etc.) were a good start for the country’s overall economic 
development and Muslims could have gained a larger share of business through reform or 
positive discrimination. This can be illustrated with the 1915 prohibition to use English and 
French in commercial correspondence. The rationale behind it must have been to put 
Muslim and Christians on an equal footing by removing the competitive advantage often 
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foreign-educated urban Christians had over urban Muslims. The CUP may even have hoped 
to give Muslim Turks an advantage over Christian employees since Turks may have known 
Turkish better than some of them. (Levantines did not speak Turkish, many Jews only 
communicated in Ladino and some Armenian and Greek businessmen may not have known 
Turkish as well as Turks). What the CUP did not consider was how businessmen would 
conduct international relations without using either of the two international languages, 
French being the diplomatic one and English the language used in business transactions.   
By prohibiting the use of English and French, the CUP punished the minorities as 
much as Muslim Ottomans. It could have educated Muslim boys to the same standards as 
the sons of the Christian bourgeoisie, apprenticed them with Armenians, Greeks and Jews, 
sent them abroad to improve their language skills and let them gain professional expertise. 
In addition, it could have provided them with credit for the setting up of Muslim-owned 
businesses. Over time, this would have put Muslims and Christians on an equal footing, 
with a small advantage for the former. Also, the transfer of knowledge and experience 
would have been unbroken and professionalism and competitiveness would have been 
maintained. Of course, this would have cost not only time, at least a generation, but also 
money. Bankrupted and at risk of breaking apart completely, the Ottoman Empire lacked 
both. As Keyder says, only under more peaceful conditions, would the CUP policies have 
resulted “in the attainment of greater political control over the market, and in the relative 
ascendancy of the non-Christian elements in the bourgeoisie.”424 Still, the CUP could have 
taken another course of action and modified its plan to include Muslims into the 
bourgeoisie rather than hope to replace it from one year to the next. This would have spared 
the minority bourgeoisie and the country would still have modernized, probably more 
successfully so. In this light, the CUP’s economic policies were shortsighted. There was 
criticism of the CUP’s economic policies before the war when members of the Liberal 
Union counseled caution and argued that it was superfluous and ridiculous to boycott shops 
since this only damaged local commerce.425 But not heeding the warning, the CUP saw 
World War I as a golden opportunity for advancing its goal of Turkification rapidly. 
Appropriation was not the leading idea of the deportations and killing of Armenians, but 
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once it had happened, there was no reason not to take advantage of the situation and take 
their property.  
Istanbul-Izmir Paradox: Why were the Armenians of Istanbul and Izmir Largely 
Spared Deportation and Expropriation? 
In view of the CUP’s program of ethnic homogenization and property transfer from 
non-Muslims to Muslims, which it carried out scrupulously even in the countryside and 
into the 1920s, it is puzzling that it should have let the Armenian communities of Istanbul 
and Izmir alive, in possession of their property, remain concentrated and retain their 
communal structures. The only exception to this seems to be the 200 members of the 
Istanbul Armenian elite who were deported on 24th April 1915 and some 400 more who 
were taken away shortly after and mostly killed early on in the deportation process.426 
The conventional explanation is that the CUP tried to carry out the deportations and 
mass killings in secrecy in order not to make negative headlines in the international press 
and to avoid unnecessary tensions with Germany which would have been implied in its 
condemnation. According to this explanation, the Armenians of Istanbul and Izmir were 
spared because the presence of foreign diplomatic personnel in these two cities would have 
made it impossible to maintain secrecy whereas in the provinces there were far fewer 
foreigners who could report home. 
It is true that the CUP instructed the executors of its orders to be discreet and to 
dispose of the corpses in a manner that they would not be visible to passers-by. Thus the 
deportees were killed outside the cities, not in their streets, though the fact that it was easier 
to get rid of the corpses and to avoid the spread of diseases where the population was 
densest surely also played a role in this decision. Likewise, foreign witnesses were 
forbidden from taking photos and all publications relating to what was happening in the 
Ottoman Empire were censored in the Empire and in Germany.  
But these measures were ineffective because what was happening could not be hidden 
and also because the perpetrators often took no care to hide anything, such as when they 
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threw thousands of corpses into the Euphrates which floated away and bore witness to 
massacres upstream. Foreigners witnessed the deportation of their Armenian neighbors, 
colleagues, or protegés, they saw corpses lying by the road in the countryside and they 
circumvented the prohibitions and took photos (for instance the German army medic Armin 
Wegner) and wrote and published reports  (see for example Johannes Lepsius’ ‘Bericht 
über die Lage des Armenischen Volkes in der Türkei’, also known as ‘Der Todesgang des 
Armenischen Volkes’, which was published and disseminated in 1916 in spite of German 
censorship). Last but not least, CUP members themselves could be frank about their goals 
(see Talat Pasha’s and Morgenthau’s conversations). The international public was thus well 
informed about what was going on in the Ottoman Empire. 
By the time it carried out the Armenian genocide, the CUP believed that it was 
fighting a deadly struggle that could only result in either Turkish-Muslim victory or 
destruction. If, in other words, the CUP had nothing to lose, there was no reason for it to 
make an exception for the Armenians of the two most important and most prosperous cities 
in Anatolia. Considering the fact that the CUP and the Kemalists pursued their project of 
ethnic homogenization and economic ‘nationalization’ with great ardor and thoroughness in 
the provinces, it is puzzling that they should have allowed the Armenians in Istanbul and 
Izmir to i) remain concentrated and to maintain a community life (in complete contradiction 
to their policy of dispersion and assimilation, especially the five-per-cent rule) and ii) to 
keep their property (even though some of the Istanbul Armenians were surely among the 
wealthiest in the country).  
Another explanation that has been given is that the Istanbul Armenians were spared 
because the city was under British occupation which meant that the CUP had no power 
there. But that was only in the period from 1918 to 1923, the CUP could have driven out its 
Armenians before that, but it did not. Also, Izmir was not under foreign occupation until 
1919 so Young Turks could have attacked the Armenian population of that city, too, if they 
had wanted to.  
Yet another reason given is that many of the Armenians in Istanbul and Izmir were 
Catholics and Protestants rather than Apostolic. Foreign missionaries who had converted 
them saw them as their protegés and lobbied with their governments for their exemption 
from deportation. One would have to find out whether the percentage of Protestant and 
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Catholic Armenians in Istanbul and Izmir was higher than elsewhere. But even if it was, it 
is doubtful that this is the explanation since in the southeastern provinces, the percentage of 
deported non-orthodox Christians was as high as that of orthodox ones as shown in chapter 
four.427 To quote a final attempt at explanation, according to Smith, who quotes Dadrian, 
German ambassador Metternich wrote in a report on 7 December 1915 that 
4000 Armenians had recently been removed from Constantinople, that the total 
number of those deported from the Ottoman capital up to that time had reached 
30,000, and that ‘gradually a clean sweep will be made of the remaining 80,000 
Armenian inhabitants of the Ottoman capital.428 
 
This asserts the possibility that Armenians were deported from Istanbul. If that were 
correct, the CUP indeed planned to remove all Armenians from the capital and started 
carrying out its plan but did not complete it, for whatever reasons. It would also mean that 
the concentration of Armenians in Istanbul is not a result of non-deportation but of the 
migration of survivors to the capital. But if this migration happened before 1918, the 
question remains why Armenians were permitted to concentrate and stay there. So far, it is 
an unsolved puzzle.  
 
 
 
                                                 
427 Üngör suggests that the definition of the victim group changed during the genocide, from a 
religious definition based on the millet system (‘Apostolic Christians are to be deported’) 
to a national or racial definition (‘people of Armenian ethnicity are to be deported, no 
matter whether Apostolic, Protestant or Catholic, even those converted to Islam’). Uğur 
Ümit Üngör 2011. Confiscation and Colonization: the Young Turk Seizure of Armenian 
Property, Armenian Weekly, April 22, 2011, p. 3. If true, this would explain why all 
Armenians, even converted ones, could be deported. At first sight, Üngör’s argument 
disagrees with Gaunt’s assertion that during the 1910s Armenophobia turned into general 
anti-Christian feeling (chapter three). But on second thought it seems possible that the fear 
of the Armenian threat and the imperial threat led to a general fear of Christians while at 
the same time increasingly national, even racial, thinking prompted a fear of anybody born 
Armenian, no matter whether he had become Muslim or not. It may be that uneducated 
people tended towards the former whereas the elite that was familiar with the latest thought 
in Europe tended towards the latter.  
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Conclusion 
Next to the homogenization of the population, placing the Ottoman-Turkish economy 
in Muslim hands was the other main goal of CUP nation building. The CUP did so by 
restricting business opportunities of non-Muslims and by creating them for Muslims. But in 
part because results did not materialize soon enough, they also expelled Armenians and 
Greeks and killed the former on a large scale which advanced two other goals at the same 
time: it contributed to the unmixing of populations and to the ‘nationalization’ of the 
economy by removing competitors and making huge amounts of property and capital 
available to Muslims. In theory, everything that had been taken from the Armenians and 
Greeks was state property and to be distributed by the state. In practice, competition over 
the spoils and large-scale corruption meant that the outcome of redistribution was very 
different from what it had been declared to be. CUP loyalists especially were rewarded 
handsomely and made huge profits. But since they lacked the skill, experience and 
networks of the Armenian and Greek members of the bourgeoisie, they were unable to 
replace them. The economy experienced a long drawn-out recession and much of the newly 
gained property was wasted. 
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6. 
 
 
HOMOGENIZATION OF THE NATION IN REPUBLICAN TIMES 
 
 
 
 
We are now entering a new stage of nation building with regard to Armenians and 
Greeks, for the parameters (territory and people) were largely fixed and the state was 
working within these parameters. Armenians were still expelled and mistreated, and even 
killed in the thousands in the 1920s. But compared to the time when hundreds of thousands 
were killed or expelled, this period constituted a phase of calming down and consolidation. 
With the end of the decade of wars and the chaos accompanying it, the conditions for 
the state’s shaping the population by promoting what it deemed desirable and suppressing 
what it deemed undesirable were excellent. The nation was further homogenized by way of 
forcing as many ‘undesirables’ as possible out and forcing the remaining ‘undesirables’ to 
give up their distinctness and to become ‘Turkish’. The former were either formally 
expelled or unofficially forced to leave the country or deprived of their citizenship and 
forbidden from reentry (mark the similarity to the late Ottoman period.). The latter were 
forced to assimilate through pressure on them to give up any language other than Turkish, 
to convert to Islam, to adopt Turkish names and the like.  
 
Before we proceed, it is important to recall the intertwinedness of expropriation and 
emigration and the overlap between this chapter and the next one. One of the ways in which 
Armenians could be forced to leave the country was by plundering them or confiscating 
their source of making a living. If they could not be sure of their property or had already 
lost it, they had good reason to leave the country. Though expropriation was an important 
factor in the emigration of Armenians and Greeks, it will be treated under ‘nationalization 
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of the economy’. The reverse was also true: By expelling someone without giving him the 
chance to take his property with him or to sell it and take the profit, one had at the same 
time expropriated him and contributed to the ‘nationalization’ of the economy. As in 
chapters four and five, the two aspects will be dealt with separately while one should keep 
in mind that they were closely related.  
It is also important to recall that the assimilatory and expulsionary effect of events 
like 1943 and 1955 went beyond those immediately targeted, beyond the number who, say, 
were deported or whose property was destroyed. Nobody knew when such a thing would 
happen next, who would be targeted then, for how long it would last and how bad it would 
be. Each time such a disaster struck one or other of the minorities, those who were not 
targeted were also intimidated and scared because they could not know when it would be 
their turn. As a result they would choose to emigrate as a precaution or, if they stayed, tried 
everything to keep a low profile. Such acts therefore had an assimilatory and expulsionary 
effect beyond the designated victim group. 
Expulsion 
Accounts of the living circumstances of Armenians and Assyrians in the Southeast of 
Turkey in the 1920s do not distinguish between the period up to 1923 and the period 
starting in 1923. It seems that it made no difference, that killings, expulsion and 
expropriation simply carried on in regions that were not under French or British 
occupation. The Armenians who had survived or returned to the Turkish-Syrian border 
region did not leave voluntarily in the 1920s nor were they formally expelled during the 
first half of the decade.429 Instead, institutions close to the CHP such as local newspapers, 
the Türk Ocakları and notables made the everyday lives of the remaining Armenians 
                                                 
429 The return of surviving Armenians was not confined to the South and Southeast of Turkey: 
“According to two separate reports (one comprising British-collected figures, the other 
comprising Ottoman figures), anywhere between 2,761 and 5,800 Armenians in Adapazarı 
(out of a reported total of either 26,000 or 17,240) had lived to return by June 1919. That 
spring, 1,800 Armenians, out of a pre-1915 population of 11,300, returned to the environs 
of Đzmit.” Gingeras (2009: 52-53). 
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impossible. “On closer inspection, it is interesting to see that many of these people and the 
most important of them, were former members of the CUP who had significant experience 
in [...] the organization of mass deportations.”430 
The methods used against them differed depending on the time and location. There 
were press campaigns that declared the minorities to be enemies of the Turkish state and 
that demanded that they leave. In Cilicia, posters were put up on Christian-owned shops 
saying that they had one month to leave. In Marash, Armenians were insulted and stoned.431 
Furthermore, there was pressure on them to move from the countryside into towns where 
they were pressured to leave the country. As a result of these actions, the minority 
populations of towns such as Urfa, Marash and Aintab dropped from about 5,000 to less 
than 100.432 “Despite the scope of the expulsions from 1921 to 1923, a few pockets of 
Armenians managed to cling to several localities.”433 According to different sources, the 
flight from southern Turkey continued until 1929 or even into the 1930s.434 
Towards the end of the 1920s, Turkey added denaturalization and official expulsion 
orders to the harassment of the Christian minorities. In May 1927, parliament passed a law 
stating that anyone who had not taken part in the War of Independence and who had 
remained abroad between 24 July 1923 and 27 May 1927 was excluded from Turkish 
nationality. This affected all male Armenians because they had not taken part in the War of 
Independence as well as those females that, due to their deportation or flight, found 
themselves outside the borders of the new Turkish state in the given period. Not only did 
the Turkish government thereby contribute further to the homogenization of the population 
in this part of the country. It also put an end to the property dispute, there was no more 
hope for the return of stolen property.435 According to a British consul in Aleppo, 30,000 
Armenians were expelled from Turkey in the years 1929-30 alone.436  
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In the 1930s and 1940s, several thousand members of the minorities were deprived of 
Turkish citizenship. The state considering them as undeserving and disloyal, they were not 
to be part of the Turkish nation. It is likely that this involved Armenians as they had already 
been denied papers in the 1920s, though the source is not clear on this point. In 1929, the 
first mass denaturalizations involving hundreds of formerly Turkish citizens were carried 
out. In the 1930s, the rate increased greatly and the reasons given were non-participation in 
the war of liberation and ‘not having ties to Turkish culture’. In the early forties, 
denaturalization increased even further with 700 people stripped of their citizenship in 1940 
and 1941, respectively. In 1943, 1,400 people were denaturalized.437 It seems that most of 
the members of the minorities were deprived of their citizenship while they were abroad, 
especially in France. 
Hatay 1938   
When the sanjak of Alexandrette became part of Turkey in 1938, close to 50,000 
people emigrated from the province (almost half of which were Armenian) out of fear that 
they would otherwise be killed. According to French statistics from 1936, Armenians had 
made up twelve per cent of the population of 220,000 with almost forty per cent Turks, 
almost thirty per cent Alawite Arabs and almost ten per cent Sunni Arabs and Christian 
Arabs each.438 
In the 1920s, as soon as the area was under French occupation, tens of thousands of 
Armenians had resettled there which led to tensions with local Muslims, massacres and 
counter-massacres. Turks who did not want to get caught between Armenians and Arabs 
fled to the interior of Anatolia.439 The future of this part and its inhabitants remained 
uncertain until in May 1937 a League of Nations resolution made the sanjak an 
‘independent entity’ separate from Syria and granted its Turkish inhabitants administrative 
and cultural autonomy. 
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The time had obviously arrived for Ankara to take concrete measures geared to 
extending Turkish military, political and economic influence over the area. The 
subsequent period saw a systematic Turkification of the administration, the 
educational system and the judicial apparatus in the sanjak region. This implied, 
among other things, that Turks were given or allowed to take positions in the civil 
service, and that public institutions, such as mosques, schools and hospitals, were 
segregated.440 
 
Subsequently gang war between Arab and Turkish factions flamed up again, the 
Turkish army occupied the sanjak, proclaimed it the republic of Hatay in September 1938 
and less than a year later, in July 1939, declared its union with Turkey. Britain supported 
this course of action and France accepted it. As in Cilicia in 1922, once the French 
evacuated the sanjak of Alexandrette in 1938, 
near panic broke out and large-scale emigration could no longer be prevented. 
About 90 percent of the Armenian population, some 22,000 persons, emigrated in the 
first ten days after the union of the province with Turkey. They were followed over 
time by 10,000 Alawites, 5,000 Orthodox Christians and 12,000 Sunni Arabs.441 
 
Note that none of these groups would have been accepted as ‘full’ Turks, Alawites 
and Orthodox Christians for religious reasons and Sunni Arabs because of their ethnicity. 
They knew that they would be forced to give up their identity, if not their lives, and 
therefore fled the country. Part of the Armenians went by land to northern Syria and part by 
sea to northern Syrian port cities and to Lebanon. There, they were accommodated in 
camps and existing Armenian community buildings.442 Why Turkey was intent on making 
this heterogeneous region part of Turkey at a time when it had given up almost all 
irredentist claim is an open question.  
Wealth Tax 1942-43 
The wealth tax was levied three years into World War II in which Turkey did not take 
part but throughout which it nevertheless stayed mobilized. This tax impoverished virtually 
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the entire minority population, drove thousands of its members out of the country and 
thereby contributed to making the still rather cosmopolitan population of Istanbul more 
homogenous.  
I argue that the state’s and government’s main aim was to destroy the minorities’ 
position in business and to make many members of the minorities emigrate by exacting as 
much money as possible from them. This is clear from confidential statements and the 
discriminatory and unnecessarily frightening, humiliating and cruel way in which the law 
was applied. Completely disowned, and fearing the worst (and the government making no 
effort to alleviate these fears), thousands emigrated at the earliest opportunity. A secondary 
motive was to challenge political enemies, to protect political friends443 and to pay for 
keeping the army in arms without burdening the Muslim part of the population.  
Though the tax itself was not discriminatory, the way in which it was levied was 
since it placed a much heavier burden on minorities, including the Dönme,444 than on 
Muslims. The tax was levied on 114,000 individuals and firms among which Christian and 
Jewish Turks constituted the biggest group though foreigners and some Muslim Turks were 
also taxed.445 It seems that Muslims were taxed for two reasons: by mistake (some Muslims 
were also overtaxed because of the haphazard nature of the assessment, but not as grossly 
as the minorities446) or for political reasons (“In some cities, Mersin, Adana, Ankara, Izmir 
and Istanbul, some Moslem Turks (really exceptions), have been heavily taxed, chiefly for 
political reasons.”447) In the case of Muslims, the tax collectors’ decision could be 
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overturned, as the example of Sakıp Sabancı’s father suggests.  His father was asked to pay 
316.000 TL,448 an amount much higher than he had expected. According to family history, 
this shock resulted in his developing diabetes. But it seems that he ended up not paying: 
“My father, however, was left unscathed by this tax.”449 And even when Muslims were 
made to pay, they were neither sent to labor camps nor was their property confiscated.450  
What is interesting is that the discriminatory application of the wealth tax went 
beyond the Muslim - non-Muslim divide. Rather, non-Muslims were subdivided into non-
Muslims (Armenians, Greeks and Jews), Dönme and foreigners. Faik Ökte, Turkey’s 
minister of finance during the implementation of the wealth tax in Istanbul, revealed in his 
memoirs in 1951 that 
taxpayers were divided into two separate lists, the M list for Muslims and the G list 
for non-Muslims (gayrimüslim). Later, two other categories were created for 
foreigners (E for ecnebi) and for the dönme (D for dönme) [...]. Only 7 per cent of the 
taxpayers in Đstanbul belonged to the Muslim-Turkish population; of the remaining 
93 per cent, 87 per cent belonged to the ‘non-Muslim’ category and 6 per cent was 
mixed. 451 
 
In this context, mixed presumably meant foreigners and Dönme together. The 
subgroups (Armenians, Greeks, Jews, Dönme and foreigners) stood in a hierarchy of 
‘taxworthiness’. There were those a little untrustworthy and therefore better punished 
preemptively, those more untrustworthy and punished harder and those beyond the pale that 
had to be crushed. This point is best proven by the different relations of assessment to 
capital: Armenian merchants were taxed at 232 per cent, Jewish merchants at 179 per cent, 
Greek merchants at 156 per cent and Muslim merchants at 5 per cent.452 As is clear from 
this distribution, Armenians were a league of their own, Jews and Greeks in more or less 
the same bracket and Muslims almost fell out of the picture, so little were they taxed.  
This is the same categorization of citizens as that underlying the zones of settlement 
for Turkish-Muslim ‘trustworthy’ citizens, non-Turkish Muslim ‘assimilable’ citizens and 
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non-Turkish Muslim ‘non-assimilable’ and non-Turkish, non-Muslim ‘untrustworthy’ 
citizens. Another example is the denaturalization of non-Muslims by the interim 
government which, upon application, issued papers to Jews but not to Armenians. 
The total assessment for the whole country amounted to 456 million TL453 with 280 
million to be paid by Christians and Jews and 176 million by Muslims.454 The minorities, 
who constituted 2 per cent of the population, were thus deemed to own more property than 
the remaining 98 per cent of the population. In the tax office’s projection, over 300 million 
TL of the 456 million TL was to come from Istanbul because this was where most members 
of the minorities lived.455 
Another reason why the levying of the wealth tax was unfair was that it taxed not 
only profiteers or the rich but anybody. Even someone earning low wages such as a 
seamstress, a grocer or a liftboy was taxed if he or she was Jewish, Greek or Armenian.456 
Furthermore, “even children under the age of 15”457 and charitable institutions such as 
“minority hospitals[,] orphanages, school teachers and priests”458 were charged impossible 
amounts which is absurd because such charities do not make money by definition. 
As mentioned above, the wealth tax was instituted in a way that was on purpose 
frightening to make the victims pay as much as possible but also, I argue, to induce them to 
leave the country after payment. There were three scenarios for the person called upon to 
pay this tax. If he was lucky, he managed to raise the amount demanded within 15 days, 
paid it in cash and was off the hook.459 More often, he was not able to pay everything at 
once, but at least 50 per cent and appeared able to raise the full amount by and by. In that 
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case, he was given another 15 days and if he then paid, he was left in peace or if he could 
not, he was deported. If he saw no way of ever paying the full amount, he was deported 
immediately: “[...] the next day the people’s assets are confiscated and they are taken to 
prison for a few days until there are about 30 or 40 people together in order to form a group 
[for deportation].”460 There was no appeal and family members were jointly responsible. If 
the taxpayer could not pay, any relative could be forced to stand up for him.461 As a result 
of this harsh treatment, some people committed suicide.462  
Not only did this treatment spell ruin for hundreds or thousands of families, it was 
also unnecessarily cruel, meaning crueler than would have been necessary to get the money 
but cruel enough to make the minorities despair of Turkey and consider leaving. One 
witness wrote: 
It is difficult to describe the cruelty with which the seizures were executed. Sick 
people were thrown out of their beds and babies out of their cradles. In the course of a 
few days people of financial and social standing found themselves on the pavement 
and the tragedy goes on. [...] No medical examination of the deportees is permitted. 
Persons who had had stroke or who had just undergone an operation and were still in 
bandages were thrown out of their beds or hospitals and emprisoned (sic). The 
maimed, the infirm and the blind suffered the same fate. The wives, mothers, sisters, 
or daughters of those who did not happen to be at home when called for were arrested 
and dragged to police stations, where they were badly beaten under the accustion 
[accusation] (sic) that their relatives were in hiding and that they had refused to reveal 
the hiding-places.463 
 
Men as old as old as 70 or 80 were deported 464 and many others had to leave their 
wives and young children destitute. All in all, 1,500 people were sent to labor camps.465 
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Their destinations were Aşkale, Kopdağ, Karabik, Çiçekli and Erzurum,466 the most 
forbidding places in Anatolia, where in winter temperatures could drop to minus 30 degrees 
Celsius. Some were transported in cattle cars for four days and three nights straight without 
a stop and no food, water or medical aid. Upon arrival, they had to walk the remaining 30 
km to the labor camp.467 In their destinations, no provisions were made for their arrival, the 
deportees had to provide their own food with the 10 to 15 lira they had been allowed to take 
with them468 and neither doctors nor medicine were available.469 
The deportees in Erzurum live 50 in a room and the rooms are so small that those 
who took camp beds with them can find no space for them. In other places the 
deportees sleep in filthy cafes or in stables which they share with animals. From the 
foregoing the level of nutrition and cleanliness which has been reached can be easily 
realised. Letters from the deportees to their families have to be short, written in 
Turkish and are censored.470 
 
There were also reports of physical abuse in the labor camps.471 Under these 
conditions, it was no wonder that “[t]owards the end 2 or 3 taxpayers died every day.”472 
Finally, the deportees were exposed to humiliation and chicanery that had no purpose 
other than to break their morale and, again, to make them leave the country after their 
return from the camps. In Istanbul, they were taken to Haydarpaşa railway station in hand 
cuffs like criminals and transported in unheated carriages for three days and nights with 
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neither food nor blankets being provided.473 The labor they were forced to perform in the 
camps was little productive but enormously publicized.474 They broke stones and 
constructed roads in summer and shoveled snow in winter. This work served neither the 
state much nor the deportees since the pay they received for their work was far too little to 
allow them to ever pay their ‘debts’. But the labor camps and work they performed there 
had a different purpose, namely to humiliate and wear out the deportees 475 and to terrorize 
the rest of the population. Muslims and non-Muslims were kept in the constant fear that any 
of them could be deported next. Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany employed the fearsome 
specter of the camps to cow society at around the same time and Turkey was inspired by 
them.  
A formerly wealthy Jewish businessman remembers how he and his fellow deportees 
were regularly intimidated and threatened in the camp: 
The camp was under the command of a Colonel (Albay), a sadist who took an 
infernal joy in demoralizing the taxpayers in all sorts of ways. One of his favorite and 
most effective methods consisted in collecting the prisoners for the roll-call and 
giving them talks. This is what he said in substance: ‘You are all bad citizens and 
traitors. If anyone gives me the slightest order I will cut all your throats just as I did 
with the Kurds at Dersim’.476 
 
With the Armenian catastrophe only one generation old and the Holocaust 
contemporaneous, the Turkish state’s mistreatment of its minorities during the 
implementation of the wealth tax must have given rise to the worst fears. It made false 
claims and ran anti-semitic and other racist campaigns against the minorities in the press, 
there was no appeal, people unable to pay were detained, stripped of all valuables and 
deported by train like the Armenians of Western Turkey in 1915, and brought to camps 
with no provisions which was reminiscent of Deir el-Zor and Ra’s ul-‘Ayn in 1916. The 
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deportees also had to perform forced labor like non-Muslim soldiers in the labor battalions 
during WWI, which very few Armenians survived. It is true that only men were deported, 
not women and children, and that nobody was directly killed and that the wealth tax was 
called off after only a year. But in the beginning nobody knew this and anybody would 
have been justified for thinking that this was only the first step and that they would 
eventually all be killed. In view of this, the government’s message was clearly that there 
was no place for Christians and Jews in Turkey anymore and that they would better leave 
before it was too late. The Turkish government had no objection to the emigration of 
Armenians and Jews in the years following the imposition of the wealth tax. It could easily 
have prevented their departure but it did not which suggests that it expected and wished for 
their departure because as a result, the population and economy would become more 
Muslim and Turkish. 
Greek Pogrom of 1955 
This pogrom targeted primarily the property of 85,000 Greeks living in 29 
neighborhoods of Istanbul and scattered over an area of 45 square kilometers.477 Possibly 
with encouragement from Britain,478 the state, the DP government under Menderes479 and 
several high senior officials controlled, planned and executed it.480 They had a bomb 
explode in the consular complex in Thessalonica which includes Atatürk’s birthplace to 
make it appear as if Greeks had attacked this symbolic place. They thought that this would 
incite anti-Greek hatred in Turkey and be a convenient excuse for mob outrage. On the day 
of the pogrom, between 100,000 and 200,000 pogromists481, tightly organized and equipped 
with instruments of destruction, were brought into Istanbul and given instructions to 
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descend on Greek shops and houses in waves and to destroy as much as possible but not to 
kill.482 In addition, labor unions, student groups, the KTC (Kıbrıs Türktür Cemiyeti) and 
ethnic Turkish regional organizations483 all recruited demonstrators and looters while the 
heads of police and the armed forces were given orders not to intervene. The pogrom took 
place in a “nationalistic, religious, racist, and political atmosphere”484 and members of all 
social strata of Istanbul society participated willingly in the pogrom.485 
The main means of eliminating Greeks from Istanbul’s economy was to destroy their 
livelihood and homes so that they would lose hope in Turkey and leave the country. 
Though some of their movable property was appropriated, most of it seems to have been 
destroyed so that only immovable property like houses and estate fell into the state’s or 
Muslim individuals’ hands. One reason for having their property destroyed rather than 
stolen may have been that the state hoped that this would make it look more like an 
outburst of mob fury. Another may be that it was a stronger statement and ‘safer’ for the 
government since destroyed property cannot be returned whereas negotiations over 
monetary compensation can be dragged out almost indefinitely (as they were).   
Another feature of this pogrom was that the Greeks were terrorized but that the 
attackers stopped short of generally killing them. (At least thirty people were killed,486 but 
these were ‘accidents’ or exceptions.) Had the attackers been allowed to or instructed to 
kill, hundreds could easily have died on that night. The prohibition to murder was 
presumably based on the hope that this would minimize the blame the international 
community would direct at Turkey. It was the state’s way of achieving a maximum result 
(elimination of Greeks from the economy and the population) at minimum risk, brutality 
and bloodshed.  
What is furthermore noteworthy about the attack on the Greek communities of 
Istanbul and Izmir on that night is its comprehensiveness. It was not only Greek shops and 
homes that were destroyed (though they witnessed the majority of the damage) but also 
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community buildings. Libraries, schools, churches, clinics, cemeteries, cultural and athletic 
institutions had been gathering points of the Greek community, constituted and affirmed it 
as such, and cared for its maintenance. The destruction of these institutions made it very 
clear that there was no longer a basis for Greek community life in Istanbul.  
But there is yet another level of violence which aimed at desecrating institutions, 
persons and values that stood in high regard or that were holy. Churches, icons, monasteries 
and cemeteries were purposefully desecrated, monks beaten and humiliated487 (in some 
cases apparently circumcised),488 girls and women raped489 and the sanctity of the home 
and family honor violated. 490 Together, these acts aimed at the humiliation and moral 
destruction of the Greeks. As a result, thousands left the country for good.  
The pogrom’s main purpose was thus to send a signal to Greece and Cyprus, to 
eliminate the remaining Greeks from the Turkish economy (in which they had just started 
to play a significant role again), and to make them leave the country.491 By destroying the 
property of its Greek population in one night, the Turkish government killed three birds 
with one stone. A secondary consideration was to divert the blame for Menderes’ failed 
economic policies away from his government unto the Greeks who were to act as 
scapegoats.492  This rather failed since it was soon found out that it was a plot and 
Menderes and Zorlu were tried and found guilty in the Yassıada trial in 1960-61 and 
consequently executed (though not primarily on account of the pogrom). 
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Migration of Armenians and Other Christians in the 1950s and 1960s  
According to Komşuoğlu and Örs, most Armenian migration occurred during the 
single-party period but it continued into the 1950s and 1960s and from the Southeast even 
into the 1990s.493 The reasons for migration from villages and towns to cities and especially 
to Istanbul were diverse and not exclusive to Armenians or the other minorities. Economic 
hardship and natural disaster494 affected the rural population as a whole, though to slightly 
different degrees. Social reasons for the migration of Armenians were both an unavoidable 
outcome of the Armenian genocide some decades earlier (in many locations, the remaining 
Armenians felt lonely and isolated) and the result of hostile acts mid-century. Besides 
numerous reasons for these migrations, there exist opposed views on their desirability. 
 
One of the unavoidable long-term results of the Armenian genocide was that the 
remaining or returned Armenians lived in much diminished communities which often 
lacked teachers and priests. This made maintaining an Armenian way of life difficult: 
Priests had to be called from afar to conduct baptisms, weddings and funerals,495 children 
were less likely to learn to read and write Armenian and marriage partners were scarce. 496 
The added trauma and sense of loneliness induced many parents to send their children to 
boarding schools in Istanbul which was often only the first step in the whole family’s 
move.497 Van Bruinessen498 adds to this the fact that the migration of rural Muslims to 
towns turned the Christians there into a minority. This resulted in all locally elected 
officials being Muslim which of course weakened the Christians’ position. Migration in the 
hope of finding work further diminished the Christian communities’ staying powers 
because Christians were preferred by agencies which chose them because of their, on 
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average, higher level of education. As it was the most enterprising members that left, the 
remaining communities were doubly weakened. 
 
Besides the Armenians’ dispersion, too small communities and unemployment which 
induced them to leave for Istanbul or abroad, there were other social factors that forced 
them to pack their things. According to van Bruinessen, Christian peasants were at the 
bottom of the social hierarchy with nobody to defend them against the oppression of rich 
landowners who tried to buy their land or who usurped it. Nor were they able to defend 
themselves against poor Muslim peasants who took out their anger at increased economic 
inequalities on them. In addition, the fact that the Christians’ financial situation was 
relatively better than that of Muslims due to their “superior agricultural technology and 
skills”499 provoked envy. In towns, too the fact that the religious division partially 
overlapped with class division (Christians tended to work in better-paid jobs than Muslims) 
made them the victims of envy and attacks. A final reason van Bruinessen gives for the 
tenuous position of Christians in Eastern Turkey is the anti-Christian atmosphere that both 
fascist and Islamist circles supported. Komşuoğlu and Örs mention in particular Greek 
Cypriots’ extensive use of Christian symbols and ASALA’s terrorism, both of which were 
associated with Turkish Armenian.500 Economic inequalities, poverty, anti-Christian 
prejudice and scapegoating thus led to theft, plunder and the destruction of Christians’ 
houses which made them leave their villages and towns. In his conclusion, van Bruinessen 
states the following:  
The Christians of Eastern Turkey are persecuted, this is a fact that no one 
acquainted with their situation can deny. The persecution does not originate with the 
government, nor can the Ankara government be justly accused of unwillingness to 
protect its Christian subjects from persecution by their co-citizens. Nevertheless the 
persecution of Christians amounts to much more than terror exercised by a number of 
private individuals. The local representatives of the government are involved in the 
persecution, not incidentally but systematically.501 
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It was thus not Ankara that implemented a policy that cleared the provinces of 
Armenians but local government authorities in addition to people unrelated to the 
government that, for a variety of reasons, pushed Armenians out of their old homes. 
Government actors thus consciously contributed to nation building and people unrelated to 
the government did so unconsciously but the outcome was the same: it contributed to the 
further homogenization of Anatolia’s population. At first glance, pushing Armenians out of 
the provinces contradicts the state’s assimilation policy since it concentrated non-Muslims 
in a few places rather than disperse them all over the country. But actually, it was not an 
assimilation measure, but a two-staged expulsion measure with the first stage consisting in 
internal migration and the second one in emigration from the country.502 One example of 
the latter is the emigration of the 600 Kurdish-speaking Armenians who had survived in 
Şirnak until the mid-1960s. Most of them then moved to the Netherlands.503 
 
Yet, there is another side to the concentration of Armenian in Istanbul which is that it 
was welcomed and supported by parts of the Armenian community in Istanbul because it 
made caring for the remaining Armenian community in Turkey easier than if its members 
were scattered in the provinces. Güzelyan, an Armenian Protestant lay preacher, initiated a 
relocation program that was later taken over by the Apostolic Armenian Patriarchate. 
Between the 1960s and the 1980s, he “tried to resettle the remaining Western Armenian 
population to Istanbul through this program in order to teach their children in the language 
and belief of their ancestors.”504 This created dissent among Armenians some of whom 
rightly pointed out that this only preserved Istanbul-Armenian culture a bit longer at the 
expense of the traditions of Anatolian Armenians. They argued that it led to memory loss 
and the homogenization of Turkish Armenian culture. 505 It is clear that the Turkish state 
and the Armenian Patriarchate pursued opposite aims in concentrating Armenians in 
Istanbul – the state wanted to ultimately expel the remaining Armenians while the 
Patriarchate wanted to strengthen their hold in Turkey, if only in one city. By 1965, 61,000 
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Gregorian Armenians lived in Istanbul out of a total of 70,000 which means that more than 
ten per cent still lived outside Istanbul.506 One generation later, in 1998, only five percent 
of the 72,000 Turkish Armenians still lived there.507 
Expulsion of Greeks in 1964 
In 1964, the Turkish government cancelled the Ankara agreement (1963) and 
deported more than 11,000 so-called établis Greeks (Greek citizens living and working 
permanently in Istanbul). This was also in violation of a Turkish-Greek agreement of 1930 
which granted special rights to établis.508 The official reason given was that they had 
constituted a threat for the ‘external and internal security of Turkey’, but the real one was 
the wish to punish the établis Greeks for Greek Cypriots’ seeking political union with 
Greece. Due to family and economic ties between établis Greeks and Turkish Greeks, many 
more were actually forced to leave Turkey so that all in all more than 40,000 Greeks 
emigrated.509 According to the Committee for Monitoring Minority Rights, they had to 
leave Turkey within days and could take no more than 20 kg of luggage and 20 TL with 
them.510  
More Greeks emigrated due to harassment which broke out with the Cyprus war. By 
1975, fewer than 5,000 Greeks remained.511 The elimination of Greeks was thereby 
complete. These are examples of Turkey’s treatment of its minorities as hostages whenever 
it seems necessary to exert pressure on an international partner. In the 1970s, during 
ASALA’s terror attacks, the Armenian community of Istanbul felt obliged to constantly 
distance itself from these attacks out of fear that it would otherwise be punished for 
ASALA’s crimes. And assaults on Armenian community life certainly occurred, though the 
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authorship is unclear. The Armenian Apostolic Patriarchate, for instance, was bombed in 
retaliation for an assault on the son of a Turkish ambassador.512 Another example is the 
Turkish government’s ominous declaration that it could not guarantee for the safety of 
Turkish Jews when a conference on the Armenian genocide was announced to take place in 
Tel Aviv in 1982.513  
Killings 
Compared to the war years, the killings of Armenians and Greeks in Republican 
times were on a very small scale (many thousand) and occurred only during the first decade 
and, as far as we know, only in the South and Southeast, where most of the survivors had 
gathered. Even though these killings did not make much of a difference in the national 
census, they did contribute to the homogenization of the population in a circumscribed 
territory.  
Assimilation 
The institutional and non-institutional assimilation of the official and unofficial 
minorities continued throughout the period since such projects take at least one generation, 
but often several to achieve their goal. Zürcher estimates that in the 1930s around 30 per 
cent of the population did not speak Turkish as its mother tongue so there was a lot of work 
to be done for the nationalists.514 Like in pre-Republican times, people were assimilated by 
changing their outward circumstances (forced resettlement and forced conversion) and by 
changing their consciousness (through education, the media, official pronouncements and 
celebrations). The difference was that in Republican times, the emphasis was on the latter, 
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since people were already sufficiently dispersed and the state had enough time to reprogram 
them. A striking example of forced conversion decades into Republican times is the case of 
the 600 inhabitants of the village of Acar (Harent in Armenian) in the district of Siirt in 
1983. They had been known for their resilience in maintaining an Armenian identity, had 
listened to Armenian and Kurdish foreign programmes and given their children typically 
Armenian names.515 Koutcharian attributes their conversion to the failure of a previous 
punitive expedition the Turkish military carried out into Iraqi Kurdistan.516  
Chapter three already gave examples of the marginalization and elimination of non-
Turkish cultures in. These were not specific to Armenians and Greeks and this part will 
therefore only briefly show how these measures could pressure members of these two 
communities into conforming and assimilating. The Citizen Speak Turkish campaign 
branded any Turkish citizens speaking any language other than Turkish as unpatriotic and 
suspect. Many Turkish Armenian or Turkish Greek parents must have decided not to speak 
Armenian or Greek with their children at home in order to protect them at school and on the 
street and in the hope that they would have better job opportunities if they spoke Turkish 
without an accent of if they were not known to speak any language other than Turkish. That 
way, Armenian or Greek would die out in this family within a generation. Language, like 
religion, is a very important part of one’s identity. If one is forced to give up speaking one’s 
mother tongue and forbidden from passing it one to one’s children, it deprives one of an 
essential part of one’s chosen ‘otherness’ or distinctness and can be a grave loss.  
As for the names law, it likewise contributed to the minorities’ Turkification by 
suppressing this part of their non-Turkish culture. Names can be regarded as historical 
heritage that connects the bearer of the name to a certain geography, language, ethnicity, 
clan, family or profession. Family names can be passed on for generations and give prestige 
to the bearer. Restrictions on family names therefore cut some of these ties, symbolically 
uproot the person and, in the eyes of society, gave him a new identity that has no history. 
Minority schools were a partial exception to the assimilation effort. But there were 
numerous restrictions and disincentives for sending one’s kids there and their mere 
existence was probably a concession to the Lausanne Treaty. 
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Not all members of the minorities minded the state’s assimilation drive, there were 
individuals who embraced the new tenets, propagated them and urged their coreligionists to 
give up their particularism. The most well-known example is probably Moise Cohen, also 
known as Tekinalp, but non-Jews, too, volunteered for advancing the Turkification project. 
The Ottoman Armenian Agop Martayan (Dilaçar, 1895-1979), for instance, was a 
proponent of the Turkish History Thesis.517 The unconditional acceptance of Turkish 
nationalism by people whom it marginalizes is similar to the zeal with which individuals 
who convert to another religion as adults and out of conviction often observe the laws of 
their new religion. They make a conscious decision, want to prove their worth to their new 
coreligionists and inspire others and therefore go to extremes. 
Issue of Legality 
What characterizes the laws that were applied against the minorities? For one, they 
were deliberately vague so as to cover a wide range of actions. About the wealth tax law, an 
American source at the time stated that it 
was deliberately couched in nebulous terms, I believe, in order to allow the utmost 
elasticity in application. All right of appeal from the Assessors’ decisions was denied 
in order that the executive officers of the government might have a free hand to make 
the most arbitrary discriminations without fear of the courts or danger of acting in a 
technically illegal way.518 
The same reasoning had been applied to the legislation for the deportation of the 
Armenians. Secondly, existing laws or treaty obligations were consistently violated. It was 
as if two laws existed, the written one that could be disregarded and the tacitly understood 
one that was obeyed. The confidential lists that distinguished between Muslims and non-
Muslims at the time of the wealth tax are one example. Another is the unofficial prohibition 
for ‘non-ethnic Turks’ to join the “higher ranks of the military and civil bureaucracy 
although legally there is no restriction.”519 This is based on the same categorization of 
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Turkishness and trustworthiness as the 1934 settlement law. The consistent violation of the 
Lausanne minority protections act is another example. 
Conclusion 
During Republican times, the state thus continued to homogenize the population 
through the elimination of Armenians and Greeks, though by different means than those 
employed in late Ottoman times. There were relatively few killings and expulsions but the 
pressure to assimilate was heavy and sustained. Turkey expelled tens of thousands of 
Armenians from the South and Southeast of the country in the 1920s and continued with 
the assimilation of the remaining Armenians and Greeks. The pressure exerted on them 
made many of them move from the countryside into cities or from the provinces to Istanbul 
where they were either able to lead a low-key community life or where they decided to 
leave the country for good. The wealth tax of 1942-43 and the pogrom of 1955 had 
catastrophic effects on both communities and beyond them and led to the emigration of 
thousands. By the year 2000, the percentage of minorities (of which the Armenians and 
Greeks constituted the biggest part) in the overall population had dropped from two per 
cent in 1927 to less than 0.2 per cent.520 
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7. 
 
 
NATIONALIZATION OF THE ECONOMY IN REPUBLICAN TIMES 
 
 
 
 
Discrimination 
During the first ten years of the Republic, economic discrimination consisted in 
reserving state employment for Muslims, closing certain occupations and professions to 
non-Muslims and setting quotas for the employment of Muslims in private companies, 
whether Turkish or foreign. From the 1930s onwards, after state economic enterprises had 
been set up, employment with them also was restricted to Muslims.  
Between 1923 and 1924, all non-Muslims who had been working for the state lost 
their positions. Two years later, in 1926, all non-Muslims who had been working for the 
national railway were likewise made redundant and deprived of the status of civil servant 
which was reserved for so-called ethnic Turks.521 This not only signaled to anybody that 
Armenians, Greeks or Jews could not even be trusted enough to sort income tax papers or 
conduct a train. It also deprived these minorities of the widest field of employment. The 
state sector was enormous and though salaries were not high, they were paid regularly. The 
law thus pushed minorities into the private economy. Their situation is comparable to that 
of Jews in most of medieval and early modern Europe. Forbidden from owning land and 
joining guilds, they were forced to prove themselves in the few jobs open to them, namely 
trade and money lending. They concentrated in these fields and often excelled in them. 
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Paradoxically, they were blamed for this very situation. It was somewhat similar in Turkey 
during Republican times: The minorities were prohibited from working for the state but 
blamed for running their own businesses and making money that way. As for the private 
sector, foreign companies were required to keep their books in Turkish and to make sure 
that at least 75 per cent of their staff was Muslim Turkish.522 
In this period firms, shopkeepers, companies and sometimes even professionals 
such as doctors and lawyers were told to dismiss their non-Muslim employees and 
hire Muslim Turks instead. Perfect examples of the discrimination against non-
Muslim minorities, most of these demands had neither a legal basis nor any 
constitutional justification; they were simply de facto pressures exerted by the 
Turkish bureaucracy.523 
 
In southern and southeastern Turkey, Armenian shops continued to be boycotted and 
Armenians were denied work permits in towns and Muslims were forbidden from 
employing Armenians or working for them.524 Certain occupations in the private sector 
such as diving and ship chandling525 were closed to non-Muslims. In 1932, law number 
2007 restricted certain professions and trades to Turkish citizens as a result of which nearly 
nine thousand non-exchanged établis Greeks lost their jobs and soon after migrated to 
Greece for good. This happened in spite of the clauses specifying minority rights in the 
Treaty of Lausanne.526  
Expropriation 
There were basically three ways in which Armenians and Greeks were expropriated 
during Republican times which were not dissimilar to those employed earlier. Firstly, there 
was expropriation through the passing of expropriation laws. Secondly, there was what I 
call de-facto or bureaucratic expropriation meaning that through the passing of a law, 
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minorities were deprived of keeping or regaining their property, even though the law was 
not explicitly an expropriation law. And thirdly, there was expropriation without any legal 
basis, just by creating facts which always happened with state approval and sometimes 
added state planning.  
On April 15, 1923, half a year before the establishment of the Republic, parliament passed 
the ‘Law of Abandoned Properties’ which stipulated that all property of non-Muslims who 
had left before the Treaty of Lausanne would fall to the Turkish government. Thereby all 
Armenians and Greeks who had fled or been expelled during the war years were 
expropriated. In the same year, another law declared that people nominated to look after 
left-behind assets were forbidden from doing so any longer. And in the following year the 
government reserved the right to give a portion of ‘abandoned’ assets to Turkish citizens.527 
These are all examples of retroactive expropriation legislation since the government had 
been distributing stolen property all along. Between 1926 and 1932, additional 
expropriation laws were enacted.528 
As for de-facto, bureaucratic expropriation, individual Greeks and Jews were 
deprived of their citizenship during the first years of the Republic. Görgü Guttstadt sees this 
as the legal confirmation of the expulsions that took place in the decade of wars.529  
One can assume that the decisions were related to the acquisition of the expellees’ 
property. According to Article 8 of Law No. 1312, persons who ceased to be citizens 
had to sell their property in Turkey within one year. If this could not be accomplished 
before the deadline the government would handle the sale.530 
 
Expropriation without any legal basis in the 1920s seems to have taken place mostly 
in southern and southeastern Turkey, maybe because this is where most non-Muslims found 
themselves at the time except for in Istanbul where they were protected from continued 
persecution by the Istanbul government and by the British. But in the South and Southeast, 
non-Muslims were fair game and for example accused of having committed crimes against 
Muslims during the French occupation or of not having paid fictive debts. The Armenians 
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who fled Hatay within the first two days of union with Turkey probably lost most of their 
(regained) property because they feared for their lives too much to prepare their departure 
or handle any sales.  
While discriminatory and expropriatory laws and practices continued throughout the 
period between 1923 and 1960s, two catastrophic events shook the remaining Greeks, Jews 
and Armenians: the wealth tax of 1943 (de-facto, bureaucratic expropriation) and the 
pogrom of 6./7. September 1955 (expropriation with no legal basis whatsoever). During 
these two organized incidents, the state plundered and destroyed much of the minorities’ 
property and signaled to them that their presence in Turkey was no longer tolerated which 
led to the immigration of thousands of Jews, Greeks and Armenians. 
Wealth Tax 1942-43 
The wealth tax had a disastrous effect on the minorities’ material existence, it pushed 
them out of the Turkish economy and allowed Muslims to take over their businesses. 
Whoever was called upon to pay was completely ruined. Taxpayers had to sell all their 
property, absolutely everything, down to their cooking pots and bedding, they mortgaged it 
or auctioned it off. But it was very difficult to get a decent price for the property, most of it 
fetched only a fraction of its real value.531 In some cases the tax collectors could not wait: 
“Police have carried out ‘conservatory seizures’ of property and goods of some firms, 
alleging the owners were about to conceal it to prevent seizure by the government.”532 “[...] 
the amount of the tax in the Istanbul province alone was 344 million liras, or almost 50% of 
the total currency in circulation.”533 By 1944, when the unpaid assessments were cancelled 
and the tax abolished, 315,000,000 had been collected which is 74 per cent of the amount 
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levied.534 Istanbul had only paid 25% of its assessment, probably because its minorities had 
been over assessed.535 
The levying of the wealth tax contributed to the ‘nationalization’ of the economy not 
only by pushing minorities out of business, but also by giving Muslims the opportunity to 
take over their businesses. Since Jews and Christians were deprived of their financial 
resources, only Turkish Moslems were in a position to buy them.536 One foreign observer 
wrote: “You have no idea how many stores are taken by the Moslem Turks. Business is 
completely stopped it is something that is hard to realize.”537 Aktar estimates that 98 per 
cent of the real estate belonging to non-Muslims was either bought by Muslim individuals 
or confiscated by the state.538 
Though in theory the state treasury (and by extension the Muslim population) should 
have been the sole beneficiaries, it seems that corrupt officials in charge of confiscation and 
deportations took their share, too. The same had happened during the Armenian genocide, 
though on a much bigger scale. For instance, a British official went to a barn where 
deportees were kept for 10 days, guarded by the police like prisoners, prior to their 
deportation and noted the following: 
I had gone to see our lawyer, Mr. Eskenazi, aged about 55. He told me that when 
arrested he had 11 liras on him. 10 were taken by the police and he was left with 1 
lira. Mr. Pessa, representing the Coats Cotton Thread people, told me he had some 30 
liras. This was taken as well as his penknife, watch and wedding ring and was left 
with 35 piastres.539  
 
This small-scale plunder continued by the guards in the camps: 
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According to the law the work demanded a payment of two and a half Turkish 
pounds a day. But no more than 2 or 3 piastres a day were paid under the pretext that 
the results of the work weren’t sufficient. 540 
Relatives of forced laborers were allowed to send them parcels to the camps 
including a maximum of 25 TL 541 but “between 5 and 20 Turkish liras were seized on 
account of the tax payable.”542  
As indicated in chapter five, one of the main motives for levying the wealth tax in a 
discriminatory manner was the wish to remove members of the minorities from the 
economy. Prime Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu’s said so unambiguously in a closed meeting of 
the Republican People’s Party group in the Assembly: 
This law is at the same time a revolutionary law. We have an opportunity to obtain 
our economic independence. We will thus get rid of the foreigners who dominate our 
markets and give the Turkish market back to the Turks.543 
 
But even if it were not for this evidence, the way in which the wealth tax was exacted 
makes it clear that the government’s purpose was to rob the minorities of as much property 
as it could and to then see them leave the country, as many observers at the time noted that 
the real motives were the “collection of money at the expense of the minorities, and their 
liquidation as an economic group.”544 A foreign journalist reported: 
In part it goes back to the Capitulations of the late Ottoman period and the 1920’s 
against which the Turks have been reacting ever since by systematically eliminating 
foreign elements from business, industry, finance, crafts and all other parts of their 
national life.545 
 
And an American: 
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Many observers, including myself, concluded that the tax was intended to drive the 
non-Moslem elements out of business and thus to ‘solve’ once and for all the problem 
of minority control of much of the country’s commercial life.546 
 
This is not to say that it was the only reason for the wealth tax, but it was the main 
one. Had the government primarily wanted to meet the high cost of keeping the army 
mobilized, it could have charged rich Muslims as well. The following commentator 
recognized that concern for the population’s welfare (here equated with nationalism) and 
the partial or individual good (self-enrichment or state’s interests over any others) were in 
conflict during the wealth tax as they had been in 1915. 
The country is at the mercy of men with the limited vision of the hereditary 
bureaucrat, who has little concern for the population except as the source of 
government income, who dislikes foreigners and regards non-Moslem fellow citizens 
as a species of property fit only for exploitation. His animating force is not 
nationalism but personal advantage in turns of (sic!) [he means: ‘in terms of’] secure 
income. [...] The public interest in general is being given little consideration, and the 
interest of the office-holding class, including that of the army officers, is 
paramount.547  
 
The economic effect the wealth tax had on the minorities was their ruin and the 
psychological effect their total shock and intimidation. They had to rebuild their lives from 
scratch, whether in Turkey or abroad. Another witness predicted that the effects on the 
economy would be 
varied and far-reaching. Immediately: disorganization of production and 
distribution in Turkey, (sic!) It is still quite uncertain how many firms will be driven 
completely out of business, but a great many will be badly weakened, handicapped in 
future enterprises. Import and export firms, mostly minority-owned are hard-hit and 
there is great doubt as to what will happen to goods already enroute to bankrupted 
firms or how other firms can pay for goods ordered from abroad. Foreign firms will 
have a natural tendency to abandon Turkey as a market.548 
 
It is unclear in how far the economy actually suffered and in how far this was due to 
the closing and takeover of the minority businesses and in how far due to the war or other 
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factors. What does seem clear is that that the Turkish economy only started to really 
develop after the war because of liberal economic policies and American aid as well as the 
cooptation of minority specialists’ business expertise (more on this in chapter seven in the 
section on the two bourgeoisies).  
Greek Pogrom of 1955 
As shown above, one of the main purpose of the pogrom of 6./7. September 1955 was 
to drive the Greeks out through the destruction of their existence while appropriation was a 
secondary motive. An estimated 1,000 homes were completely destroyed, 2,500 homes 
were damaged 549 and 4,000 to 4,500 Greek businesses damaged. 550 Armenian and Jewish 
property was damaged as well “although the attacks against these minorities’ properties 
were not so systematic and widespread as was the destruction of Greek establishments.”551 
An estimated one billion TL were destroyed.552  
The appropriation of movable Greek property did occur, but on a much smaller scale 
than it would have without its large-scale destruction, it seems to have been an afterthought 
or a spontaneous act, not the purpose. Witnesses observed that “Turkish men and women 
often paraded in the clothes and jewelry stolen from their neighbors”553 and that “notable 
women [...] had become looters, returning to their homes with the booty under their 
armpits.”554 
Though thousands of homes were damaged, their basic structures and of course the 
land on which they were built remained intact. Most of them were likely appropriated, but I 
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lack information on who the new owners were. After long struggles, partial compensation 
was finally paid to the victims, but it was very insufficient.555  
The destruction of Greek businesses had a heavy impact on the Turkish economy 
because Greeks had controlled a large proportion of export and import businesses, retail 
and catering trades in Istanbul.556 According to Akar, only 8,000 out of 19,000 firms 
registered in Istanbul at the time belonged to Turkish Muslims557  and on Đstiklal Caddesi 
more than half of all shops belonged to Greeks.558 One source estimates that the total 
damage amounted to around 300 million dollars.559 A Turkish official observed that “the 
disturbances have destroyed the economy of the land!”560 “A city of 1,500,000 cannot live 
without a market. Indeed, a large city means a marketplace. Today, Istanbul is a city 
without a market.”561 Vryonis comments that the pogrom “not only brought immediate 
shortages in food and a variety of other goods, but also accelerated the Turkish lira’s fall in 
value.”562  
Armenian and Greek Religious Foundations  
From the 1960s onwards, non-Muslim religious foundations were expropriated which 
was a serious act of discrimination against them.563 It was prompted by the Cyprus problem 
and legally based on the 1935 Foundations Act (Vaıkflar Yasası). In 1936, all religious 
foundations had been asked to submit a list of their property to the government. The idea 
had been to confiscate the property of Muslim foundations in support of the Caliphate but 
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in the course of time, the law was mostly used against non-Muslims564 and the lists they 
had provided in the 1930s were employed as a database for the confiscation of their 
property. 
Minority foundations had continued to acquire property since the Foundation Act in 
1935. But in 1974, the Court of Appeals declared that non-Muslim foundations could no 
longer acquire property since this endangered state security and all the property that they 
had purchased or that had been donated in the meantime was considered illegal and 
confiscated.565 
[T]he liquidation caused severe financial stress or the collapse of foundations that 
had hitherto relied heavily on revenues earned from renting out the properties. 
Moreover, as the religious foundations lost these properties, their ability to perform 
communal services in the areas of religion, education and charity was also 
crippled.566 
Expulsion of Greeks in 1964 
The 11,000 établis Greeks that were forced to leave the country and their 30,000 
Turkish Greek family members who left with them were “only allowed to take savings not 
exceeding the equivalent of $100.”567 This meant that 40,000 urban Greeks were factually 
expropriated. “It is at the end of this nationalist period that the minorities were almost 
totally destroyed and the path of destruction brought by Turkish nationalist was nearly 
complete.”568  
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Two Parallel Bourgeoisies 1923-1950s 
Among other things, chapter five asked how Armenian and Greek property was used 
by its new owners and whether the Turkish economy profited from the large-scale property 
transfer. There were at least two uses, mere keeping and using and maybe selling at one 
point (for example jewelry or a nice house) and acquiring to produce and make a profit 
(factories, manufacturing places). We know virtually nothing about how the former served 
people, but it is hard to imagine that it had no positive effect on their financial situation, 
that it did not raise living standards. It may also have changed consumption patterns as the 
redistribution of Jewish property did in Nazi Germany where it widened the middle class 
and middle-class consumption.569 In Turkey, a person who had come into possession of 
prime estate in 1915 could easily sell it for a fortune in, say, the 1960s, become rich and 
adopt a corresponding lifestyle. Keyder argues that the Christian bourgeoisie had its own 
consumption patterns which were very different from those of Muslims of the same 
class.570 A middle-class Muslim family that took over the entire household of a bourgeois 
Christian family may therefore have changed some of its habits because it was surrounded 
by items it did not previously possess. These are intriguing questions that have not been 
explored so far.  
As for the effect the elimination of Armenians and Greeks had on business and the 
economy, I stated that the economy suffered from the sudden Christian absence and war-
time destruction which points towards a negative balance. At the same time, the amount of 
property in Muslim hands and their capital base had clearly increased. Also, the economic 
field was pretty much cleared of competitors which suggests a positive balance. With this 
information alone, it is clearly impossible to tell whether the removal of most members of 
the minorities was more of an advantage or more of a disadvantage for the Turkish 
economy. In order to find out whether the transfer of property had more of a positive or 
more of a negative effect and why, I studied the memoirs of Sabancı. My argument that the 
transfer of property had no positive effect on the economy but that employing the know-
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how of the remaining non-Muslim specialists did is based on this one source and is limited 
to the economy of Adana. Though not verifiable, it makes sense.  
For one generation, from 1923 to the mid 1950s, there existed essentially two parallel 
commercial bourgeoisies which were both weak for opposing reasons. The non-Muslim 
bourgeoisie was still weak ( because many or most of its Greek and Armenian members 
had been exiled, killed and expropriated and it had not yet recovered); and the ‘national’ 
bourgeoisie was not yet strong (though maybe numerous and politically well connected, it 
lacked experience and professional knowledge, so it was not yet powerful).  
The ‘ational’ Bourgeoisie and the Minority Bourgeoisie 
Sabancı states that almost 30 years after Muslims had taken over Greek-Armenian  
property, i.e. in the early 1950s, there had still been little industrial development in Adana 
with only three factories, 11 mills and 21 gins and presses having been added to the stock571 
of seventeen factories that had been there in 1924 already.572 “Obviously it had not been 
possible to secure much growth.”573 He makes the point that the economy of Adana only 
started to grow in the 50s and to take off in the 1960s several times. Most of the reasons for 
this delay lie in the near elimination of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie and some in the way in 
which this situation was handled by the CUP and RPP. In addition, there are external 
reasons, such as the Great Depression. 
But probably the most important reason for the slow development of the Turkish 
economy during the period was the fact that most of the country’s business know-how 
along with skills and networks had been exiled or destroyed. The resulting void was not 
filled; in part because of the unwillingness and in part because of the inability to do so. 
According to Aktar, “[...] the traditional characteristics of the Turkish urban élite remained 
intact”574 namely keeping steady office jobs rather than buying, selling, and risk taking; and 
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hoarding rather than investing.575 “Very few Muslims [...] chose to take part in 
entrepreneurial activities.”576 This touches on a huge but inconclusive debate in economic 
history and Ottoman studies about the degree to which the Ottoman commercial 
bourgeoisie was dominated by non-Muslims in the 19th century and why this was the case.  
As for the inability to fill the void, many of the people who were given business 
opportunities were chosen on the basis of loyalty to the nationalists, not business skills, so 
it is little wonder that they did not make good entrepreneurs. Ahmed disputes this: 
But this was in no way a totally arbitrary policy which utilized men unsuitable for 
the task. In many cases we find that, attracted by this policy, members of the small-
town gentry (eşraf) a, as well as the artisans (esnaf) and small merchants (tüccarı) 
joined the party.577 
 
Be that as it may, even if the new bourgeoisie was mainly capable, Ankara’s political 
patronage cannot have done it any good.  The new bourgeoisie enjoyed a sheltered 
environment which appears as an advantage only at first sight. The absence of competition, 
not having to prove oneself and to grow with the challenge leads to self-contentedness and 
inertia. As a result, the new bourgeoisie did not exploit business opportunities and 
innovation was slow. With this in mind, the statism of the 1930s can be seen as more than 
the reason for the national bourgeoisie’s continuing weakness mid-century but its 
consequence.  
What is interesting is that the relatively few remaining Armenian and Greek members 
of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie, almost all of them in Istanbul, (“110 thousand Anatolian 
Greeks and 77 thousand Armenians”),578 managed to cling on to, rebuild and in some cases 
even develop their economic position in spite of their traumata, material losses and 
restricted employment opportunities. “In the big cities like Đstanbul, Bursa and Đzmir the 
remaining non-Muslim minorities [...] held a firm position among the members of the 
commercial bourgeoisie and small producers.”579 Only this made the expropriation through 
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the wealth tax worth it. Somehow, the Greeks of Istanbul had (re)attained a central position 
in the economy by 1955 already, only a decade after the wealth tax had wrought havoc 
among them.  
The Remodeled ‘ational’ Bourgeoisie Unchallenged 
So much for the two bourgeoisies up to the mid-20th century. Around that time, 
things changed for both. The remainder of the minority bourgeoisie was basically erased in 
1943 and 1955 and the bureaucratic, metropolitan, ‘national’ bourgeoisie waned away and 
was superseded by a provincial, landowning bourgeoisie. The reasons for the emergence of 
a remodeled ‘national’ bourgeoisie were Turkey’s economic reorientation due to the 
American alliance, development aid, and the change in government (DP). As already 
mentioned, every government in Turkey has had the tendency to promote its favorites in 
business so that it continuously reconstitutes the bourgeoisie. One such reconstitution took 
place in the 1950s. The new type of entrepreneurs originated from prominent landowning 
Cilician families and consisted in provincial merchants and technical experts. The middle 
peasantry supported liberalization, market freedom and profited through commodity 
production.580 Since the commercial bourgeoisie’s wealth derived from landownership, not 
gift taking, it was less dependent on the state. “The earlier urban elite of bureaucratic and 
metropolitan origin had been relegated to a minority presence.”581  
 
As for the minority commercial bourgeoisie, it did not exist anymore, only a few 
scattered wealthy families were left. But individual members of the former minority 
bourgeoisie continued to live in Istanbul, and continued to have rare, sought-after skills. In 
the absence of other sources in English, I will use the memoirs of Sabancı and argue that it 
was thanks to the know-how of a handful of minority specialists that his (and possibly other 
Muslims’) business ventures succeeded and that his family became one of the richest in 
                                                 
580 Keyder (1994: 60).   
581 Keyder (1994: 61).  
  159
Turkey. About a Jewish employee who had a very special sense for what would sell and 
who knew his own value, Sabancı says: 
When I came to Istanbul I did some research. Working at Textiles Central was 
Nesim Kasado, a Jew. Although he had had no formal education he had been in the 
business all his life. It was he who decided what goods were to be produced, in what 
colour and in what quantity. And when the producers did as he told them, the line 
would be a sell-out. He had that Jewish agility of mind and he knew the market inside 
out. [...] I offered him a job on the spot.  He was about my father’s age. He smiled at 
the offer and said, ‘Do you know how much I’m getting now?’ I pressed him and he 
told me the figure, possibly exaggerating. I at once said, ‘I’ll give you more.’ He tried 
to conceal it, but I could see he was surprised. [...] I invited him and his wife and 
children to Adana. I introduced them to the Amado brothers and Salomon Benyaz. 
[...] The fact that we had brought Nesim Kasado to Adana convinced people in the 
drapery market that we too could make a go of (sic!) this business. All of a sudden 
our goods began to attract more attention. The machines were the same, the raw 
material was the same. I could not see how the quality and design of the goods had 
changed, but with the arrival of Nesim Kasado our sales rocketed overnight.582 
 
Another time, he managed to hire an Armenian specialist: 
We had begun to make new products and we needed experts who knew the market 
for them. We had heard that another non-Muslim, an Armenian named Avandis 
Kazancıyan, who worked as a freelance in the Istanbul market, was the man for the 
job. [...] He worked as a consultant for Bossa for many years.583  
 
Sabancı freely admits that these non-Muslim specialists had an advantage over their 
Muslim employers, an advantage that they were however unable to understand or copy: 
We could not see or divine what Avandis Kazancıyan and Elyafim Kandiyoti did, 
what skills they possessed, what their secrets were; but the results were plain to see. 
For when they came to the factory and said to you, ‘Make so much of this design and 
produce that stuff in this way and mind you don’t make this mistake’, lo and behold, 
whatever you made would sell. [...] Although we five brothers were in the business 
and were not without some competence in every aspect of it, we could clearly see that 
Nesim Kasado, Avandis Kazancıyan and Elyafim Kandiyoti had skills different from 
ours, whose nature we could not guess.584 
 
These examples show that certain non-Muslims still possessed professional 
knowledge and business skills and instinct in the 1950s that were hard to find elsewhere. 
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But more importantly, they seem to have played a decisive role in the success of Muslim 
businesses as Sabancı makes clear in the following statement: 
But in the circumstances we had to do it [pay very high salaries to these specialists], 
and a good thing that we did, because the Sabancı family’s success in the textile field 
was the foundation of later developments. Had Bossa not succeeded in those days, we 
would never have been where we are now.585 
 
Indirectly, Sabancı admits that had it not been for these Jewish, Greek and Armenian 
specialists, the Sabancıs’ business would never have succeeded. This is a very important 
point since it suggests that the Sabancıs (and possibly other Muslim businessmen) became 
big not because of the appropriation of Armenian and/or Greek property, but because they 
were able to employ the know-how of certain remaining Armenians, Greeks and Jews who, 
after the wealth tax and the pogrom of 1955, were no longer able to work in their own 
businesses. In other words, the fact that some of the remaining minority specialists were 
willing to work for the rising Muslim businessmen (while they no longer had the resources 
to work in their formerly prospering, self-contained, minority-only businesses) accounted 
for the Sabancıs’ success. The ‘national’ bourgeoisie thus co-opted or absorbed minority 
specialists after they had been deprived of the means of a competitive existence.586  
Admittedly, this evidence is very limited (it is only one person’s view, and concerns 
only one city) and possibly partial (Sabancı is unlikely to have admitted that his father took 
Armenian factories and ran them under his own name). But it provides a good explanation 
for why Muslim businesses did not prosper until after the minority bourgeoisie was 
completely destroyed: only then was both the economic field cleared of rivals and did 
minority specialists work for Muslim firms. 
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Continuity from the 1910s to the 1950s and Beyond 
The above account and analysis of the demographic and economic elimination of 
Armenians and Greeks over a period of two generations beckons the question how this 
continuity can be explained in spite of changing governments, the transition from single-
party rule to multi-party democracy and at times of war and peace. There were two factors 
at play: Firstly, a powerful ideology (Turkish nationalism) that was inculcated into people 
from an early age and that was reaffirmed throughout their lives. Especially state 
employees were steeped in Turkish nationalism and Kemalism so that the system 
continually reproduced itself. Secondly, the same people worked in politics, for the state 
and in the army and gendarmerie during Young Turk as well as RPP times. This meant that 
people who had been enthusiastic Young Turks, who had supported the terrorization and 
expulsion of the Greeks, the boycott of Christian shops or participated in the killing of 
Assyrians morphed into Republican Kemalists and got in positions where they decided on 
issues such as immigration, settlement, school curricula and work permits.  
Even though the CUP was briefly out of power during the period 1918-22, the 
proto-nationalist ideology it advocated was ultimately sustained by both the leaders 
of the Turkish Independence Struggle (who were mostly former members of the 
CUP) and by the Turkish Republic that these leaders subsequently founded. Hence 
the CUP ideology that perpetrated the crimes against the Armenians- and that 
therefore silenced and often punished those who helped the Armenians- has 
reproduced itself in Turkey to this day.587 
 
People were exposed to Turkish nationalist views at the expense of almost any others 
throughout their school years, time at university, during military service and on any 
annually recurring celebration. Monuments, the mass media, speeches and books were all 
used to enforce the Turkish nationalist view of Turkey, the people within it and the world 
outside.  
The academies which train candidates for state service were conspicuous centers for 
the reproduction and inculcation of Turkish nationalism: 
Not only were the important branches of the state inherited by the republic, but the 
means of reproducing these branches also remained virtually unchanged. [The 
military academy’s] function and way of working remained essentially unchanged. 
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The same is true for the Civil Service Academy (Mülkiye), which continued in 
Istanbul and was reconstituted as the Political Science Faculty in Ankara in 1935. It 
continued to provide the state with its governors, diplomats and administrators.  In 
time both institutions also became centres of Kemalist indoctrination, where 
nationalism, republicanism and secularism were articles of faith for staff and students 
alike – a situation that continues to this day.588 
 
As for the continuity in personnel, Zürcher argues that Young Turk and Kemalist 
leaders did not only originate from a common pool but that the “leadership of the 
Committee of Union and Progress [...] planned and prepared the national resistance struggle 
after 1918 and that Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his circle of adherents only gradually gained 
control of the movement.”589 Zürcher’s extension of the Young Turks period almost into 
1923 marks a significant departure from Turkish historiography which lets the Young Turk 
period end in 1918 and interprets the nationalist resistance struggle as a new beginning for 
which Mustafa Kemal gets the credit.  
The reason why many Young Turks that had implicated themselves in crimes during 
the war came to occupy influential positions in the republic is the mutual need the 
government and them had for each other. They needed the regime’s protection from trials 
and demands for the restitution of property and the regime needed them as its constituency, 
to legitimize its rule. For Zürcher, the Young Turk period therefore does not end until 1945 
when those that had been Young Turks in the 1920s retired, the multiparty period began 
and the RPP was replaced by the DP in the government.590 However, the continuity in 
personnel was not complete. “In 1926 Kemal himself stamped out the remaining cells of 
the CUP when they were accused of plotting his assassination and sent Dr. Nazim and 
others to the gallows.”591 Beyond the government, the bureaucracy, army and gendarmerie, 
too, were by and large those of the late Empire.592 While there were two persuasive reasons 
for continuity, there were no sufficient reasons for a break, such as war or a revolution in 
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Turkey, and outside influences sometimes reinforced the tendencies in the country, such as 
fascism and Nazism in the 1930s and 40s.593 
How ‘Successful’ was Turkish ation Building? 
All the above evidence of decades-long, laborious nation building raises the question 
in how far it was successful, in how far the CUP and Kemalists achieved what they wanted. 
This is what this part will examine while the next one asks at what cost it happened. It is of 
course impossible to answer the question whether Turkish nation building was successful 
precisely because we lack scales and units with which to weigh and compare the pieces of 
evidence. Nor do we have a definition of ‘success in nation building’. But at least it is 
possible to compare some figures that changed between the 1910s and the 1930s or 1960s 
and to state in how far the population in Turkey displayed the ‘objective’ characteristics of 
nations, namely a common religion, economy and historic memory, as outlined in chapter 
two.  
The percentage of Muslims in the population grew rapidly in the 1910s, twenties and 
thirties in spite of the high Muslim death toll during the wars due to the elimination of 
Christians and the immigration of Muslims. I have already indicated that the percentage of 
non-Muslims plummeted from almost twenty per cent in 1914 to two and a half percent in 
1927.594 By 1945, non-Muslims only constituted 1.5 per cent of the population and twenty 
years later their percentage had dropped to 0.8.595 Though it took a long time, almost fifty 
years, for Muslims to be unchallenged in the economy, it did happen after waves of 
persecution, expropriation and expulsion had done away with the last remnants of the 
minority bourgeoisie and only single affluent families continued to exist. 
In how far there is a single view of Turkish history cannot be said here but the 
material evidence of the existence of former communities is so scarce and continuously 
disappearing that it alone does not challenge the official version. As for the use of historical 
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place names, there were state offices that used maps full of Greek names in Rize as late as 
the 1980s.596 The population of Tirebolu, a small Black Sea town, used place names such as 
Ermeni Mezarlığı, Kirseburnu, Todor’un Yeri at least until the 1990s.597 But this is at most 
proof of marginal, local resistance to the state’s attempt to erase all evidence of Turkey’s 
multicultural past. The civil society initiatives touched upon in chapter one, though, stand a 
good chance of changing the monolithic view of Turkish history, if sustained. Öktem 
mentions that in order to avoid confusion on electoral rolls, the old names are still printed 
next to the new ones in order to distinguish two ‘Pretty Mountains’ or the like from each 
other.598 This shows that the zealous bureaucrats were not entirely up to the task they had 
set themselves, their imagination or repertory of place names was too limited. 
To answer the question of success – if the aim was to make every individual in 
Turkey Muslim and exclusively Turkish-speaking, and to eliminate all knowledge of 
Turkey’s non-Muslim or non-Turkish history, Turkish nation building was not a total 
success. And the increasingly bold acknowledgement of past and present heterogeneity 
outlined in the introduction probably is evidence to Turkish nationalists that it did not fully 
succeed. But if the aim was to marginalize non-Muslim Turks to the degree where they no 
longer played a role, neither demographically, nor politically, economically or socially, 
Turkish nation building can only be called a success.  
Counting the Cost of ation Building Through the Elimination of Armenians and 
Greeks 
Even though it is not actually possible to count the cost (again, we lack figures and 
scales to measure factors such as ‘brain drain’), I would like to point to the possibility that 
far from benefiting Turkish modernization and progress, the elimination of Greeks and 
Armenians threw the country back in its development and that the remaining population 
paid a much higher bill for the nation builders’ actions than they would ever have 
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imagined. I would also like to suggest that this elimination may be a so far neglected factor 
in many phenomena or problems Turkey has had. I am not saying that the elimination of 
the minorities was the sole reason for these problems and phenomena, but suggest that it 
was one of the factors that has so far not sufficiently been taken into consideration. 
I have already dealt with some of the long-lasting economic problems which the loss 
of almost one fifth of the pre-wars population, including a great part of the bourgeoisie and 
the urban artisan class, caused (see chapter five). I would like to add here some thoughts on 
the role this played in the impoverishment of Turkey’s population, stifling state 
intervention in the economy, the weakness of labor unions and the delay of class struggle 
and industrialization. 
Impoverishment of the Population 
We can only speculate as to the effect the massive redistribution had on living 
standards, changes in social classes and social mobility. Keyder states that “[...] the 
population in the 1920s, compared with the pre-World War I population, was smaller, less 
urban, less commercialized, and certainly poorer.”599 This is surprising, even if we account 
for war-time destruction, considering that at least one fifth of the property owned by the 
population before the war had become available and in part been distributed. But it is 
possible that much of it got destroyed or that the property itself did not have much of an 
effect if it was not used correctly. There may also have been big regional differences or it 
could be that the divide between rich and poor had become wider. What would in part 
explain the overall impoverishment is loss of revenues through taxes which took place as a 
result of flight, expulsion and killing. American Ambassador Abram Elkus reported to the 
State Department that “it is estimated three millions annually in taxes have been lost, 
because of the Armenian massacres.” 600 At the time, one Turkish Pound was worth about 9 
dollars.601 To this we could add the loss in tax revenues due to the Greek-Turkish 
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population exchange. Üngör makes a very important point in stating that the government 
“offered ordinary Turks incredible prospects of upward social mobility. [...] the groups who 
benefited most from this policy were the landowners and the urban merchants.”602 If 
correct, Üngör’s statement suggests that the Young Turks had their share in the 
impoverishment of the population.  
Statism 
The lack of a business background and training was one reason that slowed down the 
bourgeoisie’s and manufacturing class’ development. But there were at least two more: 
Ankara must have promoted many unsuitable men into management positions because the 
primary criterion for selection was political loyalty, not professional qualifications. 
Furthermore, Ankara’s protection and tutelage did not allow this ‘national’ bourgeoisie to 
develop its entrepreneurial skills. 
Mostly due to the lack of business skills of this emerging bourgeoisie, as well as the 
destructive effects of the Great Depression in 1929, the founders of the new Turkish 
state were forced in the 1930s to move towards a more protected and autarchic model 
of economic development. Subsequent growth in the size of the public sector and the 
newly formed state economic enterprises to compensate and eventually replace 
private initiative not only dwarfed the Turkish business elite in size, but also 
consolidated their immaturity.603 
 
In other words, the new bourgeoisie was little qualified because of the way in which 
the state had created it. The state therefore protected it which made it even less capable. As 
a result, it needed total protection which completely disabled it. This point is confirmed by 
Göçek: 
As the Muslim Turkish bourgeoisie employed elimination instead of collaboration, 
the Ottoman bourgeoisie could never develop into a political force. The minority 
bourgeoisie had the skills and wealth, but lacked political and social power; the 
Muslim Turkish bourgeoisie had such power in both the state and society but was 
short on wealth and skills. As they replaced the minority bourgeoisie without the 
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accompanying skill, knowledge and resources, economic problems escalated and 
invited increased state intervention.604 
Delay of Class Struggle and Industrialization 
Towards the end of the 19th century, the bourgeoisie was no longer exclusively 
engaged in finance and commerce but started to produce goods in a capitalist manner as 
well (import substitution). Even though the market for its products was small, essentially 
the consumption needs of the bourgeoisie itself, this was an important development because 
“in the entire economic landscape of pre-World War I Anatolia, they [the members of the 
bourgeoisie] were the only ones which carried the potential of transforming the social 
structure.”605 
Import substituting urban manufacturing went along with transforming lifestyles, and 
a change in 
logic, attitude, and political behavior [...] Most importantly, they now had to 
employ a genuine working class: urban, dispossessed, and politically conscious. [...] 
In short, the bourgeoisie we have identified as the agent of capitalist accumulation 
introduced into the social fabric a transformatory dynamic which possessed the 
requisite potential of creating a new, capitalist, class structure.606 
 
However, this development was cut short with the near elimination of the minority 
bourgeoisie which meant that the Turkish bourgeoisie was much less sizable and significant 
than it could have been and that as a consequence, the Turkish state became hugely 
bureaucratic and Turkish industrialization and class struggle were delayed.607 
The upheaval of the war period had, however, greatly altered the social structure 
and the balance of class forces within what remained of the Empire. [...] The class 
conflict which was described above and whose outcome, under a more orderly 
historical evolution, would have determined the social structure of the new political 
unit, had taken an unexpected turn through displacement and annihilation.608 
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Weak Labor Unions 
Quataert states that  
Ottoman Christians disproportionately predominated in most, if not all, of the new 
unions. Furthermore it is clear that either foreign subjects or recently naturalized 
foreigners, all Christians (and perhaps a few Jews), led these new labor 
organizations.609 
 
He goes on to say that this domination by profit-makers may have weakened labor in 
its struggle with capital and the state that was often allied with it.610 This suggests that the 
elimination of the Christians was to the advantage of workers because the unions were no 
longer headed by people whose interests ran counter to theirs. Elsewhere, however, 
mentioning the anti-Christian boycotts, massacres and the population exchange, Quataert 
says: “So labour lost many of its leaders who were Christian, and in the early Turkish 
Republic the labour force in the modern sector was often headless. How this affected its 
ability to confront the state remains an open question.”611 This sounds as if a Christian 
heading was better than none at all, or an (inexperienced) Muslim heading. The two 
statements can be reconciled if one remembers that the labor union leadership of Christians 
and Jews took place in a poisonous, anti-minority atmosphere which had a negative effect 
on their attractiveness which consequently kept the unions relatively weak. This is 
comparable to the ‘red and alien’ labor union scare in the US during the 1920s and 
thirties.612 If it had not been for this poisonous atmosphere and if Armenians and Greeks 
had not been eliminated, laborers in Turkey might have gotten their rights sooner. 
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Vacuum in Education and Academia 
As mentioned, it was not only businessmen and urban artisans that vanished from 
among the urban Armenian population, but also a great part of the educated class which 
must have had a long-lasting impact on the development of Turkish society. Greek, Jewish 
and Armenian professionals had played “a crucial role in the intellectual and social life of 
the Empire, especially in the production and translation of Western-style knowledge.”613 
Göçek shows impressively that the Armenian genocide deprived the population of Turkey 
of many of its most educated, and maybe progressive, members, namely lawyers, 
statesmen, writers, teachers, editors, poets and many like minds.614 Throughout the Empire, 
thousands of Armenian intellectuals were killed.615 The Armenian genocide 
literally destroyed the best and the brightest of an empire. The senseless nationalist 
policies of the Committee of Union and Progress not only ruined the Ottoman Empire 
but also set back the progress of the people of Anatolia for at least a century. The 
Turkish Republic also severely suffered from the loss of such productive, skilled and 
highly educated subjects. It took the Anatolian cities and town at least a century to 
once again reach the level of progress they had attained before 1915.616  
 
The same is very likely true for the Greeks. Their liquidation and the loss of their 
knowledge, innovativeness and creativity deprived Turkey of political and social 
development opportunities. Together with the draconian Darül Funun reform (1933), which 
was a massive restructuring and purge of Istanbul University removing the ‘old guard’,617 
the removal of the non-Muslim intelligentsia left a vacuum in Turkey’s academic 
institutions that probably lasted for decades. Why else would Turkey have invited German-
speaking Jews who fled from the Nazis to set up faculties at Turkish universities at the 
same time that it was determined to get rid of its own Jews, denaturalized them and 
abandoned them to the Nazis? Turkey needed the German and Austrian Jews’ learning too 
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badly to refuse them entry, their numbers were not high and it knew that they would not 
(want to) stay forever.618  
Speaking as economists, Toprak and Acar severely criticize the state’s ‘bashing’ of 
minorities at the beginning of the 20th century and that of the emerging Muslim 
bourgeoisie in the late 1990s. They conclude that both policies amounted to the 
depletion of human resources, immiserising modernization, and slowing down the 
pace of development. [... today] the country is in the process of compensating the 
huge loss in human resources by sending abroad thousands of students for higher 
education.619 
 
This sounds as if the country had still neither learnt nor overcome the intellectual 
loss. 
Loss of Kemalist Model Citizens 
One may wonder if the decrease in urbanization, brought about by the removal of the 
more urbanized Christian communities, led to a growth in conservatism since rural 
communities are more averse to change than urban ones. Before World War I, at least 25 
per cent of the population lived in towns of 10,000 inhabitants or over, whereas after the 
war only 18 per cent did so. 620 Differently put, many of the people the CUP eliminated 
were exactly the sort of people Atatürk wanted to have in the country and that he tried to 
bring into being through his modernizing reforms. The non-Muslim bourgeoisie had been 
educated, westernized and secular ‘model Turks’ except that they were not Turkish in the 
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CUP’s and nationalists’ eyes. Keyder suggests that through his reforms, Atatürk may have 
attempted to replace all the urban and bourgeois members of the minorities that had 
vanished and that the reforms may only have been necessary because the urban Christians 
had been eliminated: 
the modernization attempts of the Republican period period (sic!) may be 
understood in this context, as bids to substitute a nationalist ideology for the cultural 
germination which had taken place in Anatolian towns prior to the expulsion of the 
Christian bourgeoisie.621 
 
One may wonder whether the ‘modernization’ of Turkey would not have progressed 
much more naturally and speedier had it not been for the elimination of the educated 
Armenians and Greeks. 
Weak Civil Society 
One of the characteristics of both the bourgeoisie and civil society is their 
independence of the state. The minority commercial bourgeoisie had been largely 
independent of the Ottoman state but the ‘national bourgeoisie’, which was a merger of the 
Ottoman bureaucratic bourgeoisie with business (remember all the government and state 
officials who became businessmen mentioned in chapter five), was heavily dependent on it 
and would not have come into being without its patronage. Keyder brings up this point 
twice: 
[D]uring the 1920s, the growing commercial class did not enter any political or 
cultural conflict with state functionaries: it simply expressed its gratitude, and 
hesitantly put forth demands that would bring immediate pecuniary returns. Nor did it 
continue with the cultural traditions of englightenment (sic!) which had begun 
flourishing in the pre-war period. In other words, it exchanged the right to establish 
(even the faint traces of) a civil society for (what seemed to be) the privilege to make 
money.622 
 
Furthermore, the surviving commercial class of pre-CUP vintage was now 
concentrated – to a greater degree than before – in the two cities of Istanbul and 
Izmir, now pale reflections of their former glory. The provincial cities, where 
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economic change and cultural awakening had begun to occur only at the end of the 
nineteenth century, lost most of this momentum and reverted to their sleepy 
incarnations as administrative centres. The impact of the expulsion and annihilation 
of the provincial commercial classes served to destroy all the cultural emoluments 
that the bourgeoisie had come to desire, create and support. The beginnings of a civil 
society were thus suffocated before their fruition, and once again the rule of the state 
threatened to become compact and supreme.623 
 
The question is whether the ‘national’ bourgeoisie’s dependence on the state could be 
a factor contributing to the weakness of civil society.  
Slowdown of Westernization 
Göçek outlines a paradox consisting in the fact that the elimination of Ottoman 
Christians as supposedly Western agents was hoped to end the fear of the West when it 
actually increased it.  
The Ottoman justification for the elimination of the minority bourgeoisie had been 
their imputed connections to the West. The Republican elites sustained the same 
policy, arguing that such elimination would ultimately reduce the hold of the West 
over Turkish state and society. They also assumed that they could miraculously 
acquire the skills and knowledge it had taken the minorities centuries to accumulate. 
They failed on both counts. The end result was richly ironic: the elimination of the 
minorities who had been the Ottoman and later Turkish intermediaries with the West 
escalated the fear and anxiety about the West even more. The West grew more distant 
from (sic!) Turkish state and society and, as a consequence, more than ever the object 
of myth-making. With international connections thus further attenuated the Turkish 
state could disregard the world at large and retire into its domestic cocoon, nursing its 
continuing fear and anxiety.624 
 
It is likewise noteworthy that the elimination of the Christian minorities had opposite 
effects on the project of ‘becoming modern and catching up with Europe’: it advanced 
nation building but it severely decimated one of the groups that were among the most 
European, namely the Christian bourgeoisie.  
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Authoritarianism and Belief in Sudden Transformations 
According to Toprak and Acar, every deacade and every government since the CUP 
has created a bourgeoisie to its own liking by promoting its own rich and suppressing the 
opposition rich.625 One of the problems this created was that it gave the impression that 
“intellectual and economic assets of the country can easily be transferred or redistributed by 
government decisions.”626 This encouraged all later elected governments to make the same 
mistake. According to Toprak and Acar, 
the tendency of each government to create its own rich indicates in fact how 
distorted and deficient was the political power elites’ perception of democracy and 
market economy. [...] distributing public resources among relatives and friends was 
regarded as a gift of democracy. [...] Accordingly, throughout the Republican period, 
governments preferred a comprador-intermediary class, rather than an independent 
capitalist bourgeoisie in its true sense.627 
 
This is an interesting twist on the topos of the comprador bourgeoisie, which is 
always and unjustly associated with Armenians, Greeks and Levantines. Considering all the 
above, it does not seem too much to claim that the modernizing CUP and Kemalists did the 
greatest disservice to the country by eliminating the Armenians and Greeks. Though they 
successfully turkified the population, economy and society, their actions impoverished all 
of them and deprived them of developmental opportunities.  
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Conclusion 
During Republican times, the ‘nationalization’ of the economy continued through 
continuous, low-key discrimination and a few instances of headline-making expropriation 
which went along with emigration. From the state’s point of view, this was necessary 
because the remaining non-Muslim bourgeoisie continued to play a significant role in 
Turkey’s or at least Istanbul’s economy. The economy was not fully turkified until the mid-
20th century, after almost two generations of economic nationalism. The non-Muslim 
bourgeoisie proved surprisingly resilient and resourceful and its skills irreplaceable until at 
least the 1950s. Based on the memoirs of Sabancı, I argued that the cooptation of the 
business know-how of individual non-Muslims is responsible for the huge success of 
Sabancı’s, and possibly other Muslims’, businesses. Whether we regard the nation building 
that took place as more or less of a success, what is obvious is that it came at great cost, not 
only economically but also socially which threw the country and its society back for 
decades, if not longer.  
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8. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
This thesis has aimed to show that Turkish nation building, like other cases of nation 
building, consisted in bringing out the ‘objective’ characteristics of nation, namely a 
common language, religion, economy and historic memory. It also resembled other cases in 
so far as it went along with the large-scale use of violence which was both a result of the 
nationalist ideology and which paved the way for the realization of further nationalist plans. 
That is the destructive side of nation building that nationalist historians prefer to overlook 
but that is often the precondition for ‘constructive’ nation building. Turkish nation building 
began a few decades before the final breakup of the Ottoman Empire. Muslims had been 
identified as the most ‘worthy’ subject population and the most deserving of support for 
some time. What changed under Sultan Abdülhamid II was that he took measures to further 
the Muslim population’s welfare, growth (and control over it). Within a relatively short 
time in the late 19th century, four simultaneous and interdependent developments occurred 
that sped up the process of Turkish nation building and that are crucial for understanding its 
course: i) the shrinking of the Ottoman Empire, ii) the threat of the Great Powers iii) the 
spread of the ideology of nationalism and iv) the presence of Ottoman Christians becoming 
seen as a problem. 
 
i) The Ottoman Empire shrank because in parts of it, subject populations became 
either de facto independent or officially so when they established their own nation states. 
Some of the subject populations in the remaining part of the Empire, especially in Anatolia, 
were eying their own national independence. Nationalism was thus a threat from within to 
the viability of the Empire.  
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ii) To different degrees, all the Great Powers were involved in Ottoman affairs and 
sought to increase their share in political influence and economic profits. The Ottoman 
government feared that they would dismember the Empire if given a chance, and turn its 
parts into mandates or the like.  
iii) The ideology of nationalism and nation building was part of a package of 
European ideologies, methods and ways of life (‘modernity’) that the Armenian and Greek 
Ottoman elites adopted before the Muslim Ottoman elites. Several minorities in Anatolia 
developed (Armenians) or had the potential to develop (Greeks, Kurds) their own national 
ambitions on Ottoman territory. Since their communities were intermixed in the East of 
Anatolia, they made claims to more or less the same land, which meant that in the event of 
one of them establishing a nation state, it would have to deal with those people that were 
not considered to be part of the nation.  
Some Muslim Ottomans, having regarded nationalism as a formidable threat, came to 
see it as an opportunity, if only it were Turkish nationalism: The more homogeneous the 
population, the stronger the state and the more able to withstand external threats. Turkish 
nation building thus started in response to and in order to counter the threat posed by other 
nation building projects at a time when the Ottoman Empire still existed and with the aim 
of saving it.  
The espousal of the national idea involved a redefinition of the people; from a 
heterogeneous subject population that only owes obedience to the autocratic government, it 
transformed into a homogeneous nation that has to conform to the state’s wishes in many 
different ways. The population which the state viewed as having a legitimate claim to being 
in Anatolia was thus narrowed down from Ottomans, i.e. anybody who paid allegiance to 
the Sultan, to Muslim Ottomans to Muslim Turks which first excluded only Christian 
Ottomans and then anybody who was either not Muslim or not Turkish or neither Muslim 
nor Turkish. 
iv) The Ottoman government perceived Ottoman Christians as increasingly 
troublesome and more and more profiting at the expense of the Muslim populations. This 
was a result of great-power meddling into Ottoman affairs under the pretext of protecting 
Ottoman Christians from mistreatment and massacres. It was also a result of the 
capitulations which privileged Christian members of the Ottoman bourgeoisie (through 
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bestowing foreign passports, tax exemption, foreign law). Finally, the trade-based affluence 
of the Ottoman-Christian middle class also played into ill feeling toward them. Privileges 
and income differences endangered Muslim Ottomans’ continued status as ‘ruling millet’, 
led to ill-feeling towards Christians as a whole and, together with growing Armenian and 
Greek  nationalism, produced a sense of anger and victimization among parts of the Muslim 
population.  
 
The ten-year period of war (1912-23) witnessed a hardening of attitudes and a 
radicalization of thought and action. A few victories and many defeats made what was 
before unthinkable now imaginable, possible and even seemingly necessary. The loss of the 
Balkan Wars dealt a heavy blow to the ideal of Ottomanism and to the integrity of the 
Ottoman Empire. In World War I, the victory at Gallipoli was celebrated as a triumph over 
imperial Britain, but the defeat at Sarıkamış against the Russian army put an end to plans of 
expansion into the Caucasus and beyond. This situation was compounded by fears of 
Armenian treason and rebellion in the eastern provinces and problems with refugees, 
disease, desertion and diminishing supplies. With the idea of Ottomanism (the coexistence 
of different populations under the Sultan’s rule) having lost credibility, the national idea 
(“the more homogenous the population, the stronger the country”) gained strength, for it 
seemed to offer a solution to the Empire’s many problems. How it would be realized, 
however, was an open and disputed question.  
In this overall situation, and as a result of ideology, events and their interpretation, 
the CUP’s policy towards the population as a whole, towards minorities and Ottoman 
Christians in particular, worsened. Roughly speaking, the CUP made a distinction between 
Muslims and non-Muslims, with Muslims in principle being regarded as loyal, though more 
reliable when turkified, and Christians, in principle being regarded as disloyal, and Jews, 
though not Muslim, being turkifiable. In accordance with these views, Muslim 
communities were resettled all over Anatolia and dispersed so as to avoid potential 
disloyalty and in time to be turkified. A group’s traditional leadership was settled far from 
the members of the group in order to weaken its community spirit. As this thesis has 
shown, these measures went beyond immediate military needs and were different from 
earlier clearings of border areas or their settlement. The scale (millions of people), method 
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(deportees must not make up more than five or ten percent of the local population) and 
purpose (nation building) of these resettlements were novel. 
Christians were not so much resettled as eliminated through expulsion and killing. 
Depending on many factors (location, time, size, threat, risk of retaliation, etc.), the 
Christian communities (Armenians, Greeks and Assyrians) were dealt with differently: 
Armenians were mainly deported, killed and expelled, Assyrians mainly killed and expelled 
and Greeks mainly expelled.  About 100,000 Armenians emigrated before World War I, 
hundreds of thousands fled during and after the Armenian genocide in 1915, 100,000 were 
killed in massacres, one million were killed during the genocide, and thousands more in the 
early 1920s. As for Ottoman Greeks, at least 100,000 fled the Aegean in 1914, about one 
million fled during and after the Greco-Turkish war, and more than 400,000 Greeks were 
exchanged in 1923, with the number of fatalities being unknown. During World War I, 
about half a million Assyrians were also massacred. The survivors of all three communities 
were forcefully assimilated, institutionally and non-institutionally, though in some localities 
they managed to maintain their former identities.  
 
At the same time that all the above was happening, i.e. starting before World War I, 
the CUP also went about setting up a ‘national’ economy which consisted in restricting the 
business activities of the Christian bourgeoisie (ending their privileges, disadvantaging 
minority businessmen through boycotts, language laws, quotas and in other ways) and in 
setting up a parallel business infrastructure for Muslims only (banks, credit mechanisms, 
associations etc.). In addition to suppressing one side and encouraging the other, the CUP 
also had Armenians and Greeks expropriated either before or after their flight, expulsion, 
deportation or killing. 
Armenian and Greek property, though in theory serving the state, the army, and 
particularly needy segments of the population, was distributed very differently and highly 
unevenly because of conflicting interests. Muslims everywhere in Anatolia and of all social 
classes took part in this plunder or profited from it indirectly. But the primary beneficiaries 
of Armenian property were the CUP members and Young Turk loyalists whose political 
leanings opened them opportunities for doing business or mere enrichment. Those who had 
wrongfully enriched themselves or had received presents had every reason to be loyal to the 
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CUP and, after its dissolution, to the nationalists. For it was they who fought against the 
return of the surviving Armenians to Anatolia and the restitution of their property. The 
important implication this had was that a link and overlap between the state administration 
and politics on the one hand and business on the other was thereby established. The two 
spheres were no longer separate, as they had been in Ottoman times when the state 
bureaucracy had been mainly staffed with Muslims and the commercial bourgeoisie had 
been more and more made up of non-Muslims. This overlap which came about in the 1910s 
may in the long run have had a negative impact on the development of civil society in 
Turkey. Under the CUP, many people also became wealthy through speculation which, far 
from serving the common good, or happening only at the expense of the deported 
Armenians, hit their fellow Muslims hardest, thousands of whom starved in the capital and 
in Izmir during 1915-17. All of the above was possible because it happened during single-
party rule at a time of war and because laws appeared to legalize what was happening.  
 
There was no blueprint for Turkish nation building, neither the Turkification of the 
population nor the Turkification of the economy, there was only a general idea of where it 
should head. There were also disagreements and different visions of the Empire’s, 
Anatolia’s, or the Turks’ future. For four or five years after the end of the Ottoman Empire 
and CUP rule, nobody knew what the future of Anatolia or parts of it would be – a French 
or British mandate, an annex to Greece or an Armenian nation state. The last Ottoman 
government in Istanbul advocated a neo-Ottoman solution or heterogeneous population, 
while the nationalists who gathered around Ankara continued CUP policies. But eventually 
it was the nationalists who ended the Greek, Armenian, French and British occupation of 
parts of Anatolia and who also succeeded at the diplomatic table. Therefore, they got to 
decide what kind of nation would be built and how. 
 
By the end of 1923, two million formerly Ottoman Greeks as well as two million 
Armenians were no longer in Anatolia. Their elimination had a huge effect on the two main 
goals of Turkish nation building – eliminating non-Turks from the population and placing 
the Turkish economy exclusively in Turkish Muslim hands – because these two groups had 
played an important role in both. Though they constituted less than one fifth of the 
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population, Armenians and Greeks made up the bulk of the non-Muslim population and 
they dominated the economy. With them, the great majority of Christian intellectuals and 
reformers, a big part of Ottoman artisans and the vast majority of the minority bourgeoisie 
had disappeared, which hit the economy badly. As I have shown, almost all the Armenians’ 
and Greeks’ substantial property (land, buildings, cash, financial property, businesses, 
factories, private property) had been taken or destroyed. At least one fifth of national 
property had changed hands which opened new opportunities for Muslims to rise in status 
and wealth, new loyalties (to the nationalists) and new enemies (those demanding 
restitution and the remaining minorities). 
 
The Turkish Republic continued many of the CUP’s policies even in name, by 
discriminating against Christians and Jews politically, economically and socially. This was 
the case because many of the people in power had a personal interest in continuing the 
earlier policies and because a modified Young Turk ideology was constantly reproduced 
and disseminated in the population at large. Early Republican times were therefore very 
much a period during which the anti-Christian frenzy cooled down, rather than a break with 
it. On a smaller scale, the expulsion, killing and expropriation of Armenians continued 
during the first ten years. As their persecution ended, and since the demographic make-up 
was determined and the borders established, the Turkish state got the chance to formulate 
and execute long-term nation building policies. Besides a change in emphasis, there was 
also a change in primary targets, as it was no longer Armenians, Greeks and Assyrians, but 
Kurds and later Jews who became the main victim groups.   
The Turkish state sought to further homogenize the nation through the assimilation of 
prospective Turks, the expulsion and keeping out of non-Turks, and the settlement of 
populations deemed Turkish and willing to immigrate to Turkey. The ‘Reform Council of 
the East’ in 1925 and the laws of settlement in 1926 and 1934 all provided the basis for the 
forced resettlement, dispersion, punishment and assimilation of these groups. The 
discrimination against members of the Christian and Jewish communities (e.g. when they 
were made to work in labor battalions during World War II and when they were made to 
move from villages to cities and from there to Istanbul in the 1950s and 60s) were all 
geared towards confirming their secondary status and making them leave the country for 
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good. The denaturalization of thousands of Turkish Jews in the 1940s which led to their 
murder by the Nazis, the pogroms and war against part of its own population (Thrakia 
pogroms against Jews 1934, the suppression of Şeyh Sait rebellion in 1925, and the Dersim 
revolt in 1936-38) were meant to crush minority opposition to centralization and 
Turkification and to remove more non-Muslims from the economy. Language policies 
(‘Citizen Speak Turkish’ campaign 1928-1940s, law of family names 1934, phases of 
eventually comprehensive toponymic renaming), heritage policies (the destruction, neglect 
and reinterpretation of Jewish or Christian monuments) and educational policies (Law on 
the Unification of Education 1924), among others, contributed likewise to Turkish nation 
building by gradually eliminating linguistic diversity and other immaterial and material 
evidence of non-Turkish life in Turkey. This affected Armenians and Greeks in that they, 
impoverished and diminished in numbers, gradually concentrated in Istanbul. As survivors 
of their own peoples’ catastrophes and witnesses to other peoples’ oppression, they kept a 
low profile or emigrated, which was precisely the Kemalists’ goal. 
The much-reduced minority bourgeoisie nevertheless continued to play an important 
role in the economy, especially in Istanbul, until 1955. Up to that time there were actually 
two bourgeoisies, the minority one which was still weak and the ‘national’ one which was 
not yet strong. But the state’s discriminatory application of the wealth tax in 1942-43 
destroyed the financial basis of over 100,000 members of the minorities as well as their 
businesses, which was the state’s aim. It totally deprived them of the means of existence 
and terrorized them so that thousands emigrated at the earliest opportunity or lay very low.  
With the change in government (DP), new economic policies and American aid in the 
1950s, a new Muslim or ‘national’ bourgeoisie came to the fore which consisted of 
landowning families, provincial merchants and technical experts. But there was still a 
concentration of non-Muslims in Istanbul. In the context of the Cyprus crisis, the Turkish 
deep state and the government organized a pogrom directed primarily against Turkish 
Greeks. This act destroyed the livelihood of thousands, forced them to emigrate, and totally 
destroyed the minority bourgeoisie. Based on the memoirs of Sakıp Sabancı, I argue that, 
deprived of the means of a competitive existence, the remaining minority businessmen and 
specialists were co-opted into working for Muslim companies. They played an essential 
role in Muslim companies’ later commercial success because their special skills had still 
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not found a replacement five decades after the first attempt at eliminating the minority 
bourgeoisie. The expulsion of 11,000 Greek citizens and residents of Istanbul in 1964 and 
the emigration of 30,000 Turkish Greeks was the last act in the forced emigration of non-
Muslims from Turkey. Like those who were expelled earlier, they had to leave virtually all 
their property behind. 
Becoming national was thought to be part of becoming modern and whatever 
becoming national entailed was therefore thought to advance modernization. This thesis has 
suggested that far from aiding the country, the CUP, which was in power during the most 
momentous phase of Turkish nation building, and its policies regarding Armenians and 
Greeks threw the country back in its development for decades. The CUP’s policies should 
be regarded as one of the factors contributing to the impoverishment of the population, the 
economic inability of the early ‘national’ bourgeoisie, excessive state intervention, the 
delay of industrialization, the weakness of labor rights, the vacuum in education and 
academia, a discontinuous Western orientation and the feeble and much-delayed 
development of civil society in Turkey. 
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